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the Act of 1959 only applied to persons dying on or

after 1 June 1959 and not to those who had died before

then. Under Section 113 (3) of the Registration of

Title Act, 1964, it was provided that Part IV of the

Act of 1891 was to continue to apply to all land which

was subject to that Act before 1964. Under Section 9

(3) of the Succession Act, 1965, it was enacted that its

provisions do not apply to any persons dying before

1 January 1967. It follows that Section 84 (3) of the

Act of 1891 still applies to this sale; consequently the

personal representative has the same power of dealing

with the land as if he were the registered owner. The

plaintiff is therefore able to show good title to the lands

if he can give clear possession. This is reinforced by

the strong terms of Section 51 of the Succession Act,

1965, which states specifically that a purchaser from a

personal representative shall be entitled to hold that

property freed and discharged from all debts and liabi-

lities of the deceased . . . and from all claims of the

persons entitled to any share in this estate; it is to be

noted that this section applies to persons dying before

this Act. The summons will consequently be granted.

[Sheils v Flynn; Kenny J.; unreported; 2 May 1974.]

Increase of airport landing fees made by Minister in

respect of Shannon Airport after 1 April 1969

valid.

The Minister for Transport and Power claims from

the defendant the sum of £19,975, being the balance

of landing charges due by them in respect of the use of

the services of Shannon Airport for their aircraft

between 1 April 1969 and 24 July 1970. Before 1 April

1969 all charges made by the Minister were duly paid on

presentation of invoices. On 1 April 1968 the then

Minister made a decision that a 20 per cent increase be

applied from 1 April 1969 and on 3 July 1968 that was

sanctioned by the Minister for Finance. There were

subsequent lengthy discussions between the Inter-

national Air Transport Association (I.A.T.A.) repre-

senting the defendants and other airlines. The Associa-

tion would not agree to the increase, and the Minister

consequently put the increase into force. On 1 April

1969 an additional 7£ per cent, which is not disputed,

was imposed in substitution for the abolition of fuel

through put charges. After 1 April 1969 the defendants

received invoices for landing charges showing the

increased amounts, but they continued to pay the

Minister at the old rate, plus the 7£ per cent not in

dispute. This is a test case, as other airlines using

Shannon Airport have adopted the same procedure.

In the action before O'Keeffe P. the Minister relied

on Section 37 of the Air, Navigation and Transport

Act, 1936, as the authority giving him the right to fix

charges on landing fees. By S.I. No. 125 of 1959, the

functions under this Act originally vested in the Min-

ister for Industry and Commerce were transferred to

the plaintiff. The President held that Section 37 of the

1936 Act does not authorise the plaintiff to charge for

the services he provides at aerodromes. Although the

Minister may have power to fix charges for landing at

aerodromes, it was not to be found in Section 37

relied upon. The President accordingly dismissed the

Minister's claim.

The claim has now been made on an implied con-

tract, and it was submitted that once the Minister gives

notice under the Chicago Convention of April 1947

that the Minister is entitled to make the appropriate

charges. The relevant Article in the Chicago Conven-

tion is Article 15 which deals with "Airport and Similar

Charges". The defendant airline contended that, m

fixing the scale .of charges applicable at Shannon, the

Minister is compelled by Section 9 of the 1946 Act to

make a formal Order which would then have the

force of law in the State, but it was held that the

Minister was not required to make a formal Order,

as the Order was not necessary for carrying out the

Chicago Convention and for giving effect thereto.

Section (1) of the 1946 Act sets out specific matters

which may be made by order, and these include pre-

scribing a scale of charges at licensed aerodromes, but

Shannon was not licensed. As the scale of charges

imposed was no higher for foreign than domestic air-

lines, it was valid according to Article 15 of the Chicago

Convention, provided that this scale had been properly

communicated to IATA, which it had. The defen-

dants and other airlines, upon receiving this notice,

impliedly contracted to pay such charges on landing-

The fact that the plaintiff has relied upon different

grounds in the Supreme Court than in the High Court

should not prejudice him. As the Rules of the Superior

Courts allow pleadings to be amended at any time, the

plaintiff's application to amend the pleadings will be

granted.

Accordingly the Supreme Court (FitzGerald C.J-,

Walsh and Griffin JJ.) allowed the appeal and granted

the Minister an order for payment of £19,975 by the

defendants in respect of landing fees at Shannon

Airport.

[The Minister for Transport and Power v Trans

World Airlines Inc.; Supreme Court (FitzGerald C.J-,

Walsh and Griffin JJ.); separate judgments by Walsh

J. and Griffin J.; unreported; 6 March 1974.] ]

Rights of minority shareholder upheld on ground that

directors conducted the company in an oppressive

manner.

Westwinds Ltd. was incorporated under another

name in March 1964; its principal object was to take

over and carry on the business of builders and public

works contractors in Galway in accordance with an

agreement, which had apparently not been prepared.

The main shareholder, a developer, had discussions

with the petitioner, to arrange for the petitioner to take

shares in and become a director of Westwinds, in 1965.

On 21 July 1965 the petitioner, who had become secre-

tary, and an auditor met at the petitioner's solicitors s

office in Galway. The terms upon which the petitioner

was to join the company were settled, as was the

distribution of shares in the company—namely 5.000

shares to the developer and 5,000 shares to the peti-

tioner.

In 1968 the company purchased a site of three acres

at Knocknacarra. Full planning permission for four

houses was obtained, which were duly built and sold.

However, the company was unable to obtain planning

permission in respect of the remaining two acres, as

there were no sewerage services, and the water supply

was inadequate. It was falsely contended at the time

that these lands belonged to another company of the

developer. These lands were duly registered in a Land

Registry Folio, and in November 1968 the two acres

were sold for £600 to a third company (Company B)

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