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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

247

MD47

47-Room 104B, CC

Sustainability and Transportation

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Sustainable

Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Ruben Lobel, Operations and Information Management

Department at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,

Jon M. Huntsman Hall 3730 Walnut Street, Office 568, Philadelphia,

PA, 19104, United States of America,

rlobel@wharton.upenn.edu

1 - Compete vs. Cooperate? A Strategic Game Behind the EV

Standards War

Ni Fang, HEC Paris, 1, Rue de la Liberation, HEC Paris, Jouy en

Josas, DI, 78351, France,

ni.fang@hec.edu

, Marco Ceccagnoli

In the light of the standards war currently staged in electric vehicle (EV) industry,

this paper examines the strategic choice facing the two EV manufacturers as to

compete vs. cooperate for the development of an extensive charging

infrastructure, a key complementary asset mitigating EV range anxiety. In doing

so, this paper demonstrates EV manufacturers’ incentives towards standardization

and shows how standardization affects EV diffusion rate and firm’s performance.

2 - Food, Energy and Environment Trilemma: Land use Configuration

for Biofuel Industry Development

Michael Lim, University of Illinois, 1206 S. 6th Street,

Champaign, IL, 61822, United States of America,

mlim@illinois.edu

, Yanfeng Ouyang, Xin Wang

We address the negative side effects of the rapid development of the biofuel

industry, which has caused extensive competition among food, energy, and the

environment in agricultural land use. Taking into account interactions among

multiple stake-holders (e.g., farmers, bioenergy firms, food industry,

government), we develop policy guidelines for coordinating subsidy and

mandates to better achieve sustainable development of this emerging bio-

economy.

3 - Socially Responsible Business Models for Off-grid Energy Access

Serguei Netessine, Professor, INSEAD, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue,

Singapore, 138676, Singapore,

Serguei.Netessine@insead.edu,

Bhavani Shanker Uppari, Ioana Popescu

One fifth of the humankind does not have access to electricity. They are mainly

poor and rely on unhealthy solid fuels (kerosene etc.) for lighting. Even though

cheaper rechargeable lighting technologies are available, their adoption is low and

some consumers still use kerosene. We propose a model which explains this

preference for kerosene and explore various business models which could alter

this preference.

4 - Technology Sharing in Two-sided Markets

Ozge Yapar, Doctoral Candidate, University of Pennsylvania,

Wharton School, Operations and Information Mgmt.,

Philadelphia, PA, 19104, United States of America,

yapar@wharton.upenn.edu

, Lorin Hitt, Ruben Lobel

This paper investigates the drivers behind Tesla’s decision to make its patents

freely available to other electric car manufacturers. The two sides of this market,

car owners and potential charging stations, rely on each other to increase the

value of their investment. We show under what conditions subsidizing the

competitors can be profitable. By sharing technology, Tesla may be able to

improve the charging station network and increase its own profit from car sales.

MD48

48-Room 105A, CC

Operations/Corporate Finance Interface

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/iFORM

Sponsored Session

Chair: Vishal Gaur, Cornell University, 321 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY,

14850, United States of America,

vg77@cornell.edu

1 - How Do Information Spillover and Debt Financing Affect

Companies’ Innovation Decisions?

Jie Ning, Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University,

11119 Bellflower Rd, Cleveland, OH, 44106, United States of

America,

jie.ning@case.edu

, Volodymyr Babich

Information spillover alone leads to inefficient innovation equilibrium by

inducing companies to free ride. Debt financing alone also leads to inefficient

equilibrium by inducing companies to take excessive risks. This paper examines

the interaction of these two economic forces and shows that the presence of both

leads to either under-investment, over-investment, or social optimality.

2 - Systematic Risk and Mass Layoffs in the U.S. Manufacturing

Nikolay Osadchiy, Emory University, 1300 Clifton Rd NE,

Atlanta, GA, 30322, United States of America,

nikolay.osadchiy@emory.edu,

Suresh Dasari, Peeyush Taoiri,

Sridhar Seshadri

We study the role of systematic risk in jobs relocation decisions of manufacturers.

Using the mass layoffs data in the U.S. manufacturing sector for the period from

2002 to 2010, we explore the view voiced by a number of manufacturers that in

addition to cheap labor, systematic risk is also an important input in their

production decisions.

3 - Risk or Margin: The Role of Trade Credit in Competition

Heikki Peura, London Business School, Regent’s Park,

London, United Kingdom,

hpeura@london.edu

, S. Alex Yang,

Guoming Lai

We analyze horizontal competition with and without trade credit under the

classic Bertrand framework. We find that when the competing firms are

financially constrained, trade credit allows them to soften price competition. We

further investigate the relationship between firms’ financial strength and their

physical production capacity, finding that with trade credit, financial constraints

are a partial substitute for the role that physical capacity plays in price

competition.

4 - Mental Cost Ratios and the Beer Game

Maximiliano Udenio, Technical University of Eindhoven,

Eindhoven, Netherlands,

M.Udenio@tue.nl

, Vishal Gaur,

Jan Fransoo

In this study we investigate the underlying behavior of beer-game players

through a series of experiments. We argue that players make decisions based,

partly, on a dynamic mental cost-ratio that fluctuates following multiple factors.

We use a structural estimation model to quantify the mental weighing of

underage and overage costs, and discuss several factors driving the decision

making.

MD49

49-Room 105B, CC

Supply Chain Operations

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Supply Chain

Sponsored Session

Chair: Alp Muharremoglu, Associate Professor, University of Texas at

Dallas, 800 W Campbell Rd, Richardson, TX, United States of America,

alp@utdallas.edu

1 - Using Retailer Order Commitments to Improve Supply

Chain Performance

Nagesh Gavirneni, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,

United States of America,

sg337@cornell.edu,

Nagesh Gavirneni

We establish that retailer order commitment strategies improve the efficiency of

decentralized distribution supply chains whenever the supplier’s cost is at lest

29.3% of the total supply chain cost. The effectiveness increases as the supplier’s

share of the total supply chain cost increases. We establish the robustness of these

results for settings with non-normal demand distributions, backlogging at the

supplier, and positive lead times between the supplier and the retailers.

2 - Can a Zero-margin Demand Stream Increase Profits?

Shaokuan Chen, The University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W.

Campbell Road,, Richardson, TX, 75080, United States of

America,

shaokuan.chen@utdallas.edu

, Ganesh Janakiraman,

Alp Muharremoglu

We consider a firm selling a non-perishable product in its primary market over

time with uncertain demand. Suppose a new opportunity arises from a secondary

market where the firm’s product can only be sold at a zero-margin. Moreover, the

firm is required to give priority to the demand from the secondary market. We

explore the following question: Can such a zero-margin opportunity increase the

firm’s profit, and if so, when?

3 - Mitigating Supply Chain Disruptive Risks: A Two-stage Robust

Optimization Approach

Peter Yun Zhang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77

Massachusetts Avenue, Building E40-261, Cambridge, MA,

02139, United States of America,

pyzhang@mit.edu

,

Nikolaos Trichakis, David Simchi-levi

We present a model that captures two sets of decisions a supply chain risk

manager faces: the placement of inventory in preparation for supply disruption

and demand uncertainty, and the recourse decisions that coordinate capacity and

inventory allocation after the uncertain events unfold. We take a worst-case

perspective and analyze the problem via its Affinely Adjustable Robust

Counterpart.

MD49