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County Clare Law Society.
A
t
the Annual General Meeting of the Society, the
following officers and Committee were elected for
1954-55: President, I. M. Ploulihan; Vice-Presi
dent, M. J. MacMahon; Hon. Secretary, James
Lynch; Hon. Treasurer, Bryan MacMahon; Com
mittee : John Casey, M. J. Walsh, T. F. O’Reilly,
T. A. Lynch.
ISSUE OF SUBPOENAS ON THE
HEARING OF CIRCUIT APPEALS.
B
y
the High Court (Appeals from Circuit Court)
Rules, 1954 (S. I. No. 3 of 1955) the rules o f the
High Court and Supreme Court made on 10th
November, 1937 are amended by the insertion in
Order II thereof o f the following additional rules :
12. A
subpoena ad testificandum
or
duces tecum
at
the High Court on Circuit may be sued out
either in the Central Office or in the office
o f the County Registrar of the County in
which the case was heard.
13. Where a subpoena is sued out in the office of
the County Registrar under the immediately
preceding rule, the order o f subpoena shall
issue out of that office and be sealed with the
seal of the Circuit Court for the county in
which the case was heard, and be signed by
the County Registrar; and every subpoena
so issued, sealed, and signed shall have the
same force and effect as if it had been issued
out of the Central Office.
Counsel’s fees in the Circuit Court.
B
y
the Circuit Court Rules, 1955 (S.I. No. 1/1955)
scales of counsel’s fees as between party and party
are prescribed for proceedings in the Circuit Court,
in district Court appeals proceedings under the
Workmen’s Compensation Acts and Malicious Injury
applications. The rules may be purchased at the
Government Publication Office, Dublin, price 3d.
DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INTEREST.
(1) Negligence action against solicitor : Right
to jury.
T
h e
decision o f the Supreme Court in
Deignan v'
Greene,
although it merely followed well established
authorities, is one of interest to the solicitors’
profession. The question at issue was the plaintiff’s
right to a jury in an action against a solicitor for
alleged negligence in his professional conduct. The
defendant was solicitor for a vendor o f a publichouse,
and the plaintiff came to him as an intending pur
chaser, and signed in his office a contract to buy
the premises. At some stage in the transaction—•
whether before or after the contract was signed was
disputed—the plaintiff raised the question of getting
a loan to enable him to complete the purchase, and
asked the solicitor to act for him as well as for the
vendor. A few days after the contract had been
signed by both parties, the plaintiff repudiated it,
on the ground that the sale had been conditional
on the solicitor procuring for him a loan, which
had not been got. Subsequently, the vendor obtained
a decree for specific performance, and, on Mr.
Deignan making the case that he was unable to
complete, the matter was compromised by the
payment of a substantial sum by Mr. Deignan as
damages to the vendor. Mr. Deignan then instituted
the present action for damages against the solicitor,
alleging that he had been negligent as his solicitor
in failing to insert a clause in the contract making
it conditional on a loan being procured, and that
he had failed to advise him as to the consequence
of signing the contract, and been negligent in not
obtaining a loan for him. Notice of trial with a
jury was refused in the Central Office, whereupon
the plaintiff applied to the High Court (Murnaghan
J.) for an order directing that such notice should be
accepted.
This application was dismissed by
Murnaghan J. and the plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court. At the hearing, counsel for the
plaintiff admitted that it was well established that
an action by a client against his solicitor for pro
fessional negligence was essentially an action for
breach o f contract, in respect of which the plaintiff
would have no right to a jury. Reference was made
to the leading Irish case on this question, Liston
v.
Munster and Leinster Bank. Ltd., (1940) I.R. 77
and to Somers
v.
Erskine, (1943) I.R. 348. Counsel
contended, however, that an undertaking to procure
a loan was no part of a solicitor’s normal duty and
that negligence in carrying out such an undertaking
was a to rt: alternatively, he submitted that even
if the plaintiff had no right to a jury, this was a
case where the Court, in its discretion, should
direct that the trial should be by a jury, having
regard to the fact that the issue was one between
a layman and an officer of the Court. The Supreme
Court, unanimously dismissing the appeal with
costs, rejected both these contentions. Kingsmill
Moore J. (with whom the Chief Justice and Lavery J.
concurred) said that in his view, the case was one
more suitable for trial by a judge without a jury.
O’Daly J. (with whom Maguire J. concurred) said
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