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DISCUSSION
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C. CRITICISM OF HABERMAS' THEORY OF RATIONALITY
Habermas' systematic theory of rationality is definitely an important
contribution to philosophy and the social sciences. In particular, the
humanitarian and democratic premises of the theory are admirably
insightful. The aesthetic and moral beauty of Habermas' theory, how-
ever, cannot overcome its serious sociological misconceptions and
shortcomings. In this paper, I am not concerned with a review of the
literature of the criticisms expressed against Habermas' theory. Instead,
I shall raise some sociological objections to Habermas' definition of
practical rationality, and briefly criticize his notions of critique and free
communication as the basis of rational policy-making.
The fundamental problem with Habermas' theory of rationality is its
rigid and sharp differentiation between the realm of ends and the realm
of means, corresponding to the normative and technical social struc-
tures, respectively. This does not mean that I advocate an economisfic
reduction of symbolic interactions to the realm of instrumental actions.
On the contrary, I emphasize a mutual interaction between the two
systems. Habermas confuses his analytical and abstract dichotomy of
the two systems with concrete reality, and that, in turn, leads to a naive
formulation of his theory of rationality. More specifically, Habermas'
rigid differentiation between systems of actions and interaction leads to
a false assumption of the neutrality of technology, a naive rejection of
the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends,
and a utopian belief in the absolute harmony of the norms of efficiency
and democracy. Let us consider these issues in more substantive detail.
Habermas assumes that the rationality of means is independent from
practical questions. For Habermas, there exist objective, practical
interests underlying both technological knowledge and instrumental
choice. This dialogical and practical precondition of the monological
structure of natural science is the pragmatic interest in the domination
and control of nature. Therefore a scientific statement is true if it fulfills
this interest. But aside from this general, quasi-transcendental interest,
the question of efficiency and the rationality of means is perceived by
Habermas to be independent of practical considerations. That is why
the choice of technical alternatives is determined by the use of pro-
fessional scientific knowledge defined in a monological fashion. There