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unknown minerals of great value which the Minister
can acquire without payment of adequate compen-
sation. The Minister has made no attempt to meet this
objection. Under Section 14 (2) (a) of the Act of 1940
one cannot specify the nature, situation and extent of
the minerals without knowing what such minerals are.
Consequently O'Keeffe P. granted a declaration to
the plaintiffs that the Minister's Order is invalid on
the ground that it does not specify with reasonable
particularity the nature, situation and extent of the
rninerals being acquired.
[Roche and Bula Ltd. v. The Minister for Industry
and Commerce, the Attorney-General and Wright;
O'Keeffe P.; unreported; 13 April 1973.]
Conditional Order of Certiorari quashing Nevinstown
Mineral Development Order, 1971, made absolute.
The applicants had obtained a conditional order of
Certiorari
on 21 March 1972 to quash the
Minerals
Development
(Nevinstown
and other Townlands,
Co.
Meath) Order, 1971,
and they now seek to have the
conditional order made absolute.
Despite the fact that the Minister wished to adduce
further evidence, he only filed a Notice to show cause,
instead of filing a detailed affidavit. This was pointed
out to the Court who made an order on 1 June 1972
giving liberty to file an affidavit before June 12, but
no affidavit was filed.
The applicants had made a
prima facie
case by
which it was shown that the Minister had no evidence
to form an opinion whether there were minerals under
the applicant's lands or not, which ought in the public
interest to be acquired. The Minister had not tried to
rebut this, and the applicant must succeed.
As the Minister's Order was not in accordance with
the Statute, as decided in the Roche case, the Order
cannot stand. Consequently the conditional order of
Certiorari
will be made absolute .
[The State (Randies) v. The Minister for Industry
and Commerce; O'Keeffe P.; unreported; 13 April
1974.]
The Minister appealed against the judgment of the
President of the High Court in the two cases, but the
two appeals were dismissed unanimously by the full
Supreme Court.
Budd J., in delivering the first judgment, read the
full text of "The Minerals Acquisition (Nevinstown
and other Townlands in Co. Meath) Order, 1971". It
indicated that all minerals under the land described
in the Schedule to the Order are vested in the Minister
in fee simple. The lands were delineated by a red line
on a map deposited in the Geological Survey and duly
sealed with the seal of the Minister.
In Section 14 (2) (a) of the Mineral Development
Act, 1940, it is stated specifically that the Minister's
Order must specify the nature, situation and extent of
the minerals to which it relates. The nature of the
mineral-bearing ore, and the depth and extent of the
mineral seam can be discovered by experimental boring.
The situation of the minerals can easily be described
by reference to the townland. As the nature, situation
and extent of the minerals to which this Order relates
is not stated, the Minister's Order is consequently
invalid.
Henchy J., in delivering the second judgment, stated
that Section 14 (1) of the 1940 Act makes it clear that,
before a Minerals Acquisition Order can be made by
the Minister, three requirements are necessary : (1) It
must appear to the Minister that there are minerals on
or under the land—this is called into question here;
(2) It must appear to the Minister that such minerals
are not being worked or not being worked efficiently
and (3) That the Minister considers it desirable in the
public interest that the working of such minerals should
be controlled by the State with a view to their exploi-
tation. These requirements, put together, show that the
Minister must make an appraisal of the situation in
the light of the particular mineral substances which lie
unworked, or are being inefficiently worked, and having
considered that it is desirable in the public interest that
their working should be controlled by the State. As the
Minister's Order is a blanket Order to cover "all min-
erals" under the land, thereby showing a want of the
necessary discrimination and appraisal, it infringes
Section 14 (1) of the Act of 1940. The mandatory
provisions of Section 14 (2) (a) mentioned by Budd J.
were also not complied with.
The scheme of compensation itself seems incompat-
ible with the blanket acquisition of all minerals on or
under land. The amount of the royalty rent can be
assessed by the Mining Board only after consideration
of what a willing grantor and a willing grantee would
agree to, having strict regard to "the situation, nature
and extent" of the minerals acquired.
The appeals are consequently dismissed.
[Roche and Bula Ltd. v. The Minister for Industry
and Commerce and others
and
The State (Randies) v.
The Minister for Industry and Commerce and the
Attorney-General; Full Supreme Court; unreported;
4 March 1974.]
If an unregistered owner of registered land dies before
1959 his executor may sell the estate as if he had
been the registered owner, under Part IV of the
Local Registration of Title Act, 1891.
On 26 April 1921 William Sheils was registered as
full owner subject to equities of part of the lands of
Barnageeragh, Co. Dublin, on Folio 2089, Co. Dubin.
Part IV of the Registration of Title Act, 1891, applied.
W. Sheils died intestate on 30 March 1931 and on
16 September 1931 letters of administration were
granted to his son, Joseph Sheils, the plaintiff in these
proceedings, who was not registered as owner on the
folio, as there were four next of kin entitled to share
in the estate.
On 29 September 1973 these lands were sold by pub-
lic auction to the defendant. In the conditions of sale,
it was stated that the plaintiff was selling the lands as
the personal representative of his father. The purchaser
objected to the title on the ground that, as the owner
had died forty-two years ago, a sale by the plaintiff as
personal representative could not be in due course of
administration, and required the plaintiff to have him-
self registered as full owner. The plaintiff contended
that his father's estate had not been administered, and
that the administration bond had to be renewed each
year; as the defendant has refused to accept this
explanation, the plaintiff has issued a summons under
the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, seeking a declara-
tion that he has shown good title.
It was contended by the defendant that Section 84
(3) of the Registration of Title Act, 1891, no longer
applied, as it had been repealed by the Second Schedule
of the Administration of Estates Act, 1959. However.
208