379 / 406
GAZETTE
MARCH 1985
Court followed Finlay P. in holding
that there was no evidential basis for
suggesting that the Plaintiff would
be exposed to physical dangers or
the risk of an unfair trial by reasons
of conditions in Northern Ireland.
3. The Plaintiff claimed that Part III
was in conflict with a generally
recognised principle of international
law, in that it did not contain a
provision similar to Section 11(2) of
the Extradition Act, which only
referred to Part II of that Act.
Accordingly, Part III was therefore
invalid in regard to Article 29
Section 3 of the Constitution.
Section 11(2) of Part II of the Act is
concerned with circumstances where
a request for extradition for an
ordinary criminal offence has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting
or punishing a person on account of
his race, religion, nationality or
political opinion.
The Supreme Court held, following
Finlay P., that even if this exception
to extradition was a generally
recognised principle of international
law, and even assuming that Article
29 of the Constitution may be used
to test the validity of Part III,
(without deciding either point) there
we re n o g r o u n ds
(let
a l o ne
substantial grounds) for believing
that the extradition of the Plaintiff
was for the purpose of prosecuting
him for any of the reasons set out in
the exception.
4. The Plaintiff claimed that the
granting of an extradition Order
should be conditional on a finding
by the District Justice that there was
a
prima facie
case against the person
to be extradited, in regard to the
offence charged on the warrant.
Finlay P. had not been satisfied that
this requirement was a generally
recognised principle of International
Law, and the Supreme
Court
accepted this view. The Supreme
Court held that it was sufficient that
someone duly authorised to do so
averred in good faith that a
prima
facie
case existed. They went on to
point out, however, that if it were to
transpire that the charge in the
wa r r a nt
was t r ump ed up, or
insubstantial, or brought for ulterior
purposes, the good faith which is the
prerequisite for the operation of
extradition would be absent, and
extradition a r r a n g eme n ts wo u ld
break down.
5. The Plaintiff submitted that the
e n d o r s e m e nt of t he N o r t h e rn
Ireland Warrant by the Commis-
sioner of the Gardai constituted an
administration of justice otherwise
than by the Courts, and was
therefore inconsistent with Article
34 Section 1 of the Constitution.
Again, the Supreme Court followed
F i n l a y
P . ' s r e a s o n i n g .
T h e
endorsement of the warrant by the
Commissioner was merely to enable
it to be executed in the State by a
member of the Ga r da Siochana. The
endorsement itself could not lead to
extradition. Extradition could only
occur when a District Justice made
the Order. The function of the
C o mm i s s i o n er wa s, t h e r e f o r e,
merely procedural, and in no sense
judicial.
6. The Plaintiff had claimed that his
personal rights under Article 40 Sub-
section 3 of the Constitution were
not secured due to the absence from
Part III of a provision requiring the
Northern Ireland authority to bring
the Plaintiff b e f o re a judicial
authority for trial in accordance
with law.
Finlay P. had heard expert evidence
on the matter, and had held that
under Northern Ireland law, there
was a legal obligation to bring an
extradited person f r om the Republic
before a Magistrate's Court within
forty-eight hours of him being
received into custody. On the basis
of this, he held that the presumption
of f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s of
procedures was not rebutted. This
presumption exists because of the
reciprocity which is necessarily
implicit in extradition legislation.
The Supreme Court also accepted
Finlay P.'s view.
Accordingly, the S u p r eme C o u rt
H E LD that none of the grounds put
forward by the Plaintiff supported his
submission that Part III of the Act was
invalid, having regard to the provisions of
the Constitution, and dismissed the
appeal.
Seamus Shannon
-v-
Ireland and the
Attorney General - The Supreme Court
(per Henchy J.. Nem Diss). 16 November,
1984.
Michael Staines
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A decision of the Employment Appeals
Tribunal dismissing a claim by an
employee for redress under the Unfair
Dismissals Act, 1977, held to be a nullity.
S. 15(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act,
1977 (the Act) states as follows: "Wh e re
proceedings for damages at c ommon law
for wrongful dismissal are initiated by or
on behalf of an employee, the employee
shall not be entitled to redress under this
Act in respect of the dismissal to which
the proceedings relate".
The claimant, James Ferris, having
reached the rank of Industrial Branch
Inspector in 1983 with the Society and
vii
earning an annual income of about
£50,000, mainly in commission, was
informed by the Committee of Manage-
ment of the Society that he was being
suspended from his duties, with basic pay
of £35 a week, pending the outcome of
investigations. In June, 1983, he issued a
High Court Plenary Summo ns in which
he sought,
inter alia,
to have the
purported suspension declared invalid.
The summons also claimed "damages for
breach of contract, wrongful dismissal
and breach of the plaintiffs right to
natural justice".
As appeared from the statement of
claim delivered on 8 July, 1983, and from
the correspondence passing between the
Solicitors, and from Affidavits filed in the
proceedings, the expression "wrongful
dismissal" was an error (apparently a
typist's error) for "wrongful suspension".
In April, 1984, the Master of the High
Court gave liberty to the claimant to
substitute "suspension" for dismissal.
The Society resolved to dismiss the
Claimant on 10 July, 1983 and the
Claimant responded by serving a notice
of appeal to the Employment Appeals
Tribunal under the Act seeking redress
for alleged unfair dismissal. It came on
for hearing in March, 1984 when the High
Court proceedings, based on alleged
wrongful suspension, were then still
pending.
When the case was opened before the
Tribunal, it was submitted on behalf of
the Society that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the
case, basing its submission on s. 15(3) of
the Act. The Tribunal held that because
of the use of the expression "wrongful
dismissal" in the plenary summons,
s. 15(3) applied and, accordingly, it ruled
that the claimant was not entitled to
redress under the Act.
The claimant obtained a conditional
order of
mandamus
in the High Court to
compel the Tribunal to enter on a hearing
on the merits of his statutory claim.
Subsequently, the cause shown was
allowed and the conditional order was
discharged. The claimant appealed.
H E LD (per Henchy J. with He d e rman
J. concurring): (1) The point should be
approached on the basis of the extent of
the jurisdiction that was given to the
Tribunal by
S
.15(3). What the Tribunal
did was not simply to decline jurisdiction
to decide the claimant's case on the
merits, but also to seek to exercise a
jurisdiction to dismiss it under s. 15(3)
when the condition precedent for the
exercise of that jurisdiction did not exist,
that was to say, when the initiation of a
claim for damages at c ommon law for
wrongful dismissal had not been proved.
(2) The Tribunal no less acts
ultra vires
or in excess of its jurisdiction when it seeks
to rule out a case under s. 15(3) when no
proceedings for damages for wrongful
dismissal are initiated by the claimant
than when it purports to exercise that