380 / 406
GAZETTE
JULY/AUGUST
1985
jurisdiction when proceedings that have
been initiated are wrongly construed as
being or containing a claim for damages
at common law for wrongful dismissal. In
both cases the necessary pre-condition
for the exercise of jurisdiction is wanting.
(3) The order made under s. 15(3) was a
nullity, having been made without juris-
diction since the proceedings relied on did
not in reality contain a claim for damages
at common law for wrongful dismissal.
In a separate although concurring
judgment Griffin J. added that although
the employers were fully aware of the true
position when the hearing before the
Tribunal took place, they nevertheless
sought to take advantage of the fact that
the word "dismissal" had been used in
error in the Plenary Summons, and the
Tribunal accepted their submission.
The Court disallowed the cause shown
and granted an absolute order of
certiorari
quashing the decision of the
Tribunal. No order was made on the
application for an Order of Mandamus
since it had not been suggested that the
Tribunal would now be unwilling to
decide the statutory claim on its merits.
The State (Ferris)
-v-
Employment Appeals
Tribunal and Royal Liver Friendly
Society - Supreme Court (per Henchy J.
new. diss.). 10 December, 1984 -
unreported.
Damian McHugh
payment of the "expenses" referred to in
Order 74.
Irish Commercial Society Limited (In
Liquidation) and Others-v- Peter Plunkett
and Others - High Court (per CarrollJ.). 6
June, 1984 -unreported.
John P. O'Malley
Copies of judgments in the above
cases are available on request from
the Society's Library. The photo-
copying rate is lOp per page.
INSOLVENCY
Liquidation — injunction obtained by
Liquidator — priority as to undertaking
for damages.
The Defendants consented to the
continuation of an injunction obtained
by the Liquidator of the Plaintiff
companies, subject to one proviso, that
they would accept the Liquidator's
undertaking as to damages, provided that
if called upon to pay, the damages would
be given priority under Order 74, Rule
126. This Order of the Rules of the
Superior Courts (No. 1) 1966, as
amended, provides for the priority of
payments after the deduction of "fees and
expenses properly incurred in preserving,
realising or getting in the assets . . . " The
Defendants sought to have any damages
that might be awarded granted priority
under Order.
It was HELD that the undertaking as
to damages given by the Liquidator
should be accepted by the Court without
any order as to priority. The question of
damages was, at this stage, hypothetical.
The question of priority therefore could
not be dealt with at this stage, but would
have to be the subject of a further applica-
tion at a later stage after the assessment of
damages. The question of priority was
not ruled out in the Supreme Court case
In Re VanHool McArdle Ltd.
(24/2/83),
which dealt with priority
after
the
viii