GAZETTE
NEWS
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1995
The Indigent's Search for a Champion:
Lawyers and
Pro Bono Publico
Practice
by Adrian F. Twomey, B.C.L. (N.U.I.),
M. Litt. (Dub.), Barrister-at-law;
Associate Lecturer in Law, National
College of Industrial Relations.
"Lawyers cannot escape being
officers of the court and cannot
escape. .
. pro bono publico
work,
which inevitably go[es] with the
special and exclusive privilege of
being allowed to represent others in
the court. . . I believe that thoughtful
lawyers would npt want it
otherwise."
- Judge Seiler,
Missouri Supreme
Court.
1
Introduction
The last two years have seen
previously unparalleled improvements
in the State's civil legal aid system. As
the Chairman of the Legal Aid Board,
Mr. Vincent Landy, S.C., notes in the
Board's most recently published
Annual Report
2
there has been a
sizeable increase in the State grant-in-
aid to the Board,
1
a substantial number
of new solicitors and support staff
have been recruited
4
and "a pilot
project which provides for the
participation of private practitioners
(to a limited extent) in District Court
work. . . has been put into operation.'"
In addition, the Minister for Equality
and Law Reform has quite recently
announced that fourteen new law
centres will be opened.
6
It is, therefore,
with some surprise that one notes that
the Chairman of the Bar Council, Mr.
Frank Clarke S.C., has, in that same
period, been particularly critical of the
State's civil legal aid system,
7
stating,
inter alia,
that the Minister for
Equality and Law Reform "seems to
be downgrading the level of service
being given to individuals who qualify
for legal aid."
8
In such a context it is
worth recalling that Judge
Vilhjalmsson of the European Court of
Human Rights held,
9
in the now almost
legendary
Airey
case,
10
that Mrs.
Airey's difficulties were with the legal
I profession rather than the State. Also
deserving of mention is Mr. Justice
Gannon's observation, in
Cosgrove v
The Legal Aid Board,
11
that:
The duty of administering justice
and adjudicating by due process
does not create any obligation on the
state to intervene in any private civil
litigation so as to ensure that one
party is as well equipped for their
dispute as is the other.
If one agrees with the reasoning of
both Judge Vilhjalmsson and Mr.
Justice Gannon, one might be so bold
as to suggest that the Bar Council
ought to be examining the efforts
made by its colleagues, rather than
those made by the Minister, to
vindicate the right of access to justice
of indigents.
12
In such a context, that
which follows attempts to outline the
scope of the moral and ethical duty
which lawyers have to work
pro bono
publico,
at all times bearing in mind
the fact that, as Brown and Marriott
point out:
Even for those who can afford it,
civil litigation is an extremely
expensive and hazardous
undertaking. Only if very
considerable sums of money or
fundamental rights principles are at
stake, is it worth contemplating. In
certain kinds of disputes the costs of
delay in resolution may be wholly
disproportionate to the amount in
issue.
13
The Origins of the
Pro Bono
Tradition
The idea of lawyers volunteering their
services
pro bono publico
seems to
have first been mentioned in an
EnglisH statute of 1495 which
provided that if a plaintiff could
establish that he was worth less than
£5 he could sue
in forma pauperis
and
have a sergeant-at-law appointed to be
his advocate.
14
If, however, such a
'pauper' lost his case, and could not
afford to pay the defendant's costs, he
i was condemned by the law to be
"whipp'd".
15
It does not stretch the
imagination very far then, to suggest
that this threat deterred at least some
thin-skinned souls.
16
Almost two centuries later, in
Scroggs
case,
17
the English Chief Justice, Sir
Matthew Hale, warned uncharitable
lawyers that "[i]f the court should
assign [a serjeant] to be counsel, he
ought to attend; and if he refuse we
would not hear him, nay, we would
make bold to commit him."
The provision by lawyers of services
free of charge to indigent litigants has
also been something of a tradition in
the United States, where it most
commonly occurred in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In 1868, for example,
Cooley thought it far from unusual to
state that a lawyer appointed to
represent an indigent defendant "shall
be paid by the Government'"
8
but if no
payment is authorised, the lawyer
owes a duty to his profession, to the
courts and to justice to serve without
compensation. Unfortunately, the
tradition has since largely died out,
although as late as 1965, in
United
States v Dillon)
9
the federal courts
37