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Proceedings under S. 34 of the Solicitors'
(Ireland) Act, 1898.
THE Secretary was directed to file an application
with the Statutory Committee on behalf of the
Society against a solicitor alleging that he has
been guilty of professional misconduct.
The Secretary was directed to bring an applica
tion on behalf of the Society before the Chief
Justice to have the names of two solicitors
struck off the roll on the ground that they had
been convicted of criminal offences.
CURRENT TOPICS.
Interviewing Opponent's Witnesses.
A MEMBER has drawn attention to a judicial
pronouncement which should be noted in connec
tion with the paragraph under the above heading
in the November
Gazette.
In Attorney General v.
Fitzgerald (68 I.L.T.R. 249) there was an appeal
by Fitzgerald, the accused, against an order of
the Circuit Judge refusing bail and remanding
him in custody. The accused had been tried on
charges on which the jury had disagreed and
fresh charges were pending against him. One of
the grounds on which the State opposed the
granting of bail was the allegation that the
accused had interfered with State witnesses.
Per Haima, J. " The next ground was that of
interfering with State witnesses.
I am not quite
clear what ' interference ' means, as suggested by
the affidavit. Both accused and his solicitor, if
they so desire, may interview witnesses for the
State, so long as they do not suborn them to
perjury. The mere fact of talking to or having a
drink with a State witness is not of itself sufficient
to disentitle the applicant to bail." This dictum
of Mr. Justice Hanna should serve to dispel any
doubts, if they ever existed in this country, as to
solicitors' rights in such cases.
Solicitors' Income Tax.
THE COUNCIL is indebted to the English Law
Society for permission to print the following
report of the case, Commissioners of Inland
Revenue v. Elvy Robb & Co. from the Law
Society's
Gazette.
It should be noted that it is a
decision of the British General Commissioners of
Income Tax and not of a Court of Law. The sole
question involved in the appeal was whether a
loss sustained by the solicitors in the manage
ment of a client's affairs was an admissible
deduction from profits.
The facts were that the solicitors had for many
years managed the affairs of a lady client by
collecting her income and disbursing the same in
accordance with her instructions, the disburse
ments including periodical payments to the client
herself. For a number of years the account had
invariably been in credit, but as from 1931 there
was a serious diminution of income, and by 1933
there was a debit balance of £369 due to the
solicitors, which represented payments and ad
vances made by them in excess of the income
received.
In 1933 the solicitors took a second
charge from the client to secure £369 then due.
This charge recited
the facts and that the
solicitors had only agreed to continue to act for
the client upon having the security given. No
interest had been charged on the balances due
on the open account from time to time, but
interest was reserved by the charge.
After the charge had been given, the solicitors
continued to manage the client's affairs in the
same manner as previously, but the income did not
revive to the extent anticipated and, when the
lady died in 1940, she was owing a further sum of
about £130 in addition to the amount of £369
before mentioned. Both sums having proved to
be irrecoverable, the solicitors claimed the right
to set them off as deductions against profits, but
the Inspector of Taxes concerned contended that
the amounts in question had not been wholly or
exclusively paid or expended for the purposes of
the solicitors' profession in accordance with Rule
3
(a)
of the Rules applicable to Schedule D, and
were not losses connected with or arising out of
the profession within the meaning of Rule 3
(e).
The Revenue also relied upon the cases of
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Hagart and
Burn-Murdoch (1929) A.C. 396; 14 T.C.433;
(1928), S.C.745, and W. A. and F., Rutherford v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 23 T.C.8.
The solicitors contended that their case was
distinguishable from the two cases cited, because
in both those cases specific advances were inten
tionally made to clients as such, and that in
neither case did the solicitors concerned endeavour
to prove any custom or practice of the profession
in regard to making advances of that character.
In their own. case they urged that the debts
arose
in connection with a running account
dealing with the management of a client's affairs,
and that in making payments to or on behalf of a
client, which in some instances exceeded the
receipts on that client's account,
they were
merely acting in pursuance of a well recognised
professional custom or practice.
They called
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