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Some Aspects of Irish Constitutional

Reform

PART 2

By Colm Gavan-Duffy, M.A., LL.B. (Editor)

Lecture delivered to the Irish Association of Jurists in

May 1968 (Part 1 was published in July/August 1971

Gazette, page 77).

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

In order to evaluate what part Fundamental Rights

play in modern Constitutions, it would be necessary to

make a study of such documents as—The Canadian

Bill of Rights, the European Convention of Human

Rights and the different United Nations Conventions

on this subject, on Genocide and on Non-Discrimina-

tion. A most useful document issued by the Interna-

tional Commission of Jurists is

The Rule of Law and

Human Rights—Principles

and definitions

published

in 1966. It would strictly be necessary not merely to

study the text of other Constitutions, but also to know

how far Fundamental Rights have been protected in

practice in those countries.

As this is difficult of achievement, I have decided to

adopt Jacques Maritain's division of Human Rights, as

it corresponds reasonably closely to that of the Inter-

national Commission of Jurists.

Jacques Maritain divides what he calls the Natural

Rights broadly into

three main classes,

which are

much more extensive than those contained in the

Constitution :

(1)

Rights of the Human Person as such

: (a)

The

Right to

existence

—this

appears to be presumed under

the Constitution as there would otherwise be no refer-

ence to person and citizen.

(b)

The Right to personal Liberty.

This is guaranteed

most specifically by the strong language of Article 40

Section 3 of the Constitution by which—The State

guarantees in its lass to respect and by its laws to defend

and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.

Sub-Paragraph

2, is even stronger, as by it The State

shall in particular by its law protect as best it may from

unjust attack, and, in the case of injustice done, vindi-

cate, the life, person, good name and property rights

of every citizen. Prima facia this strong clause would

seem effectively—to guarantee the freedom of ' the

citizen, but as will be seen, this clause has sometimes

been construed in an exceptionally narrow way. There

appears to be a connection between Article 40, Section

3, and Article 6, Clause 1, which claims that all powers

of Government legislative, executive and judicial de-

rived from the people whose right it is to designate the

Rulers of the State and in Final Appeal to decide all

questions of National Policy according to the require-

ments of the good.

The Right to Personal Liberty and Pluralism

The Section adds that the powers of Government are

exercisable only by or on the authority of the organs

of State established by the Constitution. Furthermore,

Article 5 declares that Ireland is a sovereign indepen-

dent and democratic State. As Maritain has pointed

out, democracy is the rational organization of Freedom

founded upon Law. It is therefore the only way of bring-

ing about the moral rationalisation of politics.

Consequently, the means to achieve this must be

moral and the end in view must be the principle of

justice and freedom and the dignity of the individual.

From this arises the pluralist principle by which the

State should as far as possible leave to particular organs

and Societies the free initiative to carry out their ends.

The Principle of Pluralism is of particular importance

in construing Article 40, Clause 3, of the Constitution.

There is little doubt but that this Clause, in view of its

eminence and importance, should be considered as

absolutely vital as the Preamble itself. In the Fluorida-

tion

Case—

Ryan

v. The Attorney General,

(1966) I.R.

312, Mr. Justice Kenny made the following statement

in the course of his Judgment, which was subsequently

approved by the Supreme Court: "In my opinion, the

High Court has jurisdiction to consider whether an

Act of the Oireachtas respects and as far as practicable

defends and vindicates the personal rights of the

citizen and to declare the legislation unconstitutional

if it does not. I think that the personal rights which

may be involved to invalidate legislation are not con-

fined to those specified in Article 40, but include all

those rights which result from the Christian and Demo-

cratic nature of the State. It is, however, a jurisdiction

to be exercised with caution. There are many personal

• ights which follow from the Christian and Democratic

nature of the State which are not mentioned in Article

40 at all—The right to free movement within the State,

the right to marry, the right to bodily integrity are

examples of this. In

Macauley v. The Minister for

Posts and

Telegraphs—{

1966)

I.R. 345, Mr. Justice

Kenny further held that the necessity to obtain the fiat

of the Attorney General before instituting Proceedings

against a Minister of State is a direct failure by the

State to defend and vindicate one of the personal rights

of the citizen.

The next Article of the Constitution to be considered

is

Article 40, Section I,

which states that "No citizen

shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accor-

dance with law".

A recent application of this Section is the case of

The State

(G.)

v. Minister for Justice

(1967) I.R. 106.

The Chief Justice held that Section 15 of the Lunatic

Asylums (Ireland) Act 1875, which enables a Minister

at will to transfer an accused to a mental hospital before

the preliminary investigation on the summary pro-

ceedings in a District Court are completed is an un-

warranted interference by the Executive in the working

of the Court, because the Court alone must determine

whether an accused is insane. The Chief Justice and

Mr. Justice Walsh stated that the doing of any act by

any non-judicial authority in the State which interferes

with the District Court's discretion is an infringement of

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