231 / 338
shareholders in the transferee company, and they are
the holders of the 90 per cent, majority shareholding,
whose acceptance of that offer it is suggested binds
the dissenting shareholder also to accept the offer,
the onus is on them to satisfy the court that the
scheme is one with which the minority shareholder
ought reasonably to be compelled to fall in.
Of the three shareholders in a company, the
two majority shareholders promoted a transferee
company of which they each held 50 of the 100
issued shares. The transferee company offered to
acquire the shares of all three shareholders, but the
minority shareholders refused the offer and applied
for a declaration under s. 209 (i) that the transferee
company was not entitled to acquire his shares.
Held that, in the circumstances the onus of showing
that the price was fair was on the transferee company
and the company had failed to discharge that onus,
accordingly,
the applicant was entitled
to
the
declaration sought:
Re Bugle Press ; Application
of H. C. Treby. (1960) 2 W.L.R. 658 ; 104 S.J. 289 ;
(1960) i All E.R. 768, Buckley, J. (distinguishing
Re Hoare & Co. (1933) 150 L.T. 374.
Murder.—uncontrollable
impulse—evidence
of
in
sanity.
The law does not recognise uncontrollable
impulse as a symptom of legal insanity within the
M'Nalghten Rules.
But in a case where evidence
has been given that irresistible impulse is a symptom
of the particular disease of the mind from which a
prisoner is said to be suffering, its effect on his
ability to know the nature and quality of his act or
that his act is wrong should be dealt with by the
judge in the same way as any other relevant evidence
given at the trial.
B. was convicted of murder by shooting, the sole
defence being insanity, the medical evidence suggest
ing that, at the time of the shooting B. had lapsed
into a temporary state of schizophrenia in which he
did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
The trial judge directed the jury that " uncontrollable
impulse " was no defence in law. The Australian
High Court, allowing B.'s appeal, held that it was
necessary to " put before the jury the true operation
of incontrollable impulse as a possible symptom of
insanity ". Held, that irresistible or uncontrollable
impulse was not recognised as a symptom from
which
the
jury might without evidence
infer
insanity within the M'Nalghten Rules :
Att.-Gen.
for South Australia
v.
Brown (1960) 2 W.L.R. 588 ;
104 S. J. 268 ;
(1960) i All E.R. 734, P.C.
See
also s. 79.
Trial—summing-up.
If counsel in his address to
the jury in a murder trial refers to the consequence
of their verdict, it is incumbent on the judge to
instruct the jury that such matters are not their
concern and are completely irrelevant to any issue
they have to determine.
See Att.-Gen. for South
Australia
v.
Brown, Cupra.
Juries.
Trial by
jury,
right
to—action for personal
injuries. (R.S.C. Ord. 36, r. i (3).) Although there
may be much to be said for having a jury in an
action for personal injuries where the injuries are
very grave and there is judicial authority to indicate
that a jury is not an improper or unreasonable mode
of trial in such circumstances under R.S.C. Ord. 36,
r. i (3) it is in the absolute discretion of the court or
judge to decide one way or the other and in the
absence of grave injustice the Court of Appeal will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
The plaintiff claimed damages for serious personal
injuries sustained in a motor-car accident. Hinchcliffe,
J., on appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of a
master to order trial by jury, dismissed the appeal.
Held, that the matter was one of absolute discretion
and the Court of Appeal would not interfere.
Pease
v.
George (1960) i W.L.R. 427 ;
104 S.J.
328 ;
(1960) i All E.R. 709., C.A.
Medicine.
Restraint of trade—covenant " not to practise
privately as radiologist ".
(N.Z.) In Blakely and
Anderson
v.
De Lambert (1959) N.Z.L.R. 356, the
plaintiffs entered into a partnership deed with the
defendant, which provided that in the event of a
partner retiring or being expelled from the partner
ship he would not practice privately as a radiologist
within a certain radius for a certain time.
The
defendant withdrew from the partnership by consent
to take up a hospital appointment outside the stated
radius. Later, but still within the stated time, the
defendant applied for and obtained a post as a full-
time radiologist at a private hospital within the
stated radius to conduct the radiological department.
The Court of Appeal of New Zealand held, that the
defendant was not in breach of his covenant in the
partnership deed since the hospital appointment
would not be in private practice (following Way
v.
Bishop (1928) Ch. 647).
Practice.
Discovery — Crown
privilege — entries
in
detective's diary. A claim for Crown privilege in
respect of entries in a detective's diary (sealed by
order of the Home Secretary) is a claim made, not in
respect of a class of documents, but in respect of
each and every sealed entry, and the court has no
power to go behind the certificate of the Home
Secretary.
Entries in the diaries of a detective, who was
defendant in an action, had been sealed by order of