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UNREPORTED IRISH CASES

State must prove blood test was by a doctor.

Mr. Justice Butler, in a judgment in the High Court

yesterday, held that the State must prove that the per-

son who signed a certificate relating to the taking of a

blood specimen under the 1968 Road Traffic Act was a

designated registered medical practitioner.

He was giving his decision in a consultative case

stated by District Justice Breathnach at the request of

counsel for the Attorney-General, arising out of a case

in which Donald O'Connor of Rockfield Ave., Terenure,

Dublin, appeared before him charged that on 24th May

1972, at Harold's Cross Road, Dublin, he drove a car

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

In the course of the hearing, District Justice Breath-

nach stated, the prosecution tendered in evidence a

certificate in the prescribed form purporting to be a

certificate of a designated registered medical practi-

tioner issued under Sub-Section (1) of Section 43 of the

Road Traffic Act, 1968. The certificate was signed

"T. J. Coffey, M.D., B.L."

District Justice Breathnach stated that the Register

of Medical Practitioners was not produced to him and

there was no evidence adduced before him to show that

T. J. Coffey appeared on the register.

Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that no

such evidence was necessary.

After legal argument, Mr. Justice Butler held that

Section 44 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1968, did not

relieve the State of the obligation of proving that a

person who signed the certificate was a designated

registered medical practitioner.

[Attorney-General (O'Connor) v. District Justice

Breathnach]

The Irish Times

(13 January 1973)

New company must make redundancy payments to

workers from an old company.

The High Court, in a reserved judgment yesterday,

held that two men were entitled to have redundancy

lump sums paid to them on the basis that they were

employed respectively from 1919 and 1930, even though

the original firm ceased to operate and part of its

business was taken over by another company in 1963.

The men were dismissed on the grounds of redundancy

by the new company in 1968 and the company had

claimed that they were only responsible for redundancy

payments from the time they took over the two

employees.

On this basis they paid one of the employees £217

odd and the other a pension of £4 a week.

The Court was delivering reserved judgment in a

case referred to it by the Minister for Labour in which

he asked to have determined the question whether the

Redundancy Appeals Tribunal was correct in holding

that the company's interpretation of their liability to

the employees was the right one.

The men, Herbert Devoy, Dangan, Thomastown,

Co. Kilkenny, and William O'Brien, Newtown Tee.,

Thomastown, had been employed continuously with the

firm of R. Pilsworth Ltd., Grennan Mills, Thomastown,

since August 1919 and July 1930, respectively. The

company ceased to operate and part of its business was

taken over by R. Pilsworth (1963) Ltd. They were dis-

missed for redundancy reasons in August 1968.

Mr. Justice Kenny held yesterday that both men were

entitled to have their redundancy lump sums calcu-

lated on the basis that they had been employed continu-

ously from 1919 and 1930, respectively. Both the men

and the company were allowed their costs against the

Minister.

[Minister of Labour v. Pilsworth]

Irish Independent

(7 March 1973)

Statutory lump sum>to be paid if employer knew facts.

In a second case, Mr. Justice Kenny held that where

an employer failed to issue a redundancy certificate,

the compensation paid by him to an employee rendered

redundant could be treated as payment of the statutory

redundancy payment only when the employer proved to

the satisfaction of the Redundancy Appeals Tribunal

that at the time of the payment the employee knew

the amount of the statutory lump sum he was entitled

to and agreed to accept it in discharge of his claim for a

statutory lump sum.

The Court was dealing with a case in which Irish

Dunlop Company Ltd., Dunlop House, Cork, had paid

an employee, Daniel P. O'Connor, Ballinteer Park,

Dundrum, Co. Dublin, £500, after he had been dis-

nrssed on the grounds of redundancy. Mr. O'Connor

claimed that, in addition to this sum, he was entitled

to be paid a statutory sum of £132 under the 1967

Redundancy Payments Act.

The matter came before the Appeals Tribunal, who

held that the company, in paying a sum in excess of the

statutory sum, had fulfilled its obligations under the

Act, but Mr. Justice Kenny held that Mr. O'Connor

must now be paid the £132 in addition to the £500

already paid him by the company. He ruled that where

an employer agreed to pay a larger sum than the statu-

tory lump sum laid down in the Act, the employee did

not lose his right to the payment of the statutory lump

sum, in addition to the other sum paid by the employer.

Mr. Justice Kenny said the statutory obligation rest-

ing on the employer in such circumstances was to give

a certificate of redundancy to the employee to ensure

that the employee received the amount of statutory

redundancy payment to which he was entitled. Section

18 of the 1967 Act did not state whether the certificate

was to be given before, at the time of, or after dismissal.

This unfortunate ambiguity had been corrected by an

amendment in the 1971 Act, which provided that the

certificate was to be given to the employee not later than

the date of dismissal.

The amendment made in the 1971 Act, however, did

not affect the present case because the employee had

been dismissed before it had been passed.

Mr. Justice Kenny said he thought Section 18 of the

1967 Act, before it was amended meant that a redun-

dancy certificate was to be given at the time of dis-

missal, or within a reasonable time thereafter. The dis-

senting member of the Tribunal was incorrect in stating

that the 1967 Act required that the certificate should

be given at the date of, or before dismissal.

The obligation to make a lump sum payment on dis-

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