165 / 328
record and was in all respects and for all relevant
purposes the equivalent of a note made by him in
his own notebook, sufficiently shortly after the
occurence of the conversations. He would have been
entitled to refer to such a note had he made it.
(ii) It was not the effect of the Judge's Rules to put a
man who had been cautioned into a state of asylum
free from any eavesdropping or potential use of
anything he might say and the tendering of evidence
of the conversations was not in breach of these rules.
The appellants had been cautioned and one of them
had actually said " I will keep what I have to say
until I get to court " and counsel had submitted that
a man who had been so cautioned was thereafter in
a state of asylum and the cell into which he was put
was his own " castle " and he should be entitled to
feel himself free from any eavesdropping or potential
use against him of anything that he might say during
his incarceration in the cell. Winn J. delivering the
judgment of the court said " The court cannot
accept that exposition of the effect of the judges rules,
nor does it feel that there is any substance at all in the
complaint made by counsel for the appellant Rose
that this was sharp practice on the part of the police."
The learned judge went on to say that the court would
not approve of the practice of setting up microphones
in a cell for the purpose of recording what might be
said therein but the appellants had brought on them
selves what they suffered by being so fatuous as to
shout incriminating observations across a corridor
to one another. The usual caution given is a warning
against this type of folly.
The appeals against convictions were dismissed
(R.
v.
Mills and R.
v.
Rose (1962) 3 All England
Reports, page 298).
Restrictive Trade Practices Tribunal: Intimidation of
Witness after Proceedings had
terminated:
whether
Contempt of Court.
G. an official of a trade union gave evidence at the
hearing before the Registrar of Restrictive Trading
Agreements of proceedings relating to an agreement
between his union and an association of suppliers.
The court held that the restrictions in the agreement
were contrary to public policy and, therefore, void
and persons party to the agreement were prevented
by injunction from giving effect to it. The members
of the committee of the same branch of the union as
G caused him to appear at a special meeting to
answer for his conduct and later also at a general
meeting. At two further branch committee meetings
at which G was not present, resolutions were passed
purporting to deprive him of his honorary offices of
branch delegate and treasurer. The Attorney General
brought a motion for writs of attachment or for
orders of committal against the members of the
committee of the trade union for alleged contempt
of court in causing G to appear before a special
committee and in purporting to remove him from his
honorary positions. The Restrictive Practices Court
refused the motion and on appeal to the Court of
Appeal it was held that those respondents whose
motive, whether predominant or not, was to punish
G for having given evidence, had committed con
tempt of court since they had victimised him, it being
immaterial if one of the purposes actuating a respon
dent was the purpose of punishment, that he had also
other motives. The Restrictive Practises Court in
refusing the motion had held that the general tenor of
authority had indicated that the relevant conduct in
victimising or intimidating the witness must take
place while the proceedings were pending in order to
constitute contempt of court. Lord Denning M.R.
in his judgment said that he could not agree with this
and said that in his view there could be no greater
contempt than to intimidate a witness before he
gives his evidence or to victimise him afterwards.
His Lordship said " How can we expect a witness to
give his evidence freely and frankly, as he ought to
do, if he is liable, as soon as the case is over to be
punished for it by those who dislike the evidence he
has given ? " His Lordship continued " If this sort
of thing could be done in a single case with impunity
the news of it would soon get round. Witnesses in
other cases would be unwilling to come forward to
give evidence, or, if they did come forward, they
would hesitate to speak the truth, for fear of the
consequences."
The appeal was allowed as against six of the ten
respondents and they were ordered to pay the cost
of the Attorney General. Leave to appeal to the
House of Lords was granted. (Attorney General
v.
Butterworth and others (1962),
3
All England
Reports page 326).
Sale of Land for Fictitious consideration to avoid certain
Regulations: Suit to recover land not maintainable.
The respondent, who owned 139 acres of land
cultivated with rubber in Malaya, in order to avoid
the Rubber Regulations of 1934, under which the
permissible production of holdings of rubber land of
more than 100 acres was assessed by an assessment
committee whereas that of less than 100 acres was
assessed by the local district officer,
transferred
40 acres of the land to his son, the- appellant, for a
purported consideration which was not in fact paid.
The transfer was duly registered and a certificate of
title issued to the son. Thereafter the father, having
agreed to sell the 40 acres to a third party, asked his
son to execute a power of attorney so as to enable
him to transfer the land to the prospective purchaser.
The son having refused to do so, the father brought
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