378 / 406
GAZETTE
MARCH 1985
Rules must be read subject to the above
Rule and the period of ten days specified
in Rule 38 of the 1967 rules may be
enlarged under the present Rule 13 of the
1948 Rules.
HE LD . There is no substance in the
contention that the Circuit Court has
been deprived of jurisdiction merely
because the Order sending the two
accused forward for trial was not trans-
mitted within the specified period of ten
days as the defect is remediable by
obtaining the necessary enlargement of
time in the District Court which should
be forthcoming save where it would
unfairly prejudice the accused.
In c o n s i d e r i ng
t he s i g n i ng
of
documents by affixing thereon a rubber
stamp the Court again considered the
judgment of Ga v an Duffy P. in the above
case wherein he held that signature by a
rubber stamp was as valid as a signature
by a mark but pointed out that proof that
the stamp was affixed by the District
Justice might be called for by a person
entitled to call for proof, such evidence to
be given by the Justice himself or by
someone who can swear to the making of
the particular signature by the District
Justice.
The validity of a similar signature was
considered in
The State (McCarthy)
-v-
Governor of Mountjoy Prison,
(20
Oc t o b e r,
1967, u n r e p o r t e d)
where
O'Dalaigh C.J., giving the unanimous
decision of the Court, said (where no
evidence had been given suggesting that
the signature was applied by anyone
other than by the Justice) " In such
circumstances it is, in my opinion, proper
to apply the maxim
omnia praesumuntur
esse rite el colemniter acta donee probetur
in contrarium ...
there is no distinction in
principle between using a pen or pencil
and using a stamp where the impression is
put upon the paper by the proper hand of
the party signing".
HE LD . The rubber stamp signature of
the District Justice shall be deemed a
good signature unless and until it is
shown that it was not affixed by him. The
Court held that failure to send to the
Circuit Court within ten days the Order
sending the accused forward for trial did
not
ipsofacto
deprive the Circuit Court of
jurisdiction, and that the signing of
Orders by means of a rubber stamp is,
until the contrary is shown, a valid
signature.
The People (Director of Public Prosecu-
tions)
-v-
Patrick McCormack and David
Dunne - Supreme Court (per Henchy J.)
nem. diss.). 20 July. 1984.
Sean McMullin
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Application to District Court after passing
of Housing (Private Rented Dwellings)
Amendment Act 1983, — time of applica-
tion.
On 7 July
1983, the landlord's
Solicitor attended at the District Court
Office with a stamped Notice of Applica-
tion to the District Court under Section
12 of the Housing (Private Rented
Dwellings) Act 1982. A return date of 24
November
1983 was obtained. The
Housing (Private Rented Dwellings)
(Amendment) Act 1983 was enacted on
13 July 1983 and became operative on 2
August 1983 (S.I. No. 221/1983). On 3
October 1983 the landlord's Solicitor
notified the tenant of the landlord's
intention to proceed to the District Court
and the Solicitors served the Notice of
Application by registered post on 10
October 1983. The Notice of Declaration'
of Service was entered in the Court Office
on 12 November 1983. Application was
made to the District Justice on 18
November 1983 to decline jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 5(6) of the 1983 Act
which states " n o Application may be
made under Section 12(1) of the Act of
1982 after the commencement of this
Section".
Application was made for a Case to be
stated to the High Court on whether the
Applicants were entitled to proceed
under the 1982 Act in the District Court
or confined to such rights as are given
them under the 1983 Amendment Act.
The question the Court had to decide
was what construction should be placed
on Section 12(1) of the 1982 Act which
states — " T he Landlord or the Tenant of
a dwelling . . . may apply to the Co u r t ",
and on Section 5(6) of the 1983 Act which
states — " N o Application may be made
under Section 12(1) of the Act of 1982".
The Court had to decide when the Appli-
cants had "applied". Was it when the
stamped Notice was given back with the
return date inserted by the Clerk for
service, when one month's Notice of
Intention to Apply had been given under
Section 12(5) of the 1982 Act or when the
matter actually came on for hearing in
Court?
The Court referred to the District
C o u r t ( H o u s i n g ( P r i v a te
R e n t e d
Dwellings) Act 1982) Rules of 1982 which
set out the appropriate F o rm for Applica-
tion. The Landlord argued that the
Actions taken on 7 July 1983 were
sufficient to ground an Application. They
also argued that the District Court had
seisin of the Case at that time and that the
removal of the Case from the District
Court to a Lay Tribunal by the 1983 Act
was an unconstitutional interference in
the administration of justice.
The Court H E LD it did not have to
decide on the constitutionality of the 1983
Act or any part of it.
HE LD . The meaning and intention of
Section 5(6) of the 1983 Act is to halt in
their tracks any Applications which have
not come on for hearing before the
District Court at the time of coming into
operation of that Act and to compel the
parties to resort to the Tribunal or Rent
Officer as appropriate. Under Section 12
of the 1982 Act the only document
vi
needing to be served is a "Notice of Inten-
tion to Make an Application" as
provided in the 1982 Rules of Court. The
Application to the District Court might
be regarded as made, at best, when the
landlord's Solicitors gave Notice of
Intention to apply by service of that
Notice on the Respondent in compliance
with Section 12(5) of the 1982 Act and at
worst when the Application was listed for
hearing by the Court. In either event the
landlords were out of time. The District
Justice had to decline jurisdiction.
Folio Homes Limited
-v-
Edmond Abbott-
High Court (per O'Hanlon J.). 2 February
1984 - unreported.
Eugene Tormey
EXTRADITION — THE
CONSTITUTION
Part III of the Extradition Act 1965 is not
invalid having regard to the provisions of
the Constitution.
The Plaintiff had raised a plea in the
High Court that Part III of the Extradi-
tion Act 1965 was invalid, having regard
to the provisions of the Constitution.
This plea was rejected by Finlay P. in the
High Court, and the Plaintiff appealed to
the Supreme Court. He challenged the
constitutional validity of Part III on six
different grounds, and the Supreme
Court dealt with each one in turn.
1. The Plaintiff claimed that the law
procedure and practice relating to
the interrogation, detention and trial
of persons accused of politically
related or terrorist offences in
Northern Ireland fell short of the
minimum requirements for criminal
trials in this State, and that Part III
was accordingly inconsistent with
Article 40 of the Constitution.
Finlay P. had heard expert evidence
on this point in the High Court, and
held that the law and procedures in
Northern Ireland did not fall short
of minimum requirements of a
constitutionally valid trial in this
State. The Supreme Court accepted
his finding. They went on to point
out, however, that if it were shown in
a particular case that Part III was
being used for a purpose or in a
m a n n e r i n c o n s i s t e nt with t he
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s of
a n
individual, the Courts would be
bound to refuse to give effect to Part
III.
2. The Plaintiff had claimed that his
delivery to the R.U.C. in Northern
Ireland, an area in which there
existed a s h a rp sectarian a nd
political conflict, which had led to
armed conflict and insurrection,
constituted a failure to extend to him
the protections he was entitled to
under Article 40 Section 3 of the
Constitution. Again, the Supreme