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ance together with interest. The first defendant

retained possession and

the

title deeds. By a

debenture dated October 27th 1966 the second

defendant charged all its undertakings, property,

assets and rights to the plaintiff. Particulars of

the legal charge in favour of the first defendant

were not delivered to the Registrar of Companies

as required by Section 95 of the Companies Act

1948 (corresponding to section 99 of the Irish

Companies Act 1963). The plaintiff a debenture

holder appointed a receiver of the undertaking in

all the property of the second defendant and the

receiver asked the first defendant to deliver up

the title deeds of the property on the ground that

the legal charge in his favour was void against

the plaintiff for want of registration. The first

defendant refused, claiming that as an unpaid

vendor he had a lien on the property and was en

titled

to retain possession of

the

title deeds;

and that alternatively, the legal charge fell within

Section 97

(corresponding

to Companies Act

1963 Section 101) and not section 95 of

the

Companies Act 1948 and was not void, notwith

standing that it had not been registered.

The Plaintiff issued a writ claiming a declara

tion that a debenture charge had priority over

(i)

the legal charge in favour of the first de

fendant and (ii) any lien of the first defendant

as an unpaid vendor or otherwise. The plaintiff

also sought an order that the

first defendant

should hand over the title deeds. Held (i) that

the first defendant had not obtained an unpaid

vendor's

lien on

the property because he had

bargained for a legal charge which, being a higher

interest than a lien, excluded the latter. His pro

tection during the period between contract and

completion being afforded by the equitable mort

gage which arose on the signing of the contract

to create the legal charge as security for part of

the purchase money; that the equitable mortgage

was capable of being registered under section 95

and since it had not been registered it was void

against the liquidator and creditors of the com

pany (ii) that following the normal conveyancing

procedure where part of the purchase money for

a property was left on mortgage, the whole pro

perty had been conveyed to the purchaser who

immediately afterwards charged it in favour of

the vendor; that such a charge fell within section

95 of The Companies Act 1948 not section 97

and accordingly

that it was void against

the

liquidator and creditors of the company for want

of registration.

(Capital Finance Company Limited v. Stokes

and Another [1968]

1 W.L.R. 1158).

Contract

Where the owner of a damaged car takes it to a

garage for repair on the basis that his insurance

company will pay the cost of repair and the in

surance company instructs the garage to proceed

with the repairs in accordance with the garage's

estimate, there are two concurrent contracts—one

between the garage and the car owner, and the

other between

the garage and

the

insurance

company; therefore, ii the garage fails to repair

the car within a reasonable time, the car owner

can sue the garage for damages.

(Charnock v. Liverpool Corporation—Court of

Appeal, June 18th 1968).

Repayment of Loan

The plaintiff brought proceedings which were

heard in the county court claiming the return of

a sum of money which she alleged she had lent to

the defendant. The defendant by his defence ad

mitted receipt of the money, but claimed that it

had been a gift. There were no circumstances

such as

to give rise

to a presumption of ad

vancement. The case being called on for hearing,

the plaintiff submitted that it was for the de

fendant to begin, and the judge so ruled. The

defendant

appealed

against

that

ruling,

the

plaintiff contending that it was not open to him

to do so, the matter not coming within the words

of section 108 of the County Courts Act, 1959.

Held, that assuming, that an appeal lay from

the judge's ruling, the payment of money prima

facie imported an obligation to repay it, and that

the judge was right in placing the onus on the

defendant to prove the facts which he alleged

showed that it was not re-ayable.

(Seldon v. Davidson,

[1968]

1

W.L.R.

p.

1083).

Profits of a solicitor

In July, 1955, judgment in a High Court action

for £28,521 was entered jointly against the tax

payer, a solicitor, and X. Early in 1956 the judg

ment creditor

recovered £6,343

from certain

companies associated with .X In July, 1956 X

was declared bankrupt. In January 1957, the tax

payer's accounts for the year to March, 1956 were

prepared but without any entry in respect of the

judgment debt, which was properly deductible in

his accounts. When the accounts were being pre

pared the taxpayer believed that the balance of

the judgment would be enforced in full against

him. In June, 1958, the judgment creditor by deed

released the debt in consideration of a payment

of £3,000 by the taxpayer and the taxpayer also

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