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GAZETTE

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985

provisions of the Local Government

(Planning and Development) Acts,

1963 to 1983, while at the same time

barring any claim to compensation by

the Claimant by reason of the

exclusion referred to in Section 56

(l)(b)(i) of the Local Government

(Planning and Development) Act,

1963".

The Court directed that the award be

remitted to the Arbitrator for the sole

purpose of considering the replies which

were given to the questions of law raised

in the case stated and confirming his

award in the light of such replies, if he

should think fit to do so. It appeared to

the Court that the replies which had been

formulated to these questions entitled the

claimant to receive the higher figure

referred to by the Arbitrator, but this

matter should, at least, be determined

initially by the Arbitrator.

John Meenaghan -v- Dublin County

Council [1984] ILRM 616 - High Court

(per O'Han!on J.). 14 Setpember, 1983 -

unreported.

Daniel Brilley

GIFT TAX

The exercise of a power of appointment

under a settlement which has the effect of

conveying the contingent interest of a third

party to the donee of the power constitutes

a benefit within the meaning of the

C

.A.T.

Act, 1976 and is thus chargeable with gift

tax.

By a Settlement dated 22 November

1955, the Appellant's father settled

certain funds on trust for the Appellant so

that the income should be accumulated

and added to the capital of the fund until

the Appellant attained the age of 30 and

thereafter the income to be paid to the

Appellant until 31 December 1985 or her

earlier death and, should she survive until

31 December 1985, the capital to be paid

to her absolutely.

Provision was also made for payment

of all or any part of the trust to the

Appellant once she reached the age of 30.

If the Appellant should die at any time

while all or any part of the trust fund

remained in the hands of the Trustee, the

Settlement provided that such funds

should be held in trust for her children or

if none, for the other children of the

Settlor, as therein provided.

The Appellant attained the age of 30 on

17 November 1962. By Deed dated 4

April 1978, the Trustees irrevocably

declared that they held the trust fund for

the benefit of the Appellant absolutely,

freed and discharged from the trusts of

the Settlement.

The Appellant submitted that she took

an absolute vested interest in the fund on

17 November 1962, subject only to

divesting in the event of her death before

31 December 1985. As all possibility of

divesting was removed by the Appoint-

ment, it was argued that the gift from the

Settlor was essentially taken on 17

November 1962 and that accordingly,

there was no liability to gift tax under the

C . A . T. Act, 1976. It was f u r t h er

submitted that this was the real nature of

the transaction and as such was what

mu st

be c o n s i d e r ed

— not

t he

conveyancing form, referring to the cases

of

theAttorney-General

-v-

Power

[1906]

2 I.R. 272 and

Ramsey

-v-

Inland Revenue

Commissioners

[1981] 2W.L.R. 449. In

further support of this argument, it was

pointed out that Section 20 of the C.A.T.

Act, 1976 provides for taxation on the

basis that the contingency will not

happen but makes provision for a

subsequent

a d j u s t me nt should

the

contingency in fact take place.

T h e R e v e n u e

C o m m i s s i o n e r s,

although not contesting that the interest,

taken by the Appellant on 17 November

1962 was a vested interest, argued that it

was a limited interest, and that the

Appointment on 4 April 1978 of the trust

fund constituted a gift chargeable to gift

tax of the said fund taken absolutely by

the Appellant on that date from the

Settlor.

H E L D :

H a v i ng r e g a rd

to

t he

definitions of 'benefit', 'property', and

'interest in expectancy' set out in the

C.A.T. Act, 1976, the Appellant took a

benefit within the meaning of Section 5 of

that Act by virtue of the Appointment of

4 April 1978. This benefit consisted of the

value of the interest of the children and

remoter issue of the Appellant contingent

on her death before 31 December 1985,

and constituted a gift liable to Gift Tax.

Brigid Kathleen Jacob

-v-

The Revenue

Commissioners

- High Court

(per

McWilliam J.). 6 July, 1983 -unreported.

Sarah Cox

Copies of judgments in the above

cases are available on request f r om

the Society's Library. The photo-

copying rate is lOp per page.

iv