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judicial power. Once a Court has jurisdiction it has a

constitutional right to exercise its judicial power and no

law can interfere with this. It followed that the appli-

cant was granted an absolute order of Habeas Corpus

and entitled to be released from the mental hospital

forthwith.

The State (Burke) v. Lennon

It seems unfortunate that in recent judicial pro-

nouncements, there appears to have been a tendency

to disregard completely the vital judgment of the then

President of the High Court in

The State (Burke v.

Lennon

— (1940) I.R. 141. It was stated that the

applicant had been interned without trial from the 16th

September to December 1939 in pursuance of the

Offences against the State Act 1939, under a Warrant

issued by the Minister for Justice on the ground that

the Minister was objectively satisfied that he was

engaged in activities calculated to prejudice the pre-

servation or the security of the State. The Applicant

had, the President stated, now challenged the right of

the Oireachtas to make a law conferring the power of

internment on a Minister. It was thus necessary to

determine from a strict legal standpoint a matter of

high constitutional importance. It was emphasised that

Article 40, Clause 4, originally passed by Popular

Plebisite in 1937 was secured by a strongly worked

Habeas Corpus Clause to protect the citizen against

unlawful imprisonment.

The right to personal liberty

meant much more than mere freedom from incaceration

and carried with it necessarily,

the right of the citizen

to enjoy other fundamental

rights, the right to live his

life, subject to law, and if aman is confined against

his will, he has lost his personal liberty, whether the

name given to the restraint be penal servitude,

im-

prisonment, detention or internment.

It was then stated that there was no provision

enabling the Government or the Oireachtas to disregard

the Constitution in an emergency short of war or armed

rebellion. Furthermore—and this seems vital—

the

Con-

stitution contained no express provision for any Law

endowing the executive with powers of

internment

without a trial.

It was further stated that Article 40

guaranteed that no citizen should be deprived of

Liberty save in accordance with a law which actively

respected his fundamental rights to personal liberty and

which consequently defended and vindicated it as far

as possible by protecting his person from unjust attack.

The Constitution clearly intended that he shall be

liable to forfeit that right under the Criminal Law of

being duly tried and found guilty. It followed that a

law for the internment of a citizen without charge or

hearing for activities calculated to prejudice the State

does definitely

not respect his right to personal liberty

and does unjustly attack his person.

The Constitution

with its most impressive Preamble was the Charter of

the Irish people and should not be whittled away. The

Constitution obviously intended, while making all pro-

per provisions in time of emergency, to secure his per-

sonal freedom to the Citizen as truly as did Magna

Charta in England.

Re Offences against the State (Amendment) Bill 1940

In the reference of the

Offences against the State

Amendment

Bill 1940

(1940) I.R. 470, the Supreme

Court by a narrow majority held that this Bill was

valid because the subjective view of the Minister had

been substituted for an objective one. Henceforth the

Minister had merely to be of opinion that a person was

acting dangerously against the interests of the State,

whereas before then he had to be judicially and ob-

jectively satisfied about this. It followed that the Minis-

ter was no longer exercising a judicial function in

signing a warrant of internment. In this reference,.

Chief Justice Sullivan nebulously laid great stress on

the fact that there was nothing in the Clause in the

Preamble laying stress on the dignity and freedom of

the individual as one of the two aims to be achieved,!

which could be invoked to necessitate the sacrifice of

the common good in the interest of the freedom

of the individual. It is to be noted that Chief Justice

Sullivan's view seems to be in direct contradiction with

the view of the Supreme Court as expressed by Mr.

Justice O'Byrne in

Buckley v. The Attorney

General—

(1950) I.R. 80—as follows : In enacting the portion of

the Constitution contained in the Preamble, the People

of Ireland seeking amongst other things to promote the

common good with due observance of Prudence, Justice

and Charity, so that inter alia the dignity and freedom

of the individual may be assured, adopt, enact and

give to themselves this Constitution. These most laud-

able objects seem to us to inform the various Articles of

the Constitution, and the Court is of opinion that, in

so far as possible, the Constitution should be so con-

strued as to give to them life and reality." Chief Justice

Sullivan stated (p. 481), that it was alleged that the

provision of the offences against the State Amendment

Bill, 1940, were repugnant to the guarantee contained

in Article 40, Clause 3, of the Constitution. The guar-

antee in that Clause was alleged not to be in respect of

any particular citizen or class of citizen, but it was

to reject Natural Law and was to extend to all the

citizens of the State. Thus it was held that the duty

of determining the extent to which the rights of any

particular citizen or class of citizen could only be pro-

perly harmonized in accordance with the rights of the

citizen on the whole, and therefore was a matter

peculiarly within the province of the Oireachtas. The

reason for this nebulous pronouncement is obscure. Any

attempt by the Court to control the Oireachtas in the

exercise of this function would allegedly be usurping its

authority, thus attempting to suppress Constitutional

judicial review. Chief Justice Sullivan's arguments

appear to conflict directly with Mr. Justice Kenny's

quoted passage from the Fluoridation Case as well as

the basis of his decision in

McCauley v. The Minister

for Posts and Telegraphs—

(1966) I.R. 345. Chief

Justice Sullivan further stated (p. 482) that the phrase

"In accordance with law" was used in several Articles

of the Constitution, and he narrowly construed this as

meaning that it meant "in accordance with the law as

it existed at the time when the particular Article was

invoked" and so sought to be applied without having

the slightest regard for the dignity of the individual",

which Professor Kelly calls the unbroken trend of

judicial opinion. It will be noted that this construction

is redolent of the traditional British view of the supre-

macy of Parliament. It was first thought that this con-

struction must henceforth prevail for ever, but it could

doubtless be reargued on the ground that the Courts

contemplated by the Constitution have only been in

existence since 1961, and did not exist at the time.

The effect of the decision has been to compel the

Courts so far to construe the emergency provisions of

the Constitution in an exceptionally narrow way and

to declare that internment without trial is part of the

permanent ordinary law of the land.

Constitutional Amendment defining "Time of War' '

It may be contended that the maintenance of Irish

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