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about other matters which should be given early
priority.
It is the sub-committee's intention to keep the
material in the form in which it is given to them,
but in any case where this is not possible and the.
return of a document is required, this should be
indicated by the sender.
Future Meetings
Thursday, 26th October
1967,
at Buswells
Hotel, at 8 p.m. "Current High Court Practise"
with discussion on possible modifications by Denis
R. Peart.
Autumn Seminar
Arrangements are well in hand for the autumn
seminar which will take place in the Talbot Hotel,
Wexford, in November at a weekend, the dates of
which will be announced shortly.
CASES OF THE MONTH
Dangerous Driving—Change of Issue
The defendant was charged with causing death
by dangerous driving. Summing up,
the
trial
judge directed the jury,
inter alia.
"... I must tell
you that counsel for the defence is wrong in saying
that if you thought this was only careless driving
it could not be dangerous." The jury convicted
the defendant and he appealed against conviction
on the grounds that the judge misdirected the
jury,
inter alia,
in telling them that the defence
was wrong in submitting that the prosecution had
to prove that the defendant's driving amounted
to dangerous driving as distinct from driving
which was careless or without due care and
attention.
Sachs, L.J., during the course of giving the
judgment of the court, said that careless driving
might well be dangerous but all careless driving
was not necessarily dangerous driving. It seemed
to the court that it was right to say something
which had been said on circuits by many judges
in many cases : any attempt by defending counsel
to introduce the subject of whether the offence
was one which could properly be termed careless
driving and therefore not one of dangerous driv–
ing, was bound to produce confusion with the
jury. Time after time judges on circuits stopped
both the questions and argument on that point,
and it should be plainly stated that the court
approved of the course taken by those judges who
stopped that manner of seeking to establish that
the driving was not dangerous driving. In this
particular case, the driving was a quite atrocious
piece of driving on the part of the defendant and
there was no room whatsoever for any argument
to be raised in his defence that the jury should
have taken the view that he ought only to have
been prosecuted for careless driving. Appeal dis–
missed.
[R. v Scammell,
The Solicitors Journal
(Vol.
Ill), p. 620].
Contract: Hire Purchase
The defendant obtained a Jaguar car from the
plaintiffs on hire-purchase terms. The cash price
was £1,095 and he paid an initial instalment of
£219 with monthly payments of £24-9-1 payable
thereafter. By clause 8 of
the agreement,
the
finance company had an option to terminate the
agreement on the hirer's breach and by caluse 10
an option was given to the hirer to terminate by
returning
the goods
to
the
finance company.
Under clause 11, if either of these options was
exercised, the hirer was liable for a minimum
payment of two-thirds of the total hiring cost.
When the first monthly payment was due, the
hirer was unable to meet it and informed the
company accordingly. Three weeks later he sent a
letter dictated by
the company's representative
stating that he wished to terminate the agreement.
In reply the company warned him that he would
be liable for £709-10-8 under the minimum pay–
ment clause. Subsequently during the proceedings
they reduced the claim to £271-16-0 and amen–
ded the claim to allege repudiation.
On appeal it was held :
1. The hirer had not exercised his option to
terminate the agreement as he had not complied
with the conditions for returning the car con-.
tained in clause 10 and because a hirer should
not be taken to exercise such an option commit–
ting him to pay a large sum unless he is aware of
his liabilities.
2. Even if the hirer had wrongfully repudiated
the agreement, the company had not accepted the
repudiation but sought to sue on clause 11; the
amending of the pleadings did not amount to an
acceptance of the repudiation. In the absence of
acceptance the repudiation was of no effect.
3.
In the absence of consensual termination,
the company must be taken to have terminated
under clause 8. In these circumstances clause 11
was a penalty clause and unenforceable. The com–
pany could only recover for such breaches as
occurred before
termination,
in
this case non–
payment of one monthly instalment. However, the
company had not sued for this sum and the claim
was now statute-barred.
[United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd.
v Ennis (1967) 3 WLR 1; (1967) 2 All.E.R. 345.
41