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CASES
OF THE MONTH
Immunity of Advocates
The House of Lords unanimously held that
barristers who have for centuries been im
mune from actions for negligence brought
by clients in respect of their conduct of
litigation should, for reasons of public policy,
continue to be immune so far as concerns
their professional work in conducting litiga
tion; but, with the exception of Lord Pearce,
their Lordships were of opinion that the
immunity should not extend to a barrister's
non-litigious advisory work. The majority
also thought that the immunity attaching to
the barrister as advocate should be extended
to solicitors performing the functions of an
advocate in Court.
Their Lordships
dismissed
the
inter
locutory appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeal dismissing Mr. Rondel's proposed
action for "damages for professional neglig
ence" against the defendant, Mr. Michael
Worsley, barrister, in relation to his conduct
of Mr. Rondel's defence on a "dock brief" at
the Central Criminal Court.
There had been a powerful argument for
the appellant; if it was unnecessary to pro
tect solicitors by giving them immunity from
action by their clients, it could not be neces
sary to protect barristers in that way? Their
Lordships would turn the argument the other
way, according to Lord Justice Salmon. If it
was in the public interest to protect counsel,
what good reason was there for withholding
similar protection from solicitors? The matter
had never been fully considered; and hither
to, in England at least, cases conducted by
solicitors had generally been of comparatively
minor importance. There were differences
between the position of barristers and solic
itors.
But the case for the immunity of counsel
appeared to be so strong that Lord Morris,
concurring that the public interest required
that an advocate should have immunity in
the conduct or management of a case in court,
said that in that, as in the other aspects of
the present case, he found himself in general
accord with the judgment of Lord Justice
Salmon in the Court of Appeal.
(Rondel v. Worsley—The Times, Novem
ber 23, 1967).
Solicitor alleges slander by Judge
At the conclusion of proceedings at Leeds
Assizes on 5th April, 1965, when one 0
was prosecuted for embracery and the charge
was dismissed, Hinchcliffe, J., was asked by
counsel for the prosecution to make an order
for costs for the prosecution. He refused the
order and said:
'The application is refused
and I direct that the papers be sent to the
Director of Public Prosecutions so that con
sideration may be given to a prosecution of
Neville Glick (the plantiff, then a solicitor)
for malicious prosecution and contempt of
Court, and I also direct that the papers be
sent to the Law Society so that they may
consider whether or not to strike his name
off the rolls.' The plaintiff, who was later
struck off, began an action against the judge
for alleged slander. Time for service of the
defence was due to expire on 16th October,
1967, and arrangements were being made on
behalf of the judge to apply to strike out the
statement of claim and dismiss the action;
but before the summons was heard, the
plaintiff had signed judgment in default of
defence. On a summons to set aside the
judgment signed and the statement of claim
as vexatious, Master Diamond set it aside,
and Mocatta, J., on appeal affirmed the order.
The plaintiff appealed.
Lord Denning, M.R., said that the judge's
words were clearly the subject of absolute
privilege, being spoken in the course of his
judicial function. Although they were spoken
at the end of the proceedings, they were part
of the proceedings, and therefore the action
would not lie. Leave to appeal should be re
fused.
Diplock and Salmon,
L.JJ., agreed. Appeal
dismissed.
(Glick v. Hinchcliffe — C.A. 20/11/67 —
Solicitors' Journal (Vol. Ill), p. 927).
Stay of Execution of Possession Orders
Where a mortgagor was in default of re
payments under a legal mortgage and the
legal mortgagee, under the provisions of the
mortgage obtained an order for possession
of the property the subject of the legal charge
the Court has no jurisdiction to grant a stay
of execution of the possession order on an
application under Order 45, rule 11, of the
Rules of the Supreme Court unless some
thing has occurred which, had it occurred
before the making of the order, would have
prevented its making.
This was the reserve judgment of Mr.
Justice Plowman when he dismissed a sum-