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purported to be inserted by a solicitor who was
stated to be travelling to America, and offered
to undertake commissions on behalf of solicitors.
The other advertisement was
inserted by a
solicitor offering to undertake work for profession
al correspondents. The Council, by resolution,
expressed its disapproval of advertisements of
this nature and it was ordered that the view of
the Council should be published
in
the Society's
Gazette.
Proceedings Against a Solicitor.
THE Secretary was directed to instruct counsel
to apply to the Chief Justice to have the name of
a solicitor struck off the roll on the ground that
he had been convicted of a criminal offence.
Apprentice's Applications.
A NUMBER of applications from apprentices were
considered and dealt with.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SOLICITORS.
BY order of the Chief Justice, dated llth February,
1944, made on a report from the Statutory
Committee, it was ordered that the name of
Percy J. MacGrath be struck off the roll of solicitors
in Eire on the ground of professional misconduct.
Mr. MacGrath formerly practised at 15, Kildare
Street.
By order of the Chief Justice, dated llth
February, 1944, made on an, application by the
Society, it was ordered that the name of Seamus
S. Byrne be struck off the roll of solicitors in
Eire on the ground that he had been convicted
of a criminal offence.
Mr. Byrne formerly
practised at Mohill, Co. Leitrim.
By order of the Chief Justice, dated llth
February, 1944, made on an application by the
Society, it was ordered that the name of John
Joseph Kennedy be struck off the roll of solicitors
in Eire on the ground of his conviction of a
criminal offence. Mr. Kennedy formerly prac
tised at 31, Wicklow Street, Dublin.
CURRENT TOPICS.
Appeal from refusal to grant adjournment.
BY Section 24 of the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Ireland) Act, 1877, the Court of Appeal (now the
Supreme Court) was given jurisdiction to hear and
determine appeals from any judgment or order
of the High Court or any judges or judge thereof.
Section 37 of the- Courts of Justice Act, 1936,
gives a right of appeal to the High Court, subject
to certain exceptions, from every judgment or
order of the Circuit Court. An appeal lies in all
cases other than in criminal cases from any
decision of a District Justice to the Circuit Court
under Section 84 of the Courts of Justice Act,
1924. On appeals, however, on matters of prac
tice which are within the discretion of a judge the
Appellate Tribunal will, in general, refuse to
interfere.
The point, which is of interest to
solicitors, as to whether an appeal will lie from
the refusal of a judge to grant an adjournment or
postponement of an action was recently the
subject matter of a decision of the English Courts
in Dick
v.
Filler (17 T.L.R.276). The case is of
interest to Irish practitioners, for the statement
of Scott, L. J. of the tests which, in his view,
should be applied by the judge in granting or
refusing an application for the postponement of
an action On the ground of the inability of a
witness to attend through illness.
" If," he said,
" an important witness—a fortiori if he is a
party—is prevented by illness from attending
the Court for an adjourned hearing, at which his
evidence is directly and seriously material, what
is the legal duty of the judge when an adjourn
ment is asked for ? In my view, if he is satisfied
(1) of the medical fact and (2) that the evidence is
relevant and may be important, it is his duty to
give an adjournment—it may be on terms—but
he ought to give it unless he is satisfied that an
injustice would be done to the other side which
cannot be reduced by costs." By Order XXXVI
Rule 31 of the Rules of the Supreme Court,
which is identical in terms with the corresponding
English Rule, a judge may, if he thinks it expedi
ent for the interests of justice, postpone or adjourn
a trial for such time and to such place and upon
such terms as he shall think fit.
In order to
found a right of appeal from the refusal of a
judge or judges to postpone or adjourn an action
it will be necessary to establish that such refusal
was " a judgment or order " of the High Court
—or the Circuit Court—or a " decision " of a
Justice of the District Court, and this might
present difficulty if the judge or justice simply
made no rule on the application.
It was held in
Maxwell
v.
Keun (1928 I.K.B.) that a refusal to
grant an application for the postponement of an
action, coupled with a direction that the applicant
should pay the costs of the application, was " a
judgment or Order " of the High Court and subject
to appeal, which
in that case was allowed.
Hanworth, M. R., after referring to the English
Order XXXVI Rule 34, quoted with approval the
judgment of the Co
urt in Sackville West
v.
Attorney General (128
L.T.Jo. 265) in which it
was stated that although it could not be said that
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