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Bill is not being introduced because of the failure
of the existing law to provide adequate remedies
to property owners for forcible entry and forcible
occupation. These are already unlawful. The Bill
is being introduced because the present machinery
of the law, the court procedure, does not allow
squatters to be removed by civil — i.e., private —
proceedings speedily enough for those concerned.
The criminal law is being invoked against the
homeless to remedy the inefficiency of civil pro
ceedings.
Since property
developers
and
speculators
operate normally on borrowed money on which
they are now paying high interest rates, the delays
of civil court proceedings are expensive for them.
It is primarily buildings which are to be redevelop
ed which are likely to be occupied by protesters
and squatters (occupation of aircraft and "fish-
ins" raise rather different issues).
The Bill is,
there,
largely
in
the
interests of property de
velopers and speculators, not in the interests of the
ordinary householder.
A well-known example of the use of the crim
inal law to supplement the inadequacies, from the
viewpoint of the property owner, of the civil law
is the legislation against poaching. This makes
trespass in pursuit of game a criminal offence.
This was appropriate because, wild game not being
legally owned by a landowner, a trespasser was
not depriving the landowner of his property by
poaching. Yet the Gardai have apparently been
directed not to prosecute for poaching. The new
Bill will, therefore, deal more severely with the
homeless and with those protesting on their behalf
and with students who protest against the de-
sruction of our architectural heritage, than the
law now deals with those who poach, often on a
commercial basis.
Free
speech
Homeless
squatters
and protesters
are,
of
course,, different from poachers in that they are
making a protest against the failure of the author
ities and of house builders to provide homes in
adequate numbers at reasonable prices. Neither
David Goldberg nor Mairin de Burca in her bitter
letter (July 18th) refer to the new Bill as a restric
tion on the constitutionally-guaranteed right of
free speech, which involves the right to protest
against injustice.
While the new Bill is probably constitutionally
valid, and little is gained by quoting apparently-
conflicting constitutional provisions, it is much less
attractive if it is viewed as a method of muzzling
social and conservationist protest against injustice
and destruction, disguised as protection of the
right of private property.
In a democracy the right of free speech and
freedom to protest are far more fundamental to the
liberty of everyone than the protection of the
rights of owners of unoccupied property. Con
stitutional rights are personal rights, and freedom
of speech and the right to a home are surely more
personal and more important than rights to de
velop property. Mr. Goldberg is wrong in referring
to dissent; what is involved is protest against in
justice. His tone implies, I hope wrongly, that he
regrets the protest more than he regrets the in
justices, that he believes private property is an
inherent part of democracy and that he believes
private property rights should override the other
rights involved.
The Bill seeks to prevent a form of protest which
has shown itself to be effective in the sense that
it has gained time and publicity for the protesters'
cause, and which has drawn attention to the failure
of the authorities in certain respects. It cannot be
said too strongly or too often that these are legit
imate aims of any protests in a democracy.
Right to profit
The question of poaching is analogous in an
other respect. The squatting which has occurred
does not seem to have caused any serious damage
to the property occupied.
In the case of Hume
Street, repairs were carried out. Where vacant
buildings are occupied without damage, the civil
law, with considerable common sense, gives no
right to compensation, since there has been no
loss. The property right defended by the Bill is,
therefore, the right to develop one's property and
to make a profit, not to protect oneself from loss.
But the right to develop property is restricted by
law in many ways, e.g. by planning regulations
and the rights of others to easements of light and
air, while the right not to have one's property
damaged is much less qualified.
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