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GAZETTE
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1983
A legal Accountant with
experience of drawing and
taxation of Solicitors' costs
before Taxing Masters is a
person who should be in a
position to keep the Taxing
Master informed up to date of
the standards of the reasonable,
careful and prudent Solicitor in
practice in relation to the fees
properly charged by and payable
to Counsel.
(2) The Courts recognise and
respect the special skills and
experiences of the Taxing
Master in assessing the quality
and value of the work of
Solicitors. However, his rulings
on these matters nevertheless are
subject to review by the Court
whether for error in principle or
not.
Cases referred to in the judgment;
Lavan v. Walsh (No. 2) [
1967]
IR 129,
Dunne v. ONeill
[ 1974]
IR 180 Irish
Trust Bank Limited v. The Central
Bank of Ireland Limited (Parke J.,
unreported, 12 March 1976, summary
in Gazette April 1976).
Kelly v. Breen (HamiltonJ. unreported,
4 April 1978).
The State (at the Prosecution of John
Patrick Gleeson) v. The Minister for
Defence and the Attorney General,
High Court, (per Gannon, J.) 23 June
1980 - unreported.
E. G. Hall
PRACTICE
Single set of Proceedings —
Separate causes of action —
application for separate Trials —
0.18 R.8.
The P l a i n t i ff
i n s t i t u t ed
proceedings against the first and
second named Defendants for
damages for personal injuries
sustained in an accident in June 1977
and against the third named
Defendant for damages for personal
injuries sustained in an entirely
separate unrelated accident in
October 1977. The Plaintiff alleged
that the combined effect of these two
accidents was to render him totally
incapacitated . for employment and
issued proceedings as envisaged in
Section 12 sub section 2 of the Civil
Liability Act 1961.
The first and second named
Defendants brought a Motion undei^
the provisions of 0.18 r.8 seeking
separate trials of the two causes of
action maintaining they could not be
conveniently disposed of together. In
this application they were supported
by the third named Defendants.
In the High Court, Mr. Justice
Hamilton refused the application and
the first and second named
Defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court Held that the
onus lay on the first and second
named Defendants to establish that a
joint trial of the two causes of action
could not conveniently take place and
that these Defendants had failed to
discharge that onus. The majority
decision held that as both accidents
occurred in Dublin where all the
Defendants carry on business it could
not be suggested that any particular
inconvenience would be caused to any
Defendant by providing for a
Common Trial and that to order
otherwise would make it impossible to
guard against the risk that an
incomplete or warped version of the
sequel of the accidents or the
responsibility for them might be
presented to the Jury. The case of
Hammerstone v. OLeary
[1921] 2KB
664 showed how, with the aid of
skilful advocacy one defendant, with
the field to himself because of the
absence of a co-defendant may distort
the hearing in favour. In his dissent-
ing judgement Kenny J. held that in
considering Section 11 s.s.l and S. 12
s.s. 2 fo the Civil Liability Act 1961 it
would be extremely difficult for a
Jury to apportion damages as between
the three defendants distinguishing
Baker v. Willoughby
[1970] AC 467,
which was relied on by the Plaintiff, as
not being relevant. Appeal dismissed.
Patrick Byrne v. Triumph Engineering
Ltd. and Ors.
(Supreme Court)
(O'Higgins, C.J. and Henchy J.,
Kenny J. Dissenting). [1982] 1 LRM,
317.
David R. Pigot
MATRIMONIAL
Nullity — Duress — Mental
Capacity.
This case involved a petition for
Nullity brought by the Husband
against the wife. By Masters order,
two specific issues were raised for
decision by the court.
1. Whether the Petitioner was
induced to be a party to the ceremony
of marriage through pressure, fear,
duress and undue influence imposed
by the Respondent.
2. Whether by reason of his mental
capacity and state of mind at the time
of the marriage, the Petitioner was
able to understand the nature,purpose
and consequences of the marriage
contract.
A third issue was raised by consent
but without prejudice to the
submission on behalf of the
Respondent that even if the
arguement succeeded, it was not a
good ground for declaring a marriage
void.
3. Was the Petitioner suffering from
such disease of the mind on 21 June
1978 (the wedding day) that he was
unable to maintain and sustain a
normal relationship with the
Respondent or any children there
might be of the Proposed marriage,
and was he thereby incapable of
contracting a valid marriage with the
Respondent.
T7ie parties met in September
1976. The Petitioner was a farmer in
comfortable circumstances. He had a
mother and six sisters who were
devoted to him. There was a history of
psychiatric illness in his family, his
father having spent prolonged periods
in mental hospitals and his brother
also having received psychiatric
treatment. The Respondent was a
nurse with a successful career.
In February 1977 the Petitioner
suffered a panic attack. He had pal-
pitations of his heart and he feared
that his heart would stop. He was
admitted to hospital and the
Respondent was informed according-
ly. He told her that he had been
drinking whiskey and taking pills.
The results of his tests were satis-
factory and the Respondent was
happy that there was nothing wrong
with him.
In March and April 1977 the
parties split up for a short period.
In June 1977 the Petitioner
complained of depression. The
Respondent did not consider him
depressed in the medical sense but
nonetheless referred him to a senior
psychiatrist known to her, who saw
the Petitioner on a number of
occasions.
On a further occasion the Petitioner
complained of cold sweats at night.
The Respondent thought that he
might be suffering from Brucellosis
and referred him to a specialist. The
tests proved that he did not have the
illness. The Respondent may have
concluded that the Petitioner was a
hypochondriac, but was not seriously
worried at any stage about his health.
In September 1977 the Petitioner
and Respondent had a discussion
about their future, which the
Respondent took to be a proposal of
marriage. From the same discussion
the Petition stated he believed that the
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