357
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, PARAMILITARIES AND MERCENARIES …
human rights violations, and a shattered society with no availability of reparations
for victims or accountability. Alternatively, it may place a disproportionate amount
of accountability on the shoulders of locally-based armed groups who will bear the
blame for violence that may have been committed by private military contractors.
When the community is set to rebuild, this may be a challenge for reintegrating
armed groups into society.
Due to the great possibility of abuse and the unsteady footing for accountability,
there are certainly many arguments that private military contractors can create a
confusing situation for the communities involved and any attempts at rebuilding
towards peace. Notably, the International Committee for the Red Cross asserts that “[t]
he presence of private contractors carrying out military tasks among the population
… contributes to blurring the essential line between civilians and combatants.”
71
Furthermore, the more players there are involved in a conflict, the more confusing the
process of demobilization and reintegration can be. If fighters range from home-grown
civilians fighting for their freedom to private military contractors or paramilitaries
from another State, then it can be difficult to ascertain how to demobilize and who
to reintegrate into the community. Furthermore, it breeds distrust in the community
of who to trust and what the motives of the conflict were for each party. Certainly,
the tensions in Ukraine are great, with violence throughout communities and people
holding starkly contrasting views on the situation, as such “faultlines have been
drawn and the tension is not far below the surface.”
72
If society is unsure of who had which motives, then achieving peace and
reconciliation can be very difficult as there may not be a sense of a “winning side”
or particular goals achieved. Furthermore, inherent trust among the fighters and
civilians may linger. As mentioned earlier, the potential of Chechen soldiers can
be an example of the confusion, in large part because “it may be hard for observers
to distinguish Chechen forces in the eastern regions of Ukraine from the Crimean
Tatars, since both groups are Muslim,” and maintain similar features.
73
Particularly if there were atrocities or human rights violations committed by the
Chechen soldiers, then there could “be more support for tough measures against the
Tatars because they [would be seen as] dangerous Muslims, like the Chechens.”
74
Furthermore, if Russian paramilitaries are on the ground, many may believe that
Russia and its armed forces are present. Certainly, in this situation, it will be difficult
to reintegrate fighters into society because society itself may not know which side the
fighters were even on and what they were fighting for, making reconciliation very
challenging.
Regardless of how combatants are labeled (armed groups, paramilitaries, private
military contractors, or organized crime), the Ukrainian government, current and
71
Beerli, “A humanitarian perspective,”
supra
note 27.
72
Walker,
supra
note 1.
73
O’Neil,
supra
note 54.
74
Ibid.