89 / 244
it, except a clause that the purchaser should pay the
vendors’ costs. On October 7th the trustees’ solicitor
wrote to the beneficiaries informing them o f the
proposed sale to Mrs. Simpson. On October 19th
one of the beneficiaries called on the trustees’
solicitor and informed him that he was interested,
in purchasing the property on behalf o f a charity.
On October 20th, Mrs. Simpson’ s solicitors agreed
to pay the vendors’ costs, making a total o f £6,142
and the vendors’ solicitors thereupon wrote to the
plaintiff informing him of the trustees’ final decision
to sell the property to Mrs. Simpson. At the
last moment, when all the negotiations had been
completed, but before the contract had been signed,
the plaintiff came in with an offer o f £6,500. The
trustees’ solicitors refused to accept the offer on the
ground that having regard to the position o f the
negotiations with Mrs. Simpson, they felt it would
not be proper to cancel the negotiations. On hearing
of the plaintiff’s application, Wynn-Parry, J. decided
that it is the duty of trustees selling property to
obtain the best price possible in the interest o f the
beneficiaries. It was true that persons who are not in
the position of trustees are entitled, if they so desire,
to accept a lesser price than that which they might
obtain on the sale o f property, and not infrequently
a vendor .who had gone some lengths in negotiating
with a prospective purchaser, decided to close
the deal with purchaser notwithstanding that he
was presented with a higher offer, which redounded
to his credit. Trustees, however, were not vested
with such complete freedom. They had an over
riding duty to obtain the best price they could for
their beneficiaries. In the case before him, his view
was that the trustees and their solicitors acted on an
incorrect principle in not fully probing the genuine
ness of the plaintiff’s offer o f £6,500 before deciding
to close the sale with Mrs. Simpson. In the result, he
made an order for the payment o f the costs o f all
parties out o f the proceedings o f the sale of the
property, and as Mrs. Simpson came in with a
final offer of £6,600 gave the trustees liberty to
sell to her at that figure.
Drawing o f Agreements by Accountants
At Bradford City Magistrates’ Court, on 13 th
June, an accountant, James Edward Hartley, was
fined £44 5s. with £26 5s. costs for drawing an
agreement under seal for the purpose o f converting
a partnership into a limited company. He had
charged £24 5s. for the work. For the defence and in
mitigation on a plea o f guilty, it was pointed out
that if a seal had not been attached no prosecution
could have been brought, that it was a “ trivial
technicality,” and that the defendant had not charged
more than a solicitor would have done. Prosecuting
for the Law Society, Mr. J. Stanley Snowden pointed
out that as a result o f the defendant having drawn
the agreement, the parties might be put to the
expense o f High Court litigation. The stipendiary
magistrate, Dr. Coddington, said that the defendant
was an accountant of good reputation in Bradford
and had practised for many years. There could be
no suggestion that he had done an illegal thing
through any kind o f sheer stupidity or inadvertence.
We feel that it is necessary to state that it is a complete
error to describe either the rule or any offence
against it as either trivial or a technicality. Whether
more or less than a solicitor’s fee is charged is quite
irrelevant. The fact remains that for others to charge
for this class of work is an illegal encroachment on
work which, for the best o f reasons, was allocated to
solicitors exclusively.
—(
Solicitor’s Journal,
24th June, 1950.)
Taxation o f Costs—Discretion o f the Taxing
Master
Coon
v.
Diamond Tread Company (1938), Limited,
(Wynn-Parry, J .—June 6th)
On an inquiry as to damages, an official referee
awarded the plaintiff a sum of £ 10 ,54 1, together
with costs, which he directed should be taxed. The
inquiry at which the plaintiff was represented by
leading counsel and junior counsel, lasted for four
and a half days. A bill of costs brought in by the
plaintiff was reduced by the taxing master in respect
o f the figure included in the bill on the item “ In
structions for brief,” the fees and refreshers to leading
counsel and junior counsel, and the fees of the
accountants whose services had been retained and
used at the inquiry. The plaintiff objected to the
reductions on the ground that the fees allowed were
inadequate, and asked for the decision of the taxing
master to be reviewed.
Held—The Court had no jurisdiction to interfere
with the decision o f the taxing master since the
complaint went to quantum only, and it had not
been shown that the taxing master had erred on a
question of principle. In re Ogilvie (103, L.T.Rep.
15 4 ; (1910) P. 243) and White
v.
Altrincham
Urban District Council (154 L.T.Rep. 656; (1936)
(2 K .B . 138) followed.
In re Lindsay’s Estate
(1915) W.N. 246) explained.
—(The Law Times,
23rd June, 1950).
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