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357

PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, PARAMILITARIES AND MERCENARIES …

human rights violations, and a shattered society with no availability of reparations

for victims or accountability. Alternatively, it may place a disproportionate amount

of accountability on the shoulders of locally-based armed groups who will bear the

blame for violence that may have been committed by private military contractors.

When the community is set to rebuild, this may be a challenge for reintegrating

armed groups into society.

Due to the great possibility of abuse and the unsteady footing for accountability,

there are certainly many arguments that private military contractors can create a

confusing situation for the communities involved and any attempts at rebuilding

towards peace. Notably, the International Committee for the Red Cross asserts that “[t]

he presence of private contractors carrying out military tasks among the population

… contributes to blurring the essential line between civilians and combatants.”

71

Furthermore, the more players there are involved in a conflict, the more confusing the

process of demobilization and reintegration can be. If fighters range from home-grown

civilians fighting for their freedom to private military contractors or paramilitaries

from another State, then it can be difficult to ascertain how to demobilize and who

to reintegrate into the community. Furthermore, it breeds distrust in the community

of who to trust and what the motives of the conflict were for each party. Certainly,

the tensions in Ukraine are great, with violence throughout communities and people

holding starkly contrasting views on the situation, as such “faultlines have been

drawn and the tension is not far below the surface.”

72

If society is unsure of who had which motives, then achieving peace and

reconciliation can be very difficult as there may not be a sense of a “winning side”

or particular goals achieved. Furthermore, inherent trust among the fighters and

civilians may linger. As mentioned earlier, the potential of Chechen soldiers can

be an example of the confusion, in large part because “it may be hard for observers

to distinguish Chechen forces in the eastern regions of Ukraine from the Crimean

Tatars, since both groups are Muslim,” and maintain similar features.

73

Particularly if there were atrocities or human rights violations committed by the

Chechen soldiers, then there could “be more support for tough measures against the

Tatars because they [would be seen as] dangerous Muslims, like the Chechens.”

74

Furthermore, if Russian paramilitaries are on the ground, many may believe that

Russia and its armed forces are present. Certainly, in this situation, it will be difficult

to reintegrate fighters into society because society itself may not know which side the

fighters were even on and what they were fighting for, making reconciliation very

challenging.

Regardless of how combatants are labeled (armed groups, paramilitaries, private

military contractors, or organized crime), the Ukrainian government, current and

71

Beerli, “A humanitarian perspective,”

supra

note 27.

72

Walker,

supra

note 1.

73

O’Neil,

supra

note 54.

74

Ibid.