2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting Program

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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
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2 - Exclusivity In Online Advertising
Marjan Baghaie, Microsoft, Seattle, WA, 98105, United States,
, Amin Sayedi, Kinshuk Jerath
We investigate auction mechanisms for sponsored search in which advertisers can
bid to be displayed exclusively after a keyword search. We find that allowing
advertisers to bid for exclusivity can increase the revenue of the search engine
because bidders compete not only for positions in the non-exclusive outcome but
also for the outcome to be exclusive or non-exclusive. Interestingly, however,
under certain conditions, the revenue of the search engine can decrease because
competition between outcomes leads to bidders reducing bids for their non-
preferred outcome. We also find that, under certain conditions, advertisers have
the incentive to bid above their true valuations.
3 - Game-theoretic Modeling Of Players’ Ambiguities On
External Factors
Jian Yang, Associate Professor, Rutgers University, 1 Washington
Park Rm 1084, Newark, NJ, 07102, United States,
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates general ambiguity
attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players’
preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially mappings from states of the
world to distributions of payoffs to be received by players. When the preferences
possess ever more features, we can gradually add ever more structures to the
game. Particular attention is paid to what we shall call the enterprising game, in
which players exhibit ambiguity seeking attitudes while betting optimistically on
the favorable resolution of ambiguities.
4 - Equilibrium Structure Of Fixed-cost-reducing Alliances When
Firms’ Market Power Is Asymmetric\
Edward Anderson, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX,
Hiroki Sano
With the context of alliance formation between semiconductor manufacturers in
new technology development, we study how competing firms’ cooperative deci-
sions in a new market entry opportunity can be stabilized from a game-theoretic
perspective. We discuss the equilibrium alliance structure when firms can be
asymmetric in their relative market power while the individual investment cost
is symmetric. In a three-firm case, we show that, under certain conditions, the
firm with the second highest market power can choose not to enter a new mar-
ket while the other two firms cooperatively enter.
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Legends A- Omni
Operations Management V
Contributed Session
Chair: Ling Liu, Huazhong U of Science and Technology, 1037 Luoyu
Road, Hong Shan District, Wuhan, 430074, China,
1 - Web-based Grocery Retail Business With Order Cancellation And
Refund Options
Yi Zhang, Shandong Institute of Business and Technology, Yantai,
China, Yang Li, Xiangpei Hu
This research is based on a real web-based B2C grocery retail business in China.
Customers to this business demand fresh products and efficient delivery, at the
same time, want to keep options of cancelling the orders and getting refund. In
this study, we aim to derive an effective joint strategy on inventory planning,
selling price and the order cancellation charges, which maintains the profitability
and sustainability of the business.
2 - A Meta-analytic And Latent Semantic Analysis Approach To
Informing Quality Management
Xianghui Peng, Assistant Professor, Eastern Washington University,
Spokane, WA, United States, , Victor R Prybutok
A meta-analytic study of empirical Baldrige Quality Award research is conducted.
The analysis includes an evaluation of the relationships among award categories.
The Baldrige framework is examined using latent semantic analysis to analyze
winning applications. We identify opportunities to further develop quality
management theory based on the integrated results.
3 - A Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem With Order Available Time
Ling Liu, Huazhong U of Science and Technology, 1037 Luoyu
Road, Hong Shan District, Wuhan, 430074, China,
The capacitated vehicle routing problem with order available time is considered in
this paper, the orders are not available for delivery at the beginning of the
planning period. It is observed in the context of integrated production and
transportation scheduling. An efficient tabu search algorithm and a genetic
algorithm are presented to tackle the problem.
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Legends B- Omni
Ops Mgt/Marketing I
Contributed Session
Chair: Xue Li, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China,
1 - Equilibrium Analysis On Price-matching Policy For Two
Competitive Retailers
Jinpeng Xu, Xidian University, 266 Xinglong Section of Xifeng
Road, Xi’an, 710126, China, Yufei Huang
Price-matching policy is widely used by retailers as a competitive strategy to
stimulate demand. Under this policy, retailers promise to match the lowest price
in the market. We consider two retailers selling the same product in their
exclusive market and a competitive market. We use a game theoretical model to
investigate whether price-matching policy should be offered by the retailers in
competition, and how such decisions are influenced by the size of the exclusive
and competitive market. Our results show that the retailer with larger exclusive
market is more likely to offer the price-matching policy, and the optimal
equilibrium strategy depends on the cost of providing price-matching policy.
2 - Keys To Green Product Line Design: Consumer Perceptions, Cost
Implications, Price And Quality Optimization
Monire Jalili, PhD Candidate, University of Oregon, 1208
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 97403, United States,
, Tolga Aydinliyim, Nagesh N Murthy
Consumers may have opposing perceptions of the green quality (the amount of
recycled content in a green product). Naturalite consumers may prefer a green
product with some recycled content, while conventional consumers prefer a base
product with no recycled content. While the firm can save on material cost by
using some recycled content, processing a mixed material input may increase the
production cost. Considering these contrasting demand and supply forces, we
study a monopolist’s price and quality optimization problem in a product line
context and in particular, answer whether/when it is optimal for the monopolist
to offer only the green version of the product.
3 - Does Social Image (Pakistani Consumers) Mediate Relationship
Between Brand Performance And Brand Attachment For An
Imported Cosmetic Brand?
Huma Amir, Chairperson Marketing Deptt., Assistant Professor,
Inst of Bus Admin- Karachi, Suite # 218, Main Campus, University
Road, Karachi, 75270, Pakistan, ,
Wajid Rizvi
Empirical study on cosmetic industry suggests brand performance influences
brand attachment ( = .71 p <.05) with explained variance, R2 =.51. Further
investigation on whether this relationship is mediated by social image suggests
full mediation. When social image was used as mediating variable the direct
influence of brand performance on brand attachment reduced from = .71 (p
<.05) to = .01 (p >.05) and became insignificant, whereas indirect effect was =
.83 (p < .05). After the mediation, variance explained by the model also increased
from R2 =.51 to R2 =.71. The model fit indices also show model fit. The sample
size was bootstrapped to 5000 to assess mediation effect and also showed full
mediation.
4 - Empirical Evidence On The Contagion Effect Of Product
Harm Recall
Alireza Azimian, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue
West,, Unit 103, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3C5, Canada,
Kevin B Hendricks
The results of the studies on the impact of product harm recalls on rivals are quite
mixed. Our research explores whether the signal value of the harm,
commoditization level of the industry and physical length of the value chain can
explain the differences.
5 - Uniform Pricing Vs. Non-uniform Pricing For Branded Variants:
Implications For Channel Structure Equilibrium
Xue Li, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China,
, Jian Chen
Traditionally, firms adopt non-uniform pricing to discriminate product prices and
improve profitability. However, considering consumers’ concerns of peer-induced
price fairness, it is a reasonable choice for a firm to adopt uniform pricing for
branded variants. Under these two different pricing strategies, we analyze channel
structure equilibrium in a game-theoretic model.
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