duty in not supplying these implements to free the
timber from
ice and that, on
the balance of
probabilities, there would have been no ice had
they fulfilled this duty; (iii) That the plaintiff's
loss of confidence was attributable to his injuries
and that any resulting loss of wages was re
coverable as damages.
(Osborne v. Port of London Authority (1967)
2 Lloyd's Rep. 572).
Confidential relationship of agent with principals
1. Although the relation of agent to principal is
normally confidential, the maxim delegatus non
potest delegare being based on that confidence,
the maxim does not apply where the principal
reposes no confidence in the agent; 2. provided
the agent personally performs that part which
involves any confidential responsibility it is
im
material that he delegates to another the purely
ministerial part; 3. Where an agent gives notice
on behalf of a principal it is not necessary to
name the principal, it is sufficient if the principal
can be identified; 4. in a notice, the date on which
the notice
is
to operate need not be specified
provided it is possible for the recipient to ascer
tain it; 5. where a formula is used which involves
reference
to some other document and some
question of law arises on the interpretation of
that document, relative to ascertaining the date
on which the notice is
to operate, that is not
necessarily fatal to the validity of the notice.
(Allam & Co. v. Europa Poster Services (1968)
112 S.J. 86).
[Ed.—this case has already been reported in
the February 1968 issue of the
Gazette
(Vol. 61
No. 8 p. 77). However, in view of the succinctness
with which the case is reported in Current Law
(1968) 2. C.L. par. 314 we considered it worth
reprinting].
Un-roadworthy motor car
The plaintiff bought a car from the defendant
garage proprietor and later took it to him for a
routine 3,000-mile service. Two months after the
service, one of the front wheels came off and the
plaintiff was injured; the cause of the trouble
was that the bolts were loose. On the plaintiff's
action for damages, held (i)
that it was to be
inferred that the bolts were loose when the car
was
sold and accordingly
the defendant was
liable on an express warranty that the car was in
tip-top condition when
it was
sold; and
(ii)
(Russell L.J. dissenting) that since the 3,000-mile
service voucher prescribed the checking of steering
and brakes, the defect should have been detected
and put right on that occasion, so that on this
ground also the defendant was liable.
(Taylor v. Kiddey (1968) 118 New L.J. 133).
Liability arising from road works
In January 1965, the plaintiff fell into a trench
dug in
the pavement by contractors,
the first
defendants, who had been laying sewers connect
ing houses with the main sewer under the road as
agents for a London borough council, the second
defendants. The accident occurred at about 5
p.m. when it was dark, and although the first
defendants had adequately protected the excava
tion with a barrier of oil drums and lamps, lit
after dark, some person or persons unknown had
demolished the barrier and extinguished the lamps
before
the plaintiff's
accident. The plaintiff
claimed damages against both defendants, alleg
ing negligence on the part of the contractors or,
alternatively, breach of their statutory duty under
s. 8 of the Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950.
Waller J. held that there was no common law
negligence, and that s. 8 of the Act did not create
an absolute duty, and dismissed the action. The
plaintiff appealed, but the appeal was dismissed.
Lord Pearson said that the Judge's finding that
there was
no
negligence
should be upheld.
Furthermore he pointed out in his judgment that
there were numerous express provisions for civil
liability none of which made mention of the rights
of the private individual. The object of the Act
was to regulate relations between the contractor
executing the street works and the local authority,
and the private individual was not thereby given
a cause of action.
(Keating v. Elvan Reinforced Concrete Co.
Ltd., and Another,
Solicitors' Journal
[Vol. 112]
p. 193).
Liability of Occupier/Employer
The plaintiff, a cleaner employed by the first
defendant to clean his flat, received an electric,
shock and severe burns when dusting an electric
fire. An electrician had done certain work on the
circuit some 10 months before the accident, putt
ing in a new switch fuse, but he did not test for
polarity. The fire had appeared to be dead but
it was in fact live because of reversed polarity at
a socket to which it was connected. The plaintiff
claimed damages against the first defendant, alleg
ing that he was in breach of duty owed to her
(i) as employer, and (ii) as occupier of the flat,
and from the second defendant, the electrician,
alleging negligence in that he had either created
the danger or failed to discover its existence.
107