GAZETTE
definition is that a treatment is futile
where the last one hundred cases in
which it was used proved useless, but
has a minimum threshold of benefit
that is greater than zero.
22
Permitting the
withdrawal
of futile
treatment, such as tube feeding or
treating infection, from a patient who
has gone beyond recovery would seem
to be more complex than choosing
not
to administer life saving treatment
such as cardio-pulmonary
rescusitation. One line of reasoning
categorises the former as an omission
and the latter as a positive act, but that
has been rightly criticised.
23
On the
other hand an American case which
clearly endorsed the categorisation of
switching off a life support machine as
an omission and thereby incapable of
attracting legal culpability, held that
the withdrawing of medical nutrition
and hydration ought to be evaluated in
the same manner as other mechanical
devices such as respirators and that
legally no distinction should be drawn
between them.
24
It remains to be seen
whether the Irish courts would apply
the same criterion to both advance
directives such as
do not rescusitate
orders and the ceasing of futile
treatment. The equal status attached to
positive acts and omissions in the
context of a duty to act, show that
criminal law principles are against
drawing such a distinction. Advance
directives are discussed later in Part II
of this article.
Another method of resolving the
conflict is to classify the treatment as
'ordinary' or 'extraordinary', a moral
test generally attributed to Pope Pious
XII:
"Man has a right and duty in the case
of severe illness to take the
necessary steps to preserve life and
health... But he is obliged at all
times to employ only ordinary
means... that is to say those means
which do not impose an
extraordinary burden on himself or
others."
25
It is now perhaps more appropriate to
refer to a productive or non productive
treatment test, thereby firmly
focussing on the individual case, as the
primary determining factor must be the
best interests of the.patient.
26
Circumstances may exist where, on the
postulated test, the interest of the
I
patient has to be seen in the context of
the resources demanded. The Aristian
thrust of the Constitution may tend
towards an interpretation of the duty to
j
; .support life which as well as
considering privacy may also
!
evaluate the proposed or continuing
treatment on the basis of how it
is classified.
Whilst there is a fear that providing for
a definition of treatments that may be
deemed futile, and thereby permitted
to be withdrawn, may provide a
*
floodgate for medical paternalism, it
has been submitted that those fears are
more likely to be realised in the
present state of ambiguity.
27
Thus,
whilst it is unlikely that futility could
be provided for by statute as it
depends on a complex variety of
circumstances, it is important that
specific standards are offered by the
medical profession. Otherwise, as with
advance directives, the courts will be
forced to take over and that creates the
risk of ad hoc emotionally propelled
decisions, rather than the development
of a definition of futility.
28
3.2 Futility, Rationing and Cost
Containment
The greatest risk posed by the
principle of medical futility is that it
will be confused with rationing and
cost containment. In an age of rising
health care costs, increasing
technological health care procedures
j
and a growing elderly population who
are the most significant users of the
j
health care system such comparisons
|
are inevitable. Indeed the Archbishop
of Canterbury had the courage to point
out that the costs of preservation of
life were becoming insupportable in
his Edwin Stevens Lecture in 1977,
and received a bad press for so doing.
29
However futility is a different
phenomenon to either rationing or cost
containment.
30
A futile medical
! treatment is one which is decided to
have no benefit to an individual patient
| and the economic state of the health
system is irrelevant. Rationing also
involves withholding treatment from a
| particular group of patients, but for the
1
purpose of using limited resources to
treat others. Cost containment involves
an overall communal reduction of
limited resources. Whilst futility and
rationing or cost containment can
occur in one situation, the fundamental
distinctions are clear
31
and it is vital
that these distinctions are appreciated.
In any event there is evidence that
advance directives result in
insignificant savings to the medical
scheme. It is estimated that if all
Americans had advance directives,
the entire saving would be only 3.3%
due to the expensive nature of
labour intensive humane care at
life's end.
32
i
i
3.3 Practical Implications for Irish
Medical Practice
j
So what of the legal situation where a
j
comatose patient in an Irish hospital is i
being tube fed and infections, which
j
may occur from time to time, are being
treated? Does there come a point when
the law allows such feeding and
treatment to be discontinued? It is
unlikely that either can be regarded as
"extraordinary" measures, certainly
while some real prospect for recovery
exists. It is submitted that if a
comatose patient who has gone beyond
any realistic hope of recovery
develops a terminal infection (which
|
would seem to be inevitable at some
stage), nature should be permitted to
take its course, and the body should be
allowed to die by not using unnatural
treatment. There may also be some
circumstances where tube feeding is so
invasive and extraordinary a measure
and so productive of any result to the
patient but indignity that it may be
regarded as a treatment and so
withdrawn. The possible precedents
here are confused. It appears that the
practice of not feeding an infant who
is substandard only by reason of its
mental state is currently illegal in the
UK, Canada and Australia.
33
However,
some American courts appear to be
willing to allow such treatment
(including feeding) to be withdrawn by
competent patients, or where
incompetent, by their guardian. In the
UK the withdrawal of feeding has been
permitted from two patients who
continued in a persistent vegetative
state beyond the time for the
possibility of any recovery.
34
The
principle applied was that to treat a
32