Previous Page  704 / 736 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 704 / 736 Next Page
Page Background

nised rules. An extreme case was

R, v Soblen —

(1963) 2 Q.B. 243 — where the defendant fled

to Israel after having been convicted of spying

in the United States. The Israeli authorities re

fused to accept him, and put him on a plane in

order to return him to America. Before reaching

London, he inflicted wounds on himself, and had

to be treated in hospital, there the Israel airline

subsequently refused to book him as a passenger

for America. The Home Secretary, nevertheless,

made a deportation order and this was held valid.

He was subsequently sent to America but died on

the way.

(3)

Freedom of Citizens to return to their own

country.

International Conventions proclaim that "no one

shall be denied entry

to a State of which

he is a national". Nevertheless, the British Immi

gration Act, 1968 denied access

to Britain to

Kenyan Asians, who were British subjects; the

position was improved under the appeals pro

cedure in the 1969 Act, but appears to be again

restrictive in

the 1971 Bill.

(4)

Freedom for citizens to remain within their

own country.

Section 14 of the Irish Extradition Act, 1965

forbids the extradition of Irish citizens unless the

relevant provisions apply. Part III of the Act

provides for the endorsement and execution of

warrants between Ireland and Britain, and has

given rise to difficulties; however, the Supreme

Court in "The State (Quinn) v Ryan" — (1965)

I.R. 106 — has put an end to the former practice

whereby the police suddenly removed an accused

from the jurisdiction of the Irish Court before

giving him an opportunity to test whether the

extradition order was valid, which was character

ised as a plan to defeat the rule of law.

Under Part II of the 1965 Act, there is, how

ever, no

requirement that, before a person is

surrendered, there must be prima facie evidence

of guilt, and it would seem that, unless the accused

objects to taking Court proceedings, he can be

removed without reasonable grounds. It would

seem that in 1963, a Mrs. Cronin was brought

back to Ireland on an unjustified warrant, mean­

while she had lost her job in England. She awaited

trial for 18 months and was then acquitted. The

State may say to a person: "We will not proceed

against you if you leave." The accused is then

presented with a choice — if he refuses to go, the

sentence will probably be more severe — but if

he goes, he is deprived of his right of appeal

against conviction.

(5)

Freedom to enter a State other than one's

own.

The control over entry into Britain of aliens is

largely administrative, and this gives adminis

trators a wide discretion. It will be recalled that

aliens who wished to study scientology were not

permitted to land in Britain. This is a dangerous

and undesirable departure, which has for instance

been exercised by not permitting North Viet

namese

to enter Britain

to give lectures. The

recent case, where Rudi Duschke was refused

to be allowed to stay in Britain on the grounds

of security, has been condemned by the Cam

bridge dons, as this was merely an alleged threat

to national security in the future. Britain and

Ireland signed the European Social Charter, but

were found to have violated Article 18 by an

International Commission. If Ireland enters the

European Community, she will have to observe

the rules much more strictly.

The problem of political asylum presents itself

under two facets and this arises from the problem

of "The

Freedom

of a Citizen

to remain in an

alien State."

This freedom is qualified in Britain,

and is always subject either to formal deportation

proceedings, or to extradition proceedings at the

request of the State whose national is involved.

Although extradition is not granted for political,

military or revenue offences, nevertheless,

the

concept is a difficult one. In

Duggan v Tapley —

(1952) I.R. — the Supreme Court held that the

rules of extradition must have a definite context.

There appears to be no definite principle other

than sentiment for granting asylum to a political

offender. In

R. v Schtraks —

(1964) A.C. 556,

the facts were complicated, but briefly the accused

was arrested in order to be deported to Israel for

perjury and child stealing.

He contended un

successfully that the offences were of a political

character, but the House of Lords held: —

242