171 / 736
that the appeal was incompetent in that (a) the
word "decision"
in Section 7 did not include
sentence, and that (b) the Law Society was not
a person aggrieved. It was held that the sentence
pronounced by the committee was an operative
part of the decision. The matter was put beyond
all doubt by the terms of the Act which provided
that the committee should set forth in their de
cision, in the case of a conviction particulars of
the conviction and sentence. The Council might
well be a person aggrieved by the decision of the
committee. The legislature had made the Law
Society the'guardian of the public interest so far
as concerned the maintenance of the standard of
the profession of
solicitors. The present peti
tioners
therefore qualified as persons aggrieved
within the meaning of Section 7 of the 1958 Act.
Reference was made
to Attorney General of
Gambia v. N'Tie (1961) AC 617. The fine of
£25 was quite out of proportion to the gravity of
the offence. A censure, even if coupled with a
fine of the maximum sum of £250 would not be
adequate punishment
for
the breach of
rule
established. The Court accordingly ordered that
the respondent should be suspended from prac
tice for a period of five years and reaffirmed the
finding of expenses made against him by
the
Discipline Committee.
(Council of Law Society of Scotland v. Doc-
herty, 112, S.J. p. 312).
Contract—Liability of Builder to re-do work.
The plaintiffs, Builders, contracted with the de
fendants for the conversion of premises into a
shop with upper living accommodation reached
by an outside staircase; the contract contained
provisions for the plaintiff's to provide all mate
rials,
labour and plant
for
the proper and
efficient execution, prosecution and completion
of the works, and to allow for covering up and
protecting the works 'during frosty and inclement
weather or from damage from any other cause
and reinstating any work so damaged', at a price
of some £4,000 for
the whole of
the works
shown or implied on a drawing, to be completed
within a specified number of weeks, payment to
be made in stages on certificates, with a balance
payable on completion 'less 5 per cent, contract
retention for 3 months'. The work inside and
outside the shop (but not the living accommo
dation and staircase) was virtually finished, the
defendants' equipment was inside, the intention
was to open the shop on the following day, and
some £3,250 of the contract price had been paid,
when vandals broke into the shop and did wilful
damage which cost (it was later stated) £450
to make good. At the request of the defendants
the plaintiffs made good
the damage;
they
brought an action for the cost on a quantum
meruit claiming inter alia the existence of a fresh
contract separate from the original by reason of
the request. The defendants contended inter alia
that the original contract was an entire contract
which had not been performed (since the work
had not been completed) and that in order to
fulfil their obligations, the plaintiffs had to make
good the damage even though it was wilful.
Nield J. said that doubt had been thrown on
the extent to which the principle relating to a fresh
contract and quantum meruit applied. His lord
ship, concluded that, in
the circumstances,
in
cluding the allowing of a retention period, the
contract was an entire contract to be completed
before full payment was made. Since the con
tract works were admittedly not completed, the
contract itself was not completed at the
time
when the damage was done; if the obligation on
the plaintiffs to complete the contract involved
doing over again work which had been wilfully
damaged, the harsh liability was one they had to
shoulder. Judgment for the defendants.
(Charon
[Finchley] Ltd. v. Singer Sewing
Machine Co. Ltd. 112. S.J. 536).
Submissions of no case
The Divisional Court of
the High Court
in
England on June 26th said that when faced at
the end of
the prosecution's case with a sub
mission by an accused person there was no case
for him to answer, Justices before passing judg
ment must ascertain whether what was
sub
mitted was part of
the
final speech by
the
accused or whether he made
the submission
while reserving the right to call evidence there
after. Their Lordships allowed an application by
Sheldon, for an order of certiorari to quash his
conviction by Gravesend Justices
in February,
1967, for driving a motor vehicle without due care
and attention, contrary to Section 3(i) of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1960, as amended. No order
as
to costs was made. The Justices did not
appear and were not represented on the appli
cation which was ex parte.
.
The Lord Chief Justice said that the ground
of the application was that the justices had con
victed the applicant on a submission of no case,
whereas he had every intention of calling evidence
if the submission was not upheld. It appeared
that the applicant had in his mind was that in
the event of the submission being rejected, he
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