235 / 266
that while solicitors were officers o f the Court and
were in certain respects subject to special control
by the Court, when they were themselves litigants
they were 1on a par with any other litigant and
neither entitled nor liable to any different treatment.
{Irish Eaw Times
).— See
G
a z e t t e
,
page 31.
(2) Foreign Company—Service—Procedure.
Is a Plaintiff who serves a writ on an American Company
at an address in Condon which he alleges is the English
place o f business o f that company entitled to proceed in
the action ?
No, said the Court of Appeal (Jenkins, Hodson
and Romer L .JJ.). The writ must be set aside,
because the American Company did not have a place
of business in Great Britain at the time of the
alleged service.
(Deverall
v.
Grant Advertising
Incorporated (1954) 3 All E .R ., 389).
(3) Judgment—Defendant’s wrong surname
—Amendment.
Is a plaintiff, who has obtained judgment fo r breach
o f contract in England fo r
£47,000
and tries to enforce
same against the defendant in the German Courts, and is
then fa ced with the contention that the judgment is invalid
and unenforceable on the ground that a wrong surname was
used, entitled to amend the writ, all subsequent proceedings
andjudgment, by substituting “ Jo sef Bartels trading as
Bernhard Bartels
”
fo r “ Bernhard Bartels
” ?
Yes, said the Court of Appeal (Denning and
Hodson L .JJ.) affirming Slade J., because the
substantive judgment was in no way altered by this
amendment.
Per Denning L .J. : “ When the substantive
judgment is not being altered, but only the title of
the action, it is, to my mind, quite plain that this
Court has ample jurisdiction to correct any mis
nomer or misdescription at any time whether before
or after judgment.”
(Pearlman Veneers S. A.
Property Ltd.
v.
Bartels (1954) 3 All E .R ., 659).
(4) Compulsory Acquisition—Lands Tri
bunal.
The decision o f Stable J., noted in page 31 of
T
h e
G
a z e t t e
,
was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
(Denning, Jenkins and Morris L .JJ.) mainly on the
grounds that the plaintiff had only six weeks from
the time notice of the decision o f the Agricultural
Land Tribunal to acquire her land compulsorily was
given to her, to make an application to the Court
to quash this decision, and the Act, which treats the
decision as a compulsory purchase order, does not
allow the decision to be questioned in any “ legal
proceedings whatsoever ” except within six weeks
of the notice being given. Furthermore, any invalid
appointments to the Tribunal became validated as
a result of the rules to Schedule IX of the Agriculture
Act, 1947. It is gratifying, however, to note that,
despite the decision authorising compulsory acquisi
tion, the Minister allowed Mrs. Woollett to retain her
4 acres o f land. ('Woollett
v.
Minister o f Agriculture
and Fisheries (1954) 3 All E .R ., 529).
(5) Damages—Assessment by Jury—Test for
Intervention o f Appellate Court.
When damages have been assessed by a ju ry, w ill an
appellate Court intervene, unless the verdict is out o f all
proportion with the fa cts ?
No, said the Court of Appeal (Singleton, Denning
and Morris L .JJ.). The question is not whether the
verdict appears to the appellate Court to be right, but
whether it is such as to show that the jury have
failed to perform their duty.
(The facts were that a red-hot rod jumped from
the rollers in a factory, and came into contact with
plaintiff’s left ankle, whereby he sustained serious
injuries, as a result of which he would be unable to
lead an active life. Although the plaintiff’s expenses
including loss of earnings up to time of trial were
£ 1,10 0 , a jury assessed total damages at £3,850, for
which McNair J. entered judgment. The appeal
was taken on the ground that the damages were most
inadequate).
Per Singleton L .J. : “ Though I think the damages
given in this case were low, I am not able to say that
the verdict was out of all proportion to the facts. It
was for the jury and not for this Court to assess the
damages. I f a plaintiff in a case o f this kind asks
for and obtains a jury (merely to assess damages),
he may expect to have some advantages, or he would
not ask for a jury. There may be disadvantages also,
though I am far from saying that a jury is not
a proper tribunal for a case o f this kind.” (Bocock
v.
Enfield Rolling Mills Ltd. (1954) 3 All E .R ., 94).
(6) Court o f Appeal—Grounds on which
further evidence considered.
In an appeal, w ill the Court allow further evidence to
be adduced in regard to the evidence o f defendant's wife
who stated at the trial that she did not remember whether a
payment had been made by defendant to plaintiff, and who,
having meanwhile divorced defendant, subsequently admitted
that she did remember such payment having been made
?
No, said the Court of Appeal (Denning, Hodson
and Parker L .JJ.). In order to allow this further
evidence to be adduced in support o f an appeal
against a decision of fact, the evidence must be
such as is presumably to be believed, and, as the
evidence sought to be adduced was not o f that
description, it would not be admitted; in the
57