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agreed

to withdraw his proof

in bankruptcy

against X. Both the Crown and the

taxpayer

agreed that an entry should have been made in

respect of the liability of the 1956 accounts and

that an adjustment was to be made. The tax

payer contended that the amount to which he

was liable at the end of the period for which the

accounts were prepared should be entered, the

Crown argued for

the sum of £3,000. The

special

commissioners held

in

favour of

the

Crown. On appeal by the taxpayer :

Held, that, although the estimated liability, if

originally entered, would not have fallen to be

altered by reason of subsequent events, where

the account had to be reopened by reason of

error, it is the true amount of the debt ultimately

established should be entered.

(Simpson

v.

Jones

(Inspector

of

Taxes)

[1968] l.W.L.R. p. 1066).

Stamp Duty, Variation of Leases

Two long leases were varied by deeds so as to

increase the rents reserved. The deed of variation

was assessed

to Stamp Duty by charging

the

ad valorum lease duty on the amount of the in

crease in the average rents on the basis that it

operated as a surrender of the two leases and a

grant of new leases for terms equal to the un-

expired residues of your original terms. It was

held dismissing

the appeal

that

the deed of

variation operated to increase the rents but not

as a surrender of the original leases. However

the deed of variation was chargeable under the

heading "Bond covenant etc." in the Stamp Act,

1891 Schedule

1

the amount chargable being

limited by Section 77

(5) of that Act as if the

deed were a

lease or as

that section was a

relieving provision.

(Gable Construction Co. Ltd. v. I.R.C. [1968]

2 All E.R. 968).

BOOK REVIEW

Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland—

A Study

in Regional Government by Harry Calvert—Pp.

xxi,

400—Belfast, NORTHERN

IRELAND

LEGAL

QUARTERLY, 1968, £5 0 0.

This admirable work,

the

fruit of

several

years labour, has now appeared, and Dr. Calbert

deserves

the warmest congratulations as much

of Legal practitioners as of academic

lawyers.

Some readers may agree with the view expressed

by Gavan Duffy J. in

Cogan v. The Minister for

Finance—

(1941) I.R. at p. 402—that the Govern

ment of Ireland Act 1920 was a statutory abor

tion sardonically entitled "an Act to provide for

the better government of Ireland". In any event

the sections of that Act still in force are deemed

to represent the Constitution of Northern Ire

land. Dr. Calvert has not only carried out ex

pertly a detailed examination of

the practical

problems arising under this Act but his deep

scholarship and learning are discernible in con

sidering

the

jurisprudence and case

law

that

have derived under the Act. The author has also

analysed with cold

logic and

lucid

reasoning

some of the Statutes of the Stormont Parliament.

Of the Special Powers Act, he states on page

381

that "the Act does evidence a radical de

parture from

the procedural safeguards

tradi

tionally and justifiably regarded as desirable for

the preservation of civil liberties" and then, with

the cold perspicacity of

the academic

lawyer,

proceeds to examine it ruthlessly. In considering

the question of compensation under the Town

Planning Acts in

McConnell v. Belfast Corpora

tion,

(1957)

there is

little doubt that Sheil J's

remarks, though obiter, are correct, and that one

must examine whether the Planning Code con

flicts with Section 5 of the Government of Ireland

Act: Dr. Galvert correctly doubts the reasoning

of Hanna J. in

Pigs Marketing Board v. Don-

nelly—

(1939)

I.R.

413,

as

"Judges

do

not

hesitate to fix standards for themselves in other

circumstances, even though questions of politics,

economics or sociology may be concerned".

It is rather alarming (p. 167) that "none of the

decisions of the Irish Courts—particularly those

of first instance—are binding on the Northern

Ireland Courts since 1920—in fact the ironical

position has

arisen

that despite

the doctrine

that it is customary to cite jurisprudence from

all Common Law countries, nevertheless one

would cite Irish precedents since 1920 at one's

peril to certain Northern judges.

In

the case of

Duffy v. The Minister

for

Labour—

(1962)

N.I.6—where

the

Court

of

Appeal narrowly held that the Safeguarding of

Employment Act 1947 was not

ultra vires

the

Government of

Ireland Act 1920,

it

took no

cognizance of Article 18 of the European Social

Charter which specifies the right to engage in

gainful occupation in the territory of other Con

tracting Parties; it is to be noted that this Char

ter was duly signed and ratified by the United

Kingdom, and a most solemn undertaking

is

given in it to apply the regulations liberally. The

Court reached the legalistic conclusion that the

legislation was made for peace, order and good

government; furthermore it did not affect aliens,

as the touchstone of the Act was not nationality

34