2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting Program

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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
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3 - Customer Segmentation And Fairness: A Queueing Perspective
Yong-Pin Zhou, Professor, Foster School of Business, University of
Washington, Seattle, Seattle, WA, 98195-3226, United States,
, Jian Liu
When a service firm uses limited capacity to serve heterogeneous customers, it
can employ customer segmentation and prioritization techniques to maximize
profit. Customers are often assumed to be rational decision makers in choosing
which service option to use. In this research, we incorporate customers’ sense of
fairness and show that it can make a difference in how the firm should choose
which services to offer, and how to prioritize.
WA36
205B-MCC
Cooperation in Supply Chain Management
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain
Sponsored Session
Chair: Xiangyu Gao, University of Illinois, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, 61801, United States,
Co-Chair: Xin Chen, UIUC, UIUC, Urbana, IL, 61801, United States,
1 - Population Monotonicity In Newsvendor Games
Xiangyu Gao, UIUC, 104 S. Mathews, Urbana, IL, 61801, United
States, Xin Chen, Zhenyu Hu, Qiong Wang
We use the concept of population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS), which
requires the cost allocated to every member of a coalition to decrease as the
coalition grows, to study the cooperative newsvendor game. We focus on the
dual-based allocation scheme and identify conditions under which it is a PMAS.
2 - Strategic Inventories And Supplier Encroachment
Xin Geng, University of Miami, Miami, FL, United States,
, Huiqi Guan, Haresh Gurnani, Yadong Luo
We study the interaction between strategic inventories and supplier
encroachment in a two-period model. The buyer may withhold excess inventory
and the supplier can introduce a direct selling channel in the second period. We
find that irrespective of the buyer’s unit holding cost, strategic withholding may
occur and the supplier’s encroachment strategy is distorted.
3 - A Non-cooperative Approach To Cost Allocation In Joint
Replenishment
Xuan Wang, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
Kowloon, Hong Kong, , Simai He,
Jay Sethuraman, Jiawei Zhang
We consider the joint replenishment game in which the major setup cost is split
equally among the retailers who place an order together. Each retailer pays his
own holding and minor setup cost. Under this allocation rule each retailer
determines his replenishment policy to minimize his own cost anticipating the
other retailers’ strategy. We show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium exists
and quantify the efficiency loss of the non-cooperative outcome relative to the
social optimum.
4 - Cost-sharing Mechanism Design For Supply Chain Consolidation
Wentao Zhang, University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
CA, United States, , Nelson A Uhan,
Alejandro Toriello, Maged M Dessouky
We design cost-sharing mechanisms to incentivize suppliers to cooperate in
freight consolidation, in which suppliers have their shipping demand consolidated
before sending it to the customers to benefit from lower transportation rates. The
nonconvex and nonconcave cost functions resulting from multiple-truck volumes
make it impossible to design a truthful and budget-balanced cost-sharing
mechanism under the Moulin mechanism framework. With this in mind, we
propose a truthful cost-sharing mechanism that attempts to maximize the fraction
of the total cost that will be recovered from the prices charged. We also study our
proposed cost-sharing mechanism from the social welfare perspective.
WA37
205C-MCC
Sustainable Operations and Environmental Decisions
Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Sustainable
Operations
Sponsored Session
Chair: Xin Wang, Tepper School of Business- Carnegie Mellon
University, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213, United States,
1 - Remanufacturing Strategies For Oems Without
Remanufacturing Capabilities
Zhou Yu, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China,
Anton Ovchinnikov, Yu Xiong
We discuss two strategies for how an OEM without remanufacturing capabilities
could interact with independent remanufacturers: outsourcing and relicensing.
Factoring in the possibility of unauthorized remanufacturing and the resultant
participations concern, we solve for the equilibrium strategies and discuss how
the problem fundamentals impact the resultant solution. In addition to the
analytical results we also present numerical illustrations with behaviorally-
estimated parameters for North American and Chinese consumers and highlight
how the equilibrium solution depends on the consumer behavior and market
characteristics.
2 - Design And Technology Choice For Recycling: Collective Versus
Individual Implementation
Morvarid Rahmani, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA, United States,
Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu
Efficient and effective treatment of end-of-life products requires not only product
design improvements but also advancement in recycling technologies. In this
paper, we study how the complementarity between product design and recycling
technology affects the efficiency of collective and individual recycling
implementations.
3 - Green Technology Development And Adoption: Competition,
Regulation, And Uncertainty – A Global Game Approach
Xin Wang, Assistant Professor, Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology, IELM, HKUST, Clear Water Bay, 15213, Hong
Kong, , Soo-Haeng Cho, Alan Scheller-Wolf
When a government is considering tightening a standard on a pollutant, their
decision often is influenced by the number of firms being able to meet the
tightened standard, because a higher number indicates a more feasible standard.
We study how such regulation may affect a firm’s incentive to develop a new
technology to reduce a pollutant. To analyze this problem, we use the global game
framework recently developed in economics. We find that regulation that
considers industry capability, compared with regulation that ignores it, can more
effectively motivate development of a new green technology. Surprisingly,
uncertainty in the payoff can also help promote development of a new green
technology.
WA38
206A-MCC
Opt, Robust
Contributed Session
Chair: Abhilasha Aswal, Phd Candidate, International Institute of
Information Technology, Bangalore, 26 Willow drive, Apt 8B, Ocean,
7712, India,
1 - Efficient Methods For Stronger Performance Bounds On
Two-stage Adaptive Optimization Models
Frans de Ruiter, PhD Candidate, Tilburg University,
Warandelaan 2, Tilburg, 5037AB, Netherlands,
, Dimitris Bertsimas
Many efficient methods have been developed to find suboptimal solutions to two-
stage adaptive linear optimization problems. Although these solutions appear to
perform very well in practice, bounds on the performance of these solutions are
often far off. We present new efficient methods to obtain stronger performance
bounds. We show numerically that our method can obtain bounds quickly and
improve upon existing techniques.
WA38