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DISCUSSION
even if every citizen earned a Ph.D. in social science, the fact remains
that different social theories and models propose different descriptions
of facts and envision different forms of consequences for political
alternatives.
(2) Even if we assume that intellectuals, in an ideal speech situation,
would present alternative policies, and their related facts, to the public
in order to create an enlightened citizenry, there is no reason to think
that those citizens will reach political consensus. First of all, intellec-
tuals themselves hold contradictory ideas and assumptions, and their
conflict of attitude will probably increase as the complexity of society
increases. Second, Habermas overlooks the question of interests in
political choice. Certainly conflicts of interest create differential voting
and preferences even when there is consensus on factual statements.
Habermasian rational subjects are purely transcendental subjects who
vote not on the basis of their concrete conflicts and interests but
solely for aesthetical-altruistic reasons. Third, Habermas overlooks the
specific interests of intellectuals in maintaining their distance from
laymen. Intellectuals may be institutionally interested in free speech and
debate within the scientific community, but they are also interested in
keeping their complex, and sometimes esoteric, form of discourse and
vocabulary beyond the comprehension of the public. Such an institu-
tional interest implies that intellectuals may not adequately fulfill their
task of mediating between the public and sociological knowledgeY
Fourth, there is no doubt that intellectuals who believe in different
theoretical paradigms are rarely involved in debate and commtmication
with each other. Actually there are not many radical or conservative
theorists who do not find discourse on politics with opposing groups
futile. This distorted communication is partly due to conflicting under-
lying assumptions and partly due to non-rational influences. In concrete
reality the question of political discourse has much to do with rhetoric
and persuasion. To assume a public that is armed against rhetoric is
again another projection of naive idealism onto the arena of social
reality.
Finally, Habermas' theory of practical rationality may be claimed
to suffer from internal inconsistency. If voting in the context of free
communication is the sole defining criterion of the rationality of ends,
interest in maintaining free communication should also be an inherently