INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015
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3 - Conditional Probability of Correct Selection for Ranking and
Selection Procedures
Dave Goldsman, Professor, Georgia Tech, School of ISyE,
Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA, 30332, United States of America,
sman@gatech.edu, Joshua Mcdonald
Ranking and selection (R&S) procedures seek to select the best of a number of
competing populations, subject to a guarantee on the achieved probability of
correct selection (PCS). In the usual formulations of R&S problems, the
guaranteed PCS is specified a priori. We instead study the conditional PCS after
sampling has concluded - which may be substantially different than the a priori
version. In particular, we show how to compute or estimate the conditional PCS
given the observed scenario.
4 - Efficient Optimization via Multi-fidelity Simulation
Jie Xu, George Mason University, 4400 University Dr., MS 4A6,
Engr Bldg, Rm 2100, Fairfax, VA, 22030, United States of
America,
jxu13@gmu.edu,Si Zhang, Edward Huang, Loo Hay
Lee, Nurcin Celik, Chun-hung Chen
To efficiently solve optimization problems involving time-consuming high-fidelity
simulations, we propose a new multi-fidelity optimization framework known as
MOTOS. MOTOS uses low-fidelity simulations to broadly explore the solution
space and focuses high-fidelity simulations on promising solutions. MOTOS
integrates low- and high-fidelity simulations in an efficient and rigorous manner
and has been shown to lead to significant computational savings.
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77-Room 300, CC
Supply Chain Management IV
Contributed Session
Chair: Chun Hung Chiu, Associate Professor, Associate Professor,
Sun Yat-sen University, Business School, Sun Yat-sen University,
No 135, Xingang West Rd., Guangzhou GD 510275, China,
zhaojx5@mail.sysu.edu.cn1 - Public Versus Private Quality Disclosure of Counterfeit Goods
Laura Wagner, Zaragoza Logistics Center, Calle Bari, Zaragoza,
Spain,
laurawa@mit.edu, Mustafa Cagri Görböz, Mahmut Parlar
Some manufacturers have been accused for withholding information on
counterfeit incidences, while others have proactively warned. We analyse this
situation in a supply chain setting. In particular we are interested in
manufacturer’s willingness to disclose the quality of the potentially counterfeit
good, intermediary’s purchasing decision in response to the disclosure strategy
and consumers’ responses to such warnings.
2 - Mean Variance Analysis for Supply Chain Contract
Jinfeng Yue, Professor, Middle Tennessee State University and
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Department of
Management and Marketing, Murfreesboro, TN, 37132,
United States of America,
jinfeng.yue@mtsu.eduThis research studies the supply chain coordination by mean-variance analysis.
When only the mean and variance information is available, the coordination
conditions are obtained for wholesale price contract. The maximum number of
retailers can also be determined. For general cases, the conditions to select the
retailers are also obtained. Finally, an optimal designed wholesale price contract
can coordinate the supply chain and split the total profit by any designed level.
3 - Economic Contracts Improving the Efficiency of Cotton
Supply Chains
Jian Li, Associate Professor, Northeatern Illinois University, 5500
N. St. Louis Ave, Chicago, IL, 60625, United States of America,
jli@neiu.edu, Panos Kouvelis
We study the use of economic contracts to improve the efficiency of a stylized
cotton supply chain structure of a ginner and a farmer. The benchmark is a
standard transfer price contract that reflects the current practice on which a
minimum price is imposed from the government. We show that the minimum
transfer price is not necessarily effective. An incentive contract is proposed.
Numerical studies show that the incentive contract achieves a win-win
improvement.
4 - Supply Chain Performance Assessment and Supplier and
Component Importance Identification
Dong Michelle Li, Assistant Professor of Supply Chain
Management, Department of Management & Marketing,
Arkansas State University, Jonesboro, AR, 72467,
United States of America,
dli@astate.edu, Anna Nagurney
We develop a multitiered competitive supply chain network game theory model
with firms and associated potential suppliers. All decision-makers seek to
maximize their profits. The supply chain network performance measures, which
assess efficiency, are constructed for the full supply chain and the individual firm
levels. The identification and ranking of the importance of suppliers as well as the
components of suppliers with respect to the full supply chain or individual firm
are also proposed.
5 - Channel Coordination under Information Asymmetry by Target
Sales Rebate Quantity Discount Contracts
Chun Hung Chiu, Associate Professor, Sun Yat-sen University,
Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, No 135, Xingang West
Rd., Guangzhou, GD, 510275, China,
zhaojx5@mail.sysu.edu.cn,Jian Li, T.c.e. Cheng, Tsan Ming Choi
We study a target sales rebate quantity discount (TSR-QD) contract in a single-
manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain. The manufacturer is risk-neutral.
Retailers are mean-variance seekers with different target profits which are
unknown to the manufacturer. We explore how a Menu of TSR-QD Contracts
(MTQ) can be applied to enhance the benefit of the manufacturer and the supply
chain’s efficiency.
SD78
78-Room 301, CC
Supply Chain Risk Management II
Contributed Session
Chair: Saravanan Kuppusamy, Assistant Professor, Quinnipiac
University, 275 Mt Carmel Ave, Hamden, CT, 06518, United States of
America,
saravanan.kuppusamy@quinnipiac.edu1 - A Fair Optimization of Expected Cost and Expected Service
under Disruption Risks
Tadeusz Sawik, Professor And Chair, AGH University of Science &
Technology, Al. Mickiewicza 30, Krakow, 30059, Poland,
ghsawik@cyf-kr.edu.plA new decision-making problem of equitably efficient optimization of cost and
service level in a supply chain under local and regional disruption risks is
presented. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer program with the
ordered weighted averaging aggregation of the two conflicting objective functions.
Computational examples and some managerial insights are reported.
2 - Risk Assessment in a Large Retail Supply Chain
Burak Kazaz, Associate Professor, Syracuse University,
721 University Avenue, Syracuse, NY, 13244, United States of
America,
bkazaz@syr.edu,Mert Hakan Hekimoglu, John Park
This study develops a new risk exposure index for various infrastructures in a
large retail supply chain. It identifies detrimental disruptions, considers
operational and financial metrics with excess capacity at distribution centers and
fulfillment centers that can serve as backup facilities. It provides risk levels at all
facilities.
3 - Risk Modeling in Food Supply Chain, Insights
Saravanan Kuppusamy, Assistant Professor, Quinnipiac
University, 275 Mt Carmel Ave, Hamden, CT, 06518, United
States of America,
saravanan.kuppusamy@quinnipiac.edu,
Mario Norbis, Iddrisu Awudu
Issues related to food supply chain are becoming increasingly critical for the
business and policy makers alike. We propose a food supply chain research
framework that consider issues related to location, legislation, corporate
responsibility, collaboration, risk measures, food safety and security measures. In
addition to managerial insights and implications, we discuss the challenges and
opportunities in food supply chains.
4 - Decision Model for Prioritization of Reverse Supply Chain Risks
Dr Jitender Madaan, Professor, Indian Institute of Technology
Delhi, Room No 606 DMS, VK Bhawan, Hauz Khas, New Delhi,
110016, India,
jmadaan@dms.iitd.ac.inThis paper presents a flexible, generalized decision model that integrates and
prioritize high-level and detailed RSC design decisions that incorporates risks.
SD77