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missal for redundancy was imposed on the employer
who was entitled to a refund of half of the amount
paid by him, from the redundancy fund. One of the
purposes of the redundancy certificate was to enable
the employee to see how the sum was calculated. In
none of the cases which had come before the Court
had the employee signed the certificate. It was impor-
tant to emphasise, in the interest of employers, that
the employer must get the employee to sign the certi-
ficate when the lump sum was being paid. If this had
been done in the present case, the dispute would never
have arisen.
If an employer agreed to pay a larger sum than the
statutory lump sum, the employee did not lose his right
to the payment of the statutory lump sum in addition
unless the employer established (1) that the employee
knew the amount of the statutory lump sum before, or
at the time of his dismissal; and (2) that the employee
agreed to accept the sum offered in discharge of the
employer's liability to pay the statutory lump sum.
The Judge said he did not accept the view that
where an employer paid an amount equal to or greater
than the statutory lump sum when the negotiations
were going on, and that this amount was never men-
tioned to the employee, that this complied with the
provisions of the Act. In his view, the employee was
entitled in this case to be paid the statutory lump sum
of £132 in addition to the £500 paid him by his
employers.
Mr. Seamus Egan, S.C., for the Minister, said that
as the case had been brought for the purpose of clari-
fying the position under the Act, he had been instructed
not to oppose the payment of costs to either party in
the proceedings, and Mr. Justice Kenny said that both
parties would be allowed their costs.
[O'Connor v. Irish Dunlop Co. Ltd.]
Irish Independent
(7 March 1973)
Objector to plan will contest development plan order.
Judge dismisses action against corporation as no
reserved function involved.
Mr. Justice Teevan, in the High Court, Dublin, yester-
day, dismissed with costs an action brought by William
J. O'Hora, of 6-7 Francis Street, Dublin, against the
Dublin Corporation.
Mr. Rex Mackey, who appeared for Mr. O'Hora, sub-
mitted that Mr. James B. Molloy, assistant city manager,
had appointed, without authority, five persons to hear
representations from persons who objected to a proposed
development plan for the Francis street area of Dublin.
Mr. O'Hora sought a declaration that the order was
void and of no force and effect. He also sought an
injunction restraining the Corporation from making a
development plan or from doing any act affecting his
property rights until his case, as a ratepayer making
objection to the draft plan, has been entertained in
accordance with law.
The Corporation, in its defence, denied that it had
acted wrongfully.
Mr. Mackey said that in May 1967 the Corporation
caused notice of the draft of the proposed development
plan to be published. This plan provided for the demo-
lition of Mr. O'Hora's property. Availing himself of
the provisions of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act, 1963, Mr. O'Hora lodged objections
to the plan and requested an opportunity to state his
case.
In August last, the Corporation, in breach of statu-
tory duty, recommended by resolution that Mr. Molloy
should appoint persons from its planning staff to hear
statements from ratepayers objecting to the plan. In
the same month Mr. Molloy purported to appoint five
named persons to hear the statements, Mr. Mackey said.
Mr. Mackey submitted that while the city manager
had power to delegate functions to the assistant city
manager, that power was limited to functions which the
city manager could himself exercise. The function which
the city manager purported to delegate in this case, he
submitted, was a function reserved to members of the
City Council by statute and it could not be exercised by
the city manager.
Mr. W. D. Finlay, S.C., who appeared for the Cor-
poration, said that the area was intended to be used as
a car park. The objections which had been made had
been considered by the Planning Committee of the
Corporation. That body had recommended the exclu-
sion of Mr. O'Hora's premises from the plan and a
revised draft would be submitted to the Corporation
for approval.
There was, said Mr. Finlay, a vital distinction be-
tween preparing a draft of a proposed plan and making
a plan. At a practical level it was essential that the act
of the Planning Authority in making a plan must be
preceded by a great number of preliminary steps but
the Statute nowhere provided that the taking of the
preliminary steps was to be a reserved function. The
reserved function was the making of a plan or making
variations in the plan.
Mr. Justice Teevan, in his judgment, said he was
satisfied that the appointment of persons to hear state-
ments objecting to the plan was not a reserved function.
The Legislature was always specific, either by means
of a direct statement as to a particular function or in a
general definitive way, in saying what were and what
were not to be considered as reserved functions. Any-
thing which the Legislature did not in one way or other
make a reserved function was, accordingly, an execu-
tive function.
Mr. Finlay had drawn attention to the careful and
discriminating way in which the 1963 Act had laid
down what were to be reserved functions, said the
Judge. He had also drawn a distinction between the
making of a plan and the preparation of a draft plan.
" I am quite satisfied that this particular function
which must be undertaken in compliance with Section
21 (2) of the Act, is an executive function or, to be
more legally precise, it is not a reserved function and
that it lies in the power of the assistant city manager
to make these appointments."
Mr. Justice Teevan allowed a stay on the order for
costs.
[O'Hora v. Dublin Corporation]
The Irish Times
(26 July 1968)
Forfeiture of lease granted where false claim to posses-
sion made by tenant.
By lease of August 1895, Patrick O'Reilly, the grand-
father of the plaintiff, demised the premises 60 St.
Stephen's Green, Dublin, to Richard Tobin for twenty
years at an annual rent of £125. In 1903 the twenty
year period was extended by a further thirty years until
July 1945. On 20 August 1946 the plaintiff made a
further lease to six Sisters of Charity for a further
period of thirty years from 15 July 1945 at a rent of
£295. The defendant Sister is the sole survivor. The
premises intended to be demised by the 1946 lease were
87