Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  372 / 532 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 372 / 532 Next Page
Page Background

356

CAROLLANN BRAUM

CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ

into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active

participants in the peace process.

67

It is important to note that demobilizations normally occur in post-conflict

situations. However, the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, particularly with the heightened

tension between Russia and the West, so highly reflective of the Cold War era, make

disarmament and demobilization and higher priority, particularly in order for any

real politically stabilizing outcomes to be effective. This makes the situation in

Ukraine very unique and challenging with respect to successful measures of non-

repetition of violence. Therefore, the fact that violence in Ukraine must cease in

order for there to be effective elections or political decisions, remains at the forefront

of any discussions surrounding the effectiveness of Ukraine’s demobilization and

efforts to prevent future violence.

A. United Nations Updated Set of Principles on Impunity

The essence of measures of non-repetition of violence and human rights violations

can be seen in the “General Principles of Guarantees of Non-Recurrence of Violations,”

of the United Nations Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of

Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity Principle 35, which declares that

“States shall ensure that victims do not again have to endure violations of their rights…

States must undertake…measures necessary to ensure respect for the rule of law, foster

and sustain a culture of respect for human rights, and restore or establish public trust in

government institutions.”

68

Although these Principles are not binding, they set a good

framework for analyzing measures of non-repetition by a government.

More specific to the situation in Ukraine, is Principle 37, “Disbandment of Parastatal

Armed Forces/Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Children,” which states that

“[p]arastatal or unofficial armed groups shall be demobilized and disbanded. Their

position in or links with State institutions … should be thoroughly investigated

and the information thus acquired made public. States should … ensure the social

reintegration of the members of such groups.”

69

With respect to this Principle,

Ukraine will have to investigate the link between the State, as well as outside Sates

such as the United States or Russia, and the armed groups through investigations,

prosecutions, or another reconciliation processes.

70

Ukraine will need to provide

some level of social reintegration for the demobilized, but thismay prove very difficult

concerning the stark contrast in political desires and opinions of the armed groups,

as well as the involvement of private military contractors. Certainly, mercenaries

or private military contractors will simply go home after a conflict is resolved, but

this can leave communities and the State dealing with destruction of infrastructure,

67

Id., emphasis added

.

68

Rep. of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, 61st Sess., U.N.

Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).

69

Ibid.

at Principal 37.

70

Id.