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everything to the State arid-particularly where law
reform becomes the prerogative of persons -who
preen themselves more on their powers for impro
vising temporary expedients than for resolving
juristic issues in the light of generally-accepted
principles.
Accordingly while the law is undergoing multiple
changes—changes very often
effected without
much philosophic reflection or prior consultation
with those who could oifer valuable guidance—
lawmakers have a grave responsibility to withold
measures until an evaluation has been made as to
the probable effect on the common good. To shun
that responsibility means only that confusion and
injustice will arise.
The recent statute—The Fatal Injuries Act, 1956
(No. 2 of 1956) is an example of the type of in
completeness which irritates the legal mind. Section
7 creates a right to damages where through the
negligent driving of a
state-owned
mechanically
propelled vehicle,
a person is injured and dies from the
injuries. The wording of the section corresponds
with that of section 170 of the Road Traffic Act,
1933 (No. ii of 1933) where the right was given
for a non-fatal injury. The two Acts dispense with
the fiat of the Attorney General which was formerly
necessary before proceeding against a Minister of
State.
But why is the new right limited to the negligent
driving of a State-owned
mechanically propelled
vehicle?
The person who meets with personal
injury through the negligent driving of a pedal
cycle or a vehicle drawn by a horse owned by
the State, has not a corresponding right.
That
confusion exists through this anomalous state of
the law is apparent from a statement made by a
lawyer in the service of the State, namely that
before proceeding against the Minister for Finance
for damages arising out of the negligent driving of a
State-owned vehicle the fiat of the Attorney General
was no longer necessary.
(Cf. Public Adminis
tration, Vol. II, pp. 20, 21, Civics Institute, Ireland).
Some features in the Road Traffic Act (Northern
Ireland) 1955, are likely to be of interest to solicitors
practising in the Republic. The expression " motor
vehicle" in the Northern Ireland Act comprises
what in the Republic is contained in the expression
" mechanically propelled vehicle." But the expression
" vehicle " does not include a " pedal cycle " or
a "vehicle drawn by a horse or other animal,"
as it does in the Republic. Hence some of the
incongruous situations which arise in the Republic
are avoided in Northern Ireland. A manifest in
justice for example is to be seen in the provisions
contained in over-lapping sections of the Road
Traffic Act, 1933—e.g., Sects. 173 and 175, whereby
a pedal cyclist becomes amenable to a wider range of
offences in respect of the act
of driving or riding a
pedal cycle
than those applicable to the driver of a
mechanically propelled vehicle;
also the penalties
applicable to the pedal cyclist are of the same order
as these applicable to the driving of a mechanically
propelled vehicle notwithstanding that the power
of a pedal cyclist to cause serious injury or damage
is not nearly as great as that of the driver of a motor
vehicle.
Whether our legislature intended that a " pedal
cycle" or a "horse drawn vehicle" should be
included in the expression "vehicle" as used in
sections 50 and 51 of the Road Traffic Act, 1933, is
a debatable point. It is significant, that the part of
the Act which contains sections 50 and 51 is entitled
" Speed Limits for mechanically-propelled Vehicles "
but this is unavailing because it is not permissible
to use the title of a part of an Act for the purpose
of construing the intention of the legislature in
regard to ensuing sections (cf. Interpretation Act,
1937, sec. 11).
Another interesting feature of the Northern
Ireland Act is the use of the expression "driving
dangerously " to comprise both
driving at a speed or
in a manner which was dangerous to the public. .
.
.
Also a pedal cyclist or driver of a horse-drawn
vehicle can be convicted of "
driving carelessly"
(as
can the driver of a motor vehicle) but only a motor
driver can be convicted
of driving dangerously.
The approach in Northern Ireland to the " notice
of intention to prosecute" is more realistic than
in the Republic, as the onus is placed on the " person
prosecuted " to prove not only that he did not get
a notice but that he was prejudiced in his defence
through not receiving it.
In Northern Ireland the penalty for " riding " or
" being in charge of" a pedal cycle or of a horse-
drawn vehicle while drunk, is less than for a corres
ponding offence committed by the driver of a
"motor vehicle." (£50 fine as against 12 month's
imprisonment and £200 fine on summary conviction)
When in Northern Ireland the driver of a motor
vehicle is convicted for being " drunk in charge "
the law provides that the Court may modify the
disqualification according to the circumstances as
defined.
While propaganda for furthering road safety is
best left to voluntary bodies, such as the Safety
First Association of Ireland, the co-operation of
local authorities is necessary for an effective in
doctrination of the public. In Northern Ireland the
Government has recognised this by permitting local
authorities to expend money towards advancing
measures for accident-prevention.
In addition
precautions are kept to the fore by requiring an