The Gazette 1955-58

237 / 324

stantially to the extent of their whole possessions
on their death, known to have lived for 15 years
as boarding house keeper and boarder. But as
the Judge had found that the attention of the sol
icitor had been drawn to the prospect of marriage
by the plaintiff's son, as another solicitor had
given evidence that as a matter of good practice
it would be right in those circumstances for a
solicitor to ask the question and draw the client's
attention to the Wills Act and as Mr. Meyrick
himself had admitted that if such a state of affairs
had existed there would be such a duty on him,
this case was one in which the Judge's decision
was at any rate supported by evidence. His Lord
ship would leave that matter there, having, he
hoped, made it quite clear that he was not en
deavouring to set an absurd or extravagant standard
of duty for solicitors making wills for their clients.
On the first point, the effect of the amendment
allowed was to substitute an entirely new con
tract for that originally pleaded, and having regard
to the lapse of time the defence of the Statute of
Limitations was available to the solicitor. The
Judge was wrong to permit the amendment after
objection had been taken', and the appeal should
accordingly be allowed.
Lord Justice Ormerod, also concurring, said that
no doubt it would be the clear duty of a solicitor,
on being instructed to prepare a will, to advise
his client of the effect of a subsequent marriage
on the will if in fact the client told him that he was
intending to get married in the near future, or
even if it came to the knowledge of the solicitor
in a less direct way than that. But his Lordship
did not accept that it was the duty of the solicitor
so to advise merely because the question of mar
riage had been casually and perhaps equivocally
mentioned to the solicitor in an interview, either
by a third person, as was the case here, or even
by the client himself. Whether such a duty would
arise on a case of that kind would depend on the
actual words used at the time and all the circum
stances in which they were used, including the
knowledge of the solicitor as to his client's affairs.
In view of the evidence of the plaintiff and her
son here, his Lordship was bound to say that he
would have felt very reluctant to find that there
was a breach of duty by the solicitor, save for
his' own admission, in re-examination in answer
to the Judge, that if the words which the Judge
found were said had been said he would have
regarded it as his duty to warn the plaintiff about
the effect of a subsequent marriage on her will.
(Hall v. Meyrick—(1952) z All E.R. 722).
The Nor1hern Ireland Court of Appeal is bound by
its previous decisions.
The Court of Appeal In Northern Ireland, like
the Court of Appeal in England, is bound by its
previous decisions, save in the limited and excep
tional classes of cases listed in Young v. Bristol
Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) K.B. 718. There are
three such kinds of cases, as follows :—(i) The
Court is entitled and even bound to decide which
of two conflicting decisions of its own it will
follow ; (2) The Court is bound to refuse to follow
a decision of its own which, though not expressly
overruled, cannot in its opinion, stand with a
decision of the House of Lords ; and (3) The Court
is not bound to follow a decision of its own, if
it is satisfied that the decision was given, per incuriam.
An application to the Court for particulars of
a plea of undue influence in a probate action was
refused by Lord McDermott L.C.J., and this decis
ion was af by the Court of Appeal (Porter
and Black, and Shell, J.) on the ground that
that Court had decided the same issue in an un-
reported case in 1944.
Note—Although this question does not appear-
to have been determined by the Supreme Court,
there is an obiter dictum of Maguire, C.J. in Attorney-
General v. C.I.E., 90 I.L.T.R. (1956) at page 141,
to the following effect:—" Although there was
no express decision to this effect, this Court has
acted on the principle that this Court is bound
by its own previous decisions. Mr. Micks contends
that that principle applies only when there is an
express decision on the point in question. I cannot
accept that."
(Parkinson v. Watson—(1956) N.I. i.)
Rehearing permitted, in cases of even conflict ofjudicial
opinion.
If, in a Court of 3 Judges, one of them should
die after argument but before judgment is delivered,
and the remaining Judges are divided in opinion,
the parties should then be at liberty to enter the
appeal for rehearing, but, in the absence of any such
rehearing, the order of the Court below should stand.
So held by the Northern Ireland Co f
Appeal (Lord McDermott, L.C.J. and Black, L.JJ.,
Porter, L.J. having died before judgment was
delivered).
(In Re McConnell, (1956) N.I. 151).
Costs of three counsel allowed in case of great difficulty.
and importance.
In an action under the Fatal Accident Acts the
defendants paid £1, 8 80 into Court with admission