172 / 736
would call evidence on his behalf. In effect he
was making a submission of no case in reserving
the right to call evidence thereafter.
The Justices might well ask
the defendant,
"Are you making a final speech or are you making
a submission and reserving
the right
to call
evidence thereafter?". An answer to that ques
tion would not allow any confusion.
(Regina
v.
Gravesend
Justices,
Ex
parte
Sheldon.
Times,
June 27, 1968).
Contract
P. and D. entered into two agreements under
which D. was called the lessor and P. the lessee
of property owned by D. Under the first P. was
to apply for planning permission
for develop
ments of sites; a survey would be made after
permission was granted, and provisions made
for demolition and rebuilding in 2| years. In any
event by October 31st 1965 D. should grant P.
a lease of the property for 999 years at £5,000
per annum subject
to
review. By
the supple
mental
agreement
P.
promised
to
lend D.
£20,000 at 4 per cent, simple interest for a period
equal to the time taken by the development and
in any event for not less than two years. If a
third party refused to enter into the redevelop
ment
scheme within
twelve months
interest
would be at 10 per cent, from May 15th, 1965.
The money was duly advanced and secured by
a legal charge which recited the agreement to
develop and take a lease and provided that if
the agreement became null and void, interest as
from May 15th 1965 should be at 10 per cent
and should accrue but not be payable until
October 31st, 1965. The third party co-operated
but planning permission was refused. P. gave D.
notice to repay on June 4th 1966. D. contended
they were not liable until they, D., had taken up
the new lease and counterclaimed Specific Per
formance of the agreement to take the lease with
arrears of rent.
Held
(1)
that an officious bystander would
say,
if asked, what would happen if planning
permission was refused, that the deal was off.
(2)
that the Court was not satisfied
that the
doctrine of frustration could not apply
to an
agreement for a lease; (3) that this was a case
of supervening events and a
term should be
implied making the agreement conditional upon
P. obtaining planning permission;
(4)
that the
provision for increased interest depended on the
lease coming into being and so was inoperative;
(5) that P. was entitled to the £20,000 at 4 per
cent, interest as legal mortgagee.
(Rom Securities v. Rogers (Holdings)
[1967]
1968 5 G.L. 74).
Citing Authority
A defendant was charged with permitting her son
to drive a car without third party insurance con
trary to The Road Traffic Act. Her husband was
the registered owner of the car and the defence
submitted that there was no case to answer be
cause only a registered owner could be guilty of
the offence charged. Against that the Justices
were referred by the prosecution to Wilkinson's
Road Traffic Offences
(fifth edition page 202)
but
the
defence
contended
that
unless
the
Justices were referred
to
the actual case
that
was authority for a statement in a text book they
could not be referred to the text book itself. The
prosecutor did not have the case to hand. The
Justices dismissed the information on the ground
that there was no case to answer. It was held on
appeal that the Justices were entitled
to and
should have looked at the text book and if they
than felt that it was necessary to
look at the
actual authority, if necessary adjourning the pro
ceedings for that purpose.
(Boys v. Blenkinsopp :
The Times,
June 25th,
1968).
Nuisance—obstruction
of
a
river
by
exposed
sewer.
A sewer was by agreement and by statutory
authority built across a river and in the river
bed in such a way that it would not interfere
with the flow of water in the river. Without any
fault on the part of any person, the river bed
was washed away and the sewer pipe became
exposed, causing eddies
in
the flow of water
which damaged the plaintiffs land. The defen
dant Council was sued inter alia on the ground
of common law nuisance by interference with the
flow. Held. The burden of proof lay on
the
council to justify the presence of the obstruction
in the river but something which had begun by
not being a nuisance could not become one
merely by lapse of time; moreover, the plaintiffs
when they acquired the land, took the river bed
as it was and the Council had not altered
it
since then.
(Radstock Co-operative and Industrial Society
v. Norton-Radstock U.D.C. [1968] 2. All E.R
59).
Solicitor for Defendant—Whether accountable to
Plaintiff for fees pa\d out of plaintiffs assets
Plaintiffs, an East German company, in 1955 had
30