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nant procedure. It is surprising that this Court should
be asked to hold, as a matter of law that it is necessarily
defamatory to say of an Irish citizen, that he assisted
in the bringing to justice in another country of fellow
countrymen who broke the laws of that country, and
were tried and convicted according to law. This Court
is bound to uphold the rule of law and it is not defama-
tory to suggest that ordinary right-thinking people
could not condemn such militant activitiés abroad on
the ground of disgraceful conduct. The statement would
have been defamatory if it had been alleged that the
Secretary of the Department of Justice used information
which came to his knowledge officially without the
sanction of the Minister, but this was not alleged. The
fact that in this case the allegation was false does not
make it defamatory. No objection was taken to the
Judge's charge at the trial. The Judge did not encour-
age the jury to find that the words were not defamatory,
and this ground fails. The appeal should accordingly
be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Fitzgerald,
dissenting, said that it ap-
peared to him that the words complained of were clearly
a libel. The word "felon-setter" which was admitted to
be untrue, was equivalent to calling the plaintiff a
traitor. The defence of privilege cannot in any event
be sustained. In his view the case should be re-tried on
the issue of damages only, as a gross injustice had been
done to the plaintiff.
Mr. Justice McLoughlin,
dissenting, said that the
impression conveyed to him was that the publication
was so clearly defamatory of the plaintiff that it was
beyond all argument. The expression "felon-setter" is
clearly vituperative and reviling, and clearly means that
the plaintiff had acted as a British police spy and
informer which, though totally untrue, has a peculiarly
nauseating effect in Irish life. Undoubtedly the publi-
cation is defamatory of a person if it injures his good
reputation in the minds of right-thinking persons, who
do not approve of the acts of militant republicans in
England, yet would regard the plaintiff with contempt
if they believed he had gone out of his way to supply
information to the British police so as to have such
persons jailed in England. In his view there should be
a new trial on the question of damages.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
[Berry v. Irish Times Ltd.; Full Supreme Court;
unreported; 31 July 1972]
Premises used as theatre must comply with prescribed
notice under Fire Brigade Act, 1940.
Two summonses under Section 7 of the Fire Brigades
Act, 1940, were brought by the Corporation of Dun
Laoghaire, the Sanitary Authority for the Borough of
Dun Laoghaire against the Alliance and Dublin Con-
sumers' Gas Company, alleging that on the 21st
September 1971 and on the 30th September 1971 at
Upper George's Street, Dun Laoghaire, within the
Borough of Dun Laoghaire in the Court Area and
District aforesaid, the Defendants being the Proprietor
of a building at Upper George's Street, Dun Laoghaire,
in respect of which a Fire Precautions Notice is in
force, did : Contravene, cause a contravention, or per-
mit a contravention of the said Notice, contrary to
Section 7 (4) of the Fire Brigade Act, 1940.
The Justice, who heard the case, was District Justice
Delap. He gave his decision on the 6th January 1972.
The Corporation of Dun Laoghaire
v.
Alliance and
Dublin Consumers' Gas Company (6 Jan. 1972)
The following is the judgment in the case in full:
In this case a Fire Precautions Notice pursuant to
Section 7(2)(b) Fire Brigades Act 1940 was served on
the Defendants as Proprietors of the Gas Showrooms,
Upper George's Street, Dun Laoghaire. The Notice,
which was served on the 14th May, 1971, set out
that the Defendant Company were Proprietors of a
potentially dangerous building as far as fire hazards
were concerned and it required the Defendants to stop
using part of the first floor known as the Gas Company
Theatre unless or until certain requirements laid down
in the Notice were met. The Notice contained a State-
ment at the end that the Proprietors could appeal
within fourteen days or service to the District Court on
any of the grounds provided by Statute and there was
also another reference in the body of the Notice to this
right of appeal. The Defendants did not appeal within
the time specified but at a later stage brought an
application for extension of time to appeal before the
President of the District Court who refused the Appli-
cation. The complainants now allege that the require-
ments of the Notice were not complied with and a
Summons issued on the 12th October, 1971 alleging
that the Notice :
(i) was contravened;
(ii) a contravention of the Notice was caused;
(iii) a contravention was permitted,
contrary to Section 7(4) of the Fire Brigades
Act, 1940.
The Chief Fire Officer of the Complainants visited
the Theatre on two occasions when a play was being
staged and gave evidence that the Fire Regulations had
not been complied with and the Defendants did not
challenge this evidence. Evidence of ownership of the
premises was given by Mr. O'Brien, the Secretary of
the Gas Company, who was subpoenaed by the Com-
plainants. In cross-examination Mr. O'Brien stated
that the premises had been let under a Quarterly Agree-
ment to a Theatre Group from 29th September, 1971
and prior to that it was let on a weekly tenancy.
Neither agreement was produced in evidence nor were
their terms disclosed in Court.
The Defendants did not call any evidence and Mr.
Humphries on their behalf argued that it was not
established that they were Proprietors, that there were
different Proprietors of different parts and that Pro-
prietor means occupier. He submitted that the wrong
person was before the Court and he relied on Section 7
(Sub-Section 1) of the Act which states that where
different persons are the Proprietors of different parts of
a building each such part of a building shall for the
purposes of the Section be deemed to be the Pro-
prietor of a building and he quoted the case of
Devlin
v. Conlon
reported at (1920) 2 I.R., p. 179.
Mr. Smyth for Complainants in reply stated that
there was no provision in the Act whereby a person
could disclaim proprietorship and that Section 7 (iii)
(d) set out the grounds of Appeal. He also relied on
the fact that as the Defendants had not availed of their
right of appeal under the Act they were estopped from
denying that they were the Proprietors and quoted the
Scottish case of Magistrates of
Stornoway v. McDonald
reported in the Scots Law Times Reports of 1971 at
f). 1954. In that case the Court of Session on Appeal
held that the Proprietor of a yard who had not availed
of a right of Appeal against a Notice requiring him to
pay a contribution towards the levelling of a private
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