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Local Fuel plc - Shoreham Oil Terminal

Safety Instrument System Functional Safety Assessment Stage 5

P & I Design Ltd

DOCUMENT NO: LF364100_RPT

2 Reed Street, Thornaby, UK, TS17 7AF

ISSUE: A DATE: 15.06.2015

Tel: + 44 (0)1642 617444

PAGE 7 OF 32

Fax: + 44 (0)1642 616447

www.pidesign.co.uk

Assess how far within the SIS lifecycle to go back and review the impact of the

modification, i.e;

o

LOPA

o

SRS

o

Design

o

Installation

o

Testing

o

Operation

o

Maintenance

Review the status of operating manuals and documentation in respect to the

implemented modification;

Plans or strategies for implementing further FSA’s are in place;

4.2

Actions from Previous FSA and Competent Authority Reports

A FSA Stage 2 was conducted on 19

th

June 2008 by Chevron (previous company name of

Valero). This assessment of the design was conducted for all Valero terminals as the design

intent was identical. No actions remain open from this assessment.

A FSA Stage 3 was conducted by way of a compliance document between March 2009 and

March 2010 the final issue being revised post installation. No actions remain open from this

assessment.

With regard to FSA Stage 4, Valero were in the process of conducting Stage 4 assessments

when the decision was taken to either sell or de-commission the terminal, so a FSA Stage 4

has not be conducted at the Shoreham Terminal.

In December 2012 a FSA Stage 5 was initiated for the de-commissioning of the SIS, this FSA

was only partly completed as Valero then sold the terminal as opposed to de-commissioning.

No actions are therefore relevant to the SIS.

On 30

th

July 2014 an assessment was conducted by the COMAH Competent Authority.

Nine actions were raised from the assessment of which:

actions one to seven were related to functional safety,

action eight related to Automatic Tank Gauging system which provides a layer

of protection albeit the system is providing a safety function of low/undefined

safety integrity as defined in HSE/SPC/Technical/General/51.

Action nine related to DSEAR.

The functional safety actions are detailed below, however, not to duplicate with other control

documents the action history is not detailed in the assessment, other than showing action

status.

Action control for this FSA is conducted utilising a live action tracker called ASANA. This

allows up to date status of all actions. A snapshot from ASANA will be appended to this FSA

for the status of each action relevant to the issue of the FSA.