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the same as those in the 1895 lease, and undoubtedly
the map shows the garage opening directly on Leeson
Lane at the back, and the buildings over the original
right of way.
In 1971 the Sisters of Charity put the premises up
for sale as part of the old St. Vincent's Hospital. In the
conditions of sale, it was stated that the purchaser was
bound to admit that the map attached to the 1946 lease
showing that a small portion of the premises at the back
of the Leeson Lane was attached to 60 St. Stephen's
Green was erroneous : this was incorrect, as the pur-
pose was to pretend that the Sisters of Charity held
these particular premises under a 10,000 year lease
from the Pembroke Estate. A vigorous protest relating
to this exclusion was made by plaintiff's solicitors in
September 1971 pointing out the grave deterioration in
his property contained in this statement, and that he
would only give his consent to the sale if it comprised
the whole property. The defendant's solicitor with
blustering arrogance combined vain threats of an action
for substantial damages for delay with an unwarranted
threat that the plaintiff was deliberately putting for-
ward a false claim.
The plaintiff then took ejectment proceedings on the
title based on the plaintiff's right to forfeit the lease
for the defendant's breach of condition in denying the
plaintiff's title. The question to be determined is, was
the plaintiff entitled to forfeit the lease and re-enter
the premises.
At Common Law, as stated in Bacon's Abridgment,
a denial or disclaimer of the title of him of whom land
was held gave rise to a forfeiture of the tenant's interest
in the land. A tenant may thus incur forfeiture of his
estate by a matter of record, where, in an action by his
lessor grounded upon the lease, he resists the demand
—under the grant of a higher interest of land. The
written disclaimer accordingly had to go further than
mere denial of the title—the tenant had to prove a title
which would adversely affect the landlord's interest.
The historical position is admirably stated by Lord
Denning in
Warner v. Sampson
(1959) 1 All E.R. 120.
It is clear that forfeiture by record has always existed
through the centuries. From the authorities it is clear
that where a tenant, on or off the record, clearly and
unambiguously denies his landlord's title in a manner
which may adversely affect the landlord's estate or
reversion, the landlord is entitled to forfeit the lease in
respect of the property to which the denial extends. In
this case
Butler J .
held that the defendant had clearly
and unambiguously and in writing denied the plaintiff's
title as lessor in respect of the portion of the demised
premises coloured blue marked on the plan. The fact
that she seeks to bind the purchaser to admit that the
map on the plaintiff's lease is erroneous denies the
plaintiff's title and sets up an adverse title. The plain-
tiff is accordingly entitled to forfeit the defendant's
interest in the premises and is entitled to possession :
this forfeiture only extends to the portion of the prem-
ises coloured blue on the map.
[O'Reilly v. Gleeson; Butler J.; unreported; 19 Feb-
ruary 1973]
Claim for contribution and indemnity amongst defen-
dants in sea accident to vessel rejected.
The plaintiff is the father of the deceased, and claims
damages for negligence, and break of statutory duty
against the defendant. The plaintiff's daughter was one
of the passengers who died by drowning on 7 June 1969
while on the Motor Vessel "Redbank" near New Quay,
Go. Clare. The plaintiff settled the action with the
defendants for £1,000 damages, and £666 costs. The
first defendant is the Redbank Oyster Co. Ltd., and its
director, Stassen, and it is claiming contribution or
indemnity under the Civil Liability Act 1961 against
the second defendant, Fairway Fabrications, an English
company who built the vessel, for defective construc-
tion. Fairway Fabrications for their part are claiming
contribution against the third defendant, Bord Iascaigh
Mhara (hereinafter called BIM) for having insisted
upon some details in the erection of the vessel which
made it unseaworthy. The contract between the first
defendant and Fairways was specifically subject to the
acceptance of the vessel by BIM. In the Summer of
1968 the first defendants gave Fairways an order to
construct a new oyster and lobster vessel, and agreement
was reached as to the terms. The lengthy negotiations
are fully described.
Finally a contract in writing dated 19 February 1969
was made between the parties, and it specifically pro-
vided that this contract was subject to acceptance by
BIM for grant purposes. On inspection the BIM inspec-
tor insisted on certain changes in the structure which
were eventually the cause of the accident. On June 27
there was a further inspection after delivery of the
vessel, and everything looked satisfactory. On Sunday,
June 29, the vessel was named and blessed, and it was
taken out without incident on four occasions, but on
the last trip, the vessel had sustained much water. The
Fairways representatives was then asked to take out
some girls—but the boat was overloaded. The engines
stopped half a mile from the shore, the boat was turned
over, and everyone was thrown into the sea. Nine per-
sons including the plaintiff's daughter, were drowned.
The first defendant's claim against Fairways, and Fair-
ways' claim against BIM, both arise by virtue of Sec-
tions 21, 27 (1) (b), and 29 (1) of the Civil Liability Act
1961.
Pringle J.
was not satisfied that it was reasonably
foreseeable by Fairways that the vessel would not be
used for oyster or lobster fishing, but for pleasure trips.
Therefore Fairways were neither liable to the plaintiff
nor to the first defendants in respect of the accident as
they were not "concurrent wrongdoers" within the Civil
Liability Act: it follows that the first defendants cannot
succeed in their claim for indemnity or contribution
against Fairways, and therefore the question of a claim
by Fairways against BIM does not arise. Undoubtedly
the vessel as delivered was defective for the purposes
for which it was being used, and even for the purposes
for which it was intended to be used. But the effective
cause of the accident was not any defect in the boat
but the negligence of the defendant's in allowing the
boat to be grossly overloaded.
[Conole v. (1 Redband Oyster Co. Ltd. and Stassen,
(2) Fairway Fabrications Ltd., and (3) An Bord Ias-
caigh Mhara; Pringle J .; unreported; 2 October 1972]
Supreme CoiUrt quashes conviction for murder, and
directs a new trial, as, following an Australian case,
it is now possible to leave a verdict of manslaughter
to the jury.
The appellant was convicted of the murder in January
1969 of Smith and Ney in Ormond Square, Dublin,
held before Henchy J. in the Central Criminal Court in
November 1969 and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
His defence was that he had acted in self-defence. The
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