128 / 736
of adequate but not abundant means and to ask
oneself whether the expenses were such as a
sensible solicitor in the light of his then know
ledge would consider reasonable to incur in the
interests of his client.
(Francis v. Francis and Dickerson [1955] E.R.
836. considered. Practice Direction (Crime : Costs)
[1968] 1 WLR. p. 398).
Effect of plea on sentence
The defendant pleaded not guilty at Birmingham
quarter sessions to 3 counts of receiving stolen
property and his defence included allegations of
perjury by prosecuting witnesses and intimidation,
threats and improper behaviour by senior police
officers. He was convicted and, in sentencing him
to 5 years' imprisonment, the recorder referred to
the way he had run his defence. The defendant
appealed against sentence.
Lord Parker C.J. said that the court felt that
there was a danger that the defendant had been
given a serious sentence because he had pleaded
not guilty or because of the way he had run his
defence. It was wrong to use
language which
might convey to a defendant that his sentence
was being increased because he had pleaded not
guilty or because of the nature of his defence. It
was, however, proper to give a lesser sentence if
a defendant had shown genuine remorse, amongst
other things, by pleading guilty. The sentence
would be
reduced
to
3
years'
imprisonment.
Appeal allowed.
(R. v Harper,
Solicitors' Journal
[Volume 112]
p. 189).
Plea in mitigation
The defendant pleaded guilty at Hereford quarter
sessions to an indictment containing two counts,
housebreaking and larceny. The deputy chairman
sentenced him to a total of 4£ years' imprisonment.
The defendant appealed against sentence.
Edmund Davies L.J. said that the court had
come
to
the conclusion
that
to sentence
the
defendant to 4£ years' imprisonment, even though
the offences were grave and he had a bad record,
was
to give
inadequate consideration
to
the
mitigating element of his plea of guilty. The sen
tence would be reduced to a total of 3 years' im
prisonment. Appeal allowed.
(R. v. De Haan,
Solicitors Journal
[Volume
112] p. 189).
Privilege—Production of Documents
The reversal by the House of Lords of the Court
of Appeal's decision in Conway v. Rimmer makes
legal history. For the first time in England a
ministers' claim to withold production of a docu
ment on the grounds that it's disclosure would
be contrary to the public interest will be capable
of review by the Judge who will, now be in a
position to order its production for inspection for
the purpose of balancing the public interest in the
proper administration of justice against that of
witholding any evidence which a minister con
siders ought to be witheld. This does not mean
that the court will necessarily reject the minister's
view. Full weight will be given to such in every
case, and if the minister's reasons are of a kind
which judicial experience
is not competent to
weigh the minister's view must prevail. Duncan v.
Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (1942) A.C. 624 con
sidered).
(Conway v. Rimmer,
Solicitors' Journal
[Vol.
112] p. 191).
Road Traffic Sentence—Severe Punishment to be
expected
A passenger in a car driven by A was killed when
it
crashed while
in
a
'burn
up'
or
race
on the highway with a car driven by B; both
cars were ten years old and speeds of 60 m.p.h.
were achieved. Both A & B were convicted of
causing death by dangerous driving; each had a
bad driving record and was sentenced to,
inter alia
two years imprisonment. They applied for leave to
appeal against sentence.
James J. said that the vice of the offence was
that the applicants deliberately set out to race
along the road. Those who were familiar with
calendars
throughout
the country and at
the
Central Criminal Court knew full well of
the
considerable number of cases of causing death by
dangerous driving. The
time had come when
those who indulged
in activities amounting to
such an offence had to expect severe punishment.
No error of principle was involved in the sen
tences. Applications refused.
(R. v. Boe; R. v. Saunders,
Solicitors' Journal
[Vol. Ill] p. 999).
Exposure to unnecessary risk
The plaintiff deal porter was injured when he
slipped on a patch of ice and fell from a pile of
timber. He
sued
his
employers who
denied
liability and contended that the plaintiff's post-
accident fear of heights was not capable of
medical classification or treatment and that loss
of wages due
to
that was not a recoverable
damage. Held (i) that the plaintiff had asked for,
but not been supplied with, brooms, shovels or
salt; (ii) that the defendants were in breach of
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