166 / 244
held that the bill was defective under the Rules
of the Supreme Court (England) Order 65, Rule 27,
but the Court had discretion to permit its withdrawal
and re-delivery and it was proper to exercise it
in this case in favour of L.
Re.
A solicitor (1943,
I, All England Reports 157).
Re.
A Solicitor (1936,
I, All England Reports, 491).
Per Harman J.
“ I agree that a solicitor must show a strong case
to justify the amendment or withdrawal of a bill
o f costs and that the applicant ought to have been
alive to the rule as to showing unpaid disbursements
separately. I agree also that it would need a very
strong case to allow a solicitor to alter his bill
so as to increase his charges. The mistake here
was, however, merely one of form. No attempt
to deceive the clients was made nor is any increased
charge sought to be introduced. The clients have
largely benefited by the efforts o f their solicitor
and Counsel, and it would in my opinion, be a
disproportionate punishment of a mere slip if
they were to saddle the solicitor personally with
these not inconsiderable fees which he has paid.
For all these reasons, I propose to exercise my
discretion and to allow the bill to be withdrawn
and re-delivered.
I shall direct the bill, when
re-delivered, to be taxed. Tbe terms, therefore,
are : tax the clients’ costs of this application and
of the application for taxation as between solicitor
and client, and order the solicitor to pay them.
Subject to their payment within fourteen days of
taxation, the solicitor may withdraw his bill and
deliver a fresh bill not distinguished from it in
any particular save that proper entries may be made
in respect o f disbursements and that bill, if and
when delivered, should be taxed.”
(re.
a Solicitor
(1931) I, All E. R. 392).
Undercutting. Attracting business unfairly
The Court dismissed an appeal by Mr. Wilfrid
Ariel Evill, a solicitor, from findings and an Order,
made on December 1st, 1950, by the Disciplinary
Committee of the English Law Society, constituted
under the Solicitors’ Acts, whereby it was ordered
that Mr. Evill should pay a penalty of £100, for
failing to comply with Rules 1 and 2 o f the Solicitors’
Practice Rules, 1936.
It was stated that Mr. Evill had no desire for
the anonymity to which he was entitled as an
appellant to that Court.
By Rule I of the Rules o f 1936, “ a solicitor
shall not . . . permit in the carrying on of his
practice any act . . . which can reasonably be
regarded as calculated to attract business unfairly.
By Rule 2 “ a solicitor shall not . . . allow himself
to be held out . . . as being prepared to do
professional
business . . . in
non-cpntentious
matters . . . at less than two-thirds of the scale
o f charges fixed by the regulations contained in
the General Order o f 1882, made under the Solicitors’
Remuneration Act, 1881.”
Mr. Gilbert Pauli, K .C ., and Mr. Colin Duncan
appeared for Mr. E v ill; Mr. C. R. Havers, K.C.,
and J. R. Cumming-Bruce for the Committee.
The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said
that the Amalgamated Engineering Union, like
some other trade unions, acted like a building
society and helped their members to buy houses.
Mr. Evill had an arrangement with the union
whereby he was to act for them in their capacity
as mortgagees and at the same time would charge
the prospective purchaser of a house, who would
be a member o f the union, far less than would
ordinarily be payable. under the established scale
o f charges.
The arrangement had been made many years
previously, and it was clear that a considerable
amount o f the business brought to Mr. Evill by
the union had been done by him on those terms.
He charged the proper fee to the union as mortgagees
and then, instead of charging the scale fee to pros
pective purchasers, he had been charging what
was not much more than a nominal fee.
The point was simply this : Mr. Evill had been
acting in a way which, if he was free so to act,
was beneficial so far as the particular member of
the trade union was concerned.
But the rules
were designed not only to protect the clients of
solicitors but also to preserve proper standards
among solicitors themselves.
The case o f a solicitor acting for both parties,
a mortgagee and a purchaser, was provided for
by the rules ; he received scale aijd a half—not
double. Mr. Evill, however, and he (His Lordship)
was not suggesting that he had no reason for
his attitude, made it clear to the prospective pur
chaser that he would be charging the union the
proper fee for the mortgage and for investigating
the title for them; that he would, therefore, not
have to investigate the title all over again for the
purchaser; and that he would, accordingly, not
make the charge for investigating title to the latter
because he had not done that work for him.
That, however, was not what the relevant rule
said : I f Mr. Evill investigated a title, he did so
for the purchaser as well as for the mortgagees,
even if he did not go through the farce of doing
it all over again a Second time. A solicitor acting
for both parties owed a duty to both. By Rule 6,
o f the General Order of 1882, he ought to charge
scale and a half in such a case, and if he said that
he would not charge that but only something very
much less then- he was, to put it shortly, under