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David Goldberg also stresses that it is peaceful
protest which
is an integral part of democracy,
and that the Bill deals only with "forcible" entry
and occupation. He goes on to imply that the
occupation of Hume Street and Pembroke Road
(since they made the Bill "necessary") were not
peaceful. The record suggests that it was the
evictions, in the small hours and with overwhelm
ing physical force, which were forcible, and the
occupation which was peaceful.
Trespass on
private
property does
not
constitute violent
protest, and it is a sign either of bias or of con
fusion of thought to imply that it does.
Rights of conflict
Constitutional law and law generally has to deal
with reconciliation of rights which may or do con
flict. Modern politics have to deal with protests
against injustice (the Government can hardly say
that people have no right to homes if they can
be provided for them) which increase in force as
the strength of inertia and vested interests become
apparent. The new Bill does not reconcile rights,
but protects some and ignores others. It would
restrict the right of effective protest against in
justices and destruction which milder protests have
proved ineffective to prevent. It is an undesirable
extension of the philosophy of repressive "law and
order" rather than social justice, and is unpleas
antly reminiscent of the Criminal Justice Bill. It
is unnecessary, because the existing law already
provides adequate remedies. The Labour Party
presumably will oppose the Bill. It will be a test
of the social conscience and liberalism of Fine
Gael to see whether they do. It would be a sign
of the social conscience and liberalism of Fianna
Fail if they withdrew it.
(The Irish Times,
July 1970)
THE PURPOSE OF LAW REPORTS
IS LEGALLY CHARITABLE
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting
for England and Wales v. Attorney General
The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting
for England and Wales, which publishes the
Law
Reports
and
the
Weekly Law Reports,
was
granted a declaration that
it was entitled
to
registration as a charity under section 4 of the
Charities
Act,
1960.
It was
held
in
a
reserved
judgment,
that the council's objects
were charitable as being purposes beneficial to
the community in enabling judge-made law to
be properly developed and administered by the
courts.
The council had appealed, under section 5 (3)
of the Charities Act, against the refusal of the
Charity Commissioners for England and Wales
to register it. There were two defendants to the
summons—The Attorney
General
and
the
Commissioners for Inland Revenue.
Mr. Justice Foster said that the question was
"Is the council established for purposes which
are exclusively charitable according to the law
of England and Wales?" For the council it was
submitted that the purposes for which it was
established were either "for the advancement of
education," the second of the four classifications
of charity given by Lord Macnaghten in
Income
Tux Special Commissioners v. Pemsel
([1891]
A.C. 531, 538) or, alternatively, "for other pur
poses beneficial
to
the community not falling
under
any
of
the
preceding heads"
(Lord
Macnaghlen's fourth classification). Because
it
was for the advancement of the administration of
the law and also because it came within the spirit
and intendment of the preamble of the Statute
of Elizabeth (1601).
The Attorney General did not support the
council's submission that it was for the advance
ment of education, but did support the contention
that it fell within the fourth classification.
For the commissioners it was submitted (1) that
the court could not look outside the memorandum
of association to discover the council's purposes
and that the motives or aims of the council's
founders were irrelevant:
(2) that the purpose
was to benefit members of the legal profession in
the practice of that profession:
(3)
that the
council was not established for education pur
poses; and (4) that the council's purposes did not
fall within the classification of "other purposes
beneficial to the community since it was not
analogous to any decided case and was not with
in the spirit and intendment of the preamble.
The council, a company limited by guarantee
214