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INFORMS Philadelphia – 2015

248

4 - Package Size and Pricing Decisions with a Bulk Sale Option

Ismail Kirci, PhD Student, University Of Texas at Dallas, 800 W.

Campbell Road, Richardson, YX, 75080, United States of America,

ixk130330@utdallas.edu,

Alp Muharremoglu, Dorothee Honhon

In this study we investigate package size and pricing decisions of a retailer for a

perishable product. The retailer has the option of bulk sale, which is defined as

selling the product in a container that allows customers to buy as much or as little

as they want.

MD50

50-Room 106A, CC

Procurement, Auction, and Pricing

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Zhixi Wan, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon, Eugene,

OR, United States of America,

zwan@uoregon.edu

1 - Optimal Descending Mechanisms for Constrained Procurement

Shivam Gupta, PhD Candidate, UT Dallas, NJ School of

Management, 800 W. Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX, 75080,

United States of America,

sxg104920@utdallas.edu,

Milind

Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, Wei Chen

We propose optimal descending mechanisms for procurement under two

practically-relevant feasibility constraints. We then show that both mechanisms

belong to a larger class of descending mechanisms that are optimal for

procurement under polymatroid feasibility constraints.

2 - Dual Sourcing Auctions for Unreliable Suppliers: with or Without

Cost Distribution Information

He Huang, Professor, Chongqing University, School of Economics

and Business Admin., Chongqing, China,

huanghe@cqu.edu.cn

,

Zhipeng Li, Hongyan Xu

This paper examines dual-sourcing auctions for risk mitigation when a buyer

faces uncertain demand and multiple unreliable suppliers with private cost

information. Two scenarios involving three auction formats are considered,

Generalized First-price Auction, Generalized English Auction and Optimal

Auction with Learning. We separately design the above dual-sourcing auctions

and then examine the buyer’s strategic choice.

3 - Using Procurement Service Providers in Supplier Screening

Zhixi Wan, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon,

Eugene, OR, United States of America,

zwan@uoregon.edu

,

Sripad Devalkar

A buyer engages a procurement service provider (PSP) to short-list pre-screened

suppliers for final selection. The PSP can exert costly effort to include promising

candidates that have a higher probability to be deemed qualified by the buyer. We

solve the buyer’s joint optimization about the short-list size and the performance

bonus.

4 - Dynamic Pricing with Product Returns

Xing Hu, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR,

United States of America,

xingh@uoregon.edu

We consider a monopolist’s dynamic pricing problem when the customers may

stochastically return the purchased products. We study how the customers’ return

speed and return probability affect the optimal pricing decisions.

MD51

51-Room 106B, CC

Applications of Operations Management to

Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Industry

Sponsor: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Zhili Tian, Assistant Professor, Florida International University,

11200 S.W. 8th Street, Miami, FL, United States of America,

ztian@fiu.edu

1 - Process Flexibility with Inventory

Yang Wang, UC Berkeley, IEOR Dept., Berkeley, CA, 48109,

United States of America,

yangwang0803@berkeley.edu

,

Philip Kaminsky

Motivated by a capacity planning project undertaken with a biopharmaceutical

firm, we explore the benefits of combining process flexibility with inventory to

better respond to demand uncertainty. We consider a multi-plant multi-product

multi-period supply chain model in which each plant is capable of producing

multiple products as well as holding inventory, and characterize conditions under

which inventory, flexibility, or a combination of the two are most beneficial.

2 - Optimal Investment in Support of Existing Drug and Development

of New Drug

Zhili Tian, Assistant Professor, Florida International University,

11200 S.W. 8th Street, Miami, FL, United States of America,

ztian@fiu.edu

Firms invest in the support of existing drug and R&D of new drug. While the

investment fund comes from the net sales of the existing drug, a firm has to

balance the investment in the two types of competing projects. We determine the

optimal resource allocation between the marketing support of the existing

product and developing a new product. We estimate the demand as function of

investment in marketing. We derive the optimal investment policy for the above

two types of investment.

3 - Nurse Staffing Decision in Nursing Homes

Min Chen, Florida International University, 10200 SW 8th St,

Miami, FL, 33199, United States of America,

mchen2@fiu.edu

Staffing is the dominant input in the production of nursing home services. This

paper examined how skilled nursing facilities responded to the minimum nursing

hours per resident day regulations. Panel data analyses of facility-level nursing

inputs and outputs revealed that nursing homes strategically reallocated their

staffing levels and skill mix, which could have important implications for quality

management.

MD53

53-Room 107B, CC

Behavioral Studies in Supply Chains and

Revenue Management

Sponsor: Behavioral Operations Management

Sponsored Session

Chair: Jun Li, Assistant Professor, Ross School of Business, University of

Michigan, 701 Tappan St, Ann Arbor, 48103, United States of America,

junwli@umich.edu

Co-Chair: Xiaobo Zhao, Professor, Tsinghua University, Shunde

Building, Beijing, China,

xbzhao@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

, Beijing, China

1 - Does Elicitation Method Matter? Behavioral and Neuroimaging

Evidence from Capacity Allocation Game

Yukun Zhao, Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua

University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua

University, Beijing, 100084, China,

zhaoyk1989@gmail.com

,

Lihong Wang, Yefen Chen, Xiaobo Zhao

Based on the allocation game, we conduct a normative-behavioral experiment

and a neuroimaging experiment by adopting fMRI technique to investigate the

elicitation-method effect under the direct-response method and the strategy

method. No significant difference is observed in either ordering behaviors or brain

activities between the two elicitation methods. Our results indicate that in multi-

round game experiments without emotion features, the elicitation-method effect

is not likely to exhibit.

2 - Transparency and Indirect Reciprocity in Social Responsibility:

An Incentivized Experiment

Leon Valdes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,

MA, United States of America,

lvaldes@mit.edu,

Tim Kraft,

Karen Zheng

We design an incentivized experiment to study the impact of transparency on

consumers’ valuations of a firm’s social responsibility practices. We investigate

how much of consumers’ valuations can be attributed to indirect reciprocity. We

also analyze how heterogeneity in prosocial orientation impacts the roles of

transparency and indirect reciprocity. Our results demonstrate that consumers are

willing to pay a higher price under a higher level of transparency.

3 - Social Influence and Quality Competition: An Experimental Study

Dayoung Kim, Cornell University, 301A, 114 East Avenue,

Ithaca, NY, 14850, United States of America,

dk668@cornell.edu

,

Vishal Gaur, Andrew Davis

We investigate the impact that different types of social information have on the

market share and demand uncertainty of firms competing through service quality.

In particular, we conduct a lab experiment, where a consumer chooses to visit

one of two firms, which differ in their average service quality. Our results suggest

that the presence and type of social information can dramatically impact the

consumers’ decisions, a firm’s market share and demand uncertainty.

MD50