The Gazette 1967/71

It was held :

1. Such a communication would, if normally

made, be made on an occasion of qualified privi–

lege and even though the letter from B to W was

not sent to discharge any duty or to further any

common interest, the occasion remained one of

qualified privilege.

2. However, as B had been actuated by malice

and the words complained of were defamatory,

the plaintiff was entitled to damages for libel.

[Angel v Bushell and Co. Ltd. and Anon.

(1967) 2 WLR 976; (1967 1 AER 1018. Queen's

Bench Division (Milmo J.)].

Definition of "Owner" in Town Planning

In 1963 the appellant twice applied for plan–

ning permission to use farm land for storage of

cars. The applications were refused and an appeal

to the Minister dismissed. Two years later the

local planning authority served an enforcement

notice requiring discontinuance of use for car

storage. In 1966 seven informations were preferred

for contravention of the notice. In the applica–

tions for planning permission the appellant had

certified that he was the owner in fee simple but

in fact his wife was the landowner. The appellant

contended

that

the enforcement notice was a

nullity as it had not been served on his wife.

The appeal against conviction was allowed and

it was held that the justices' inference was unjusti–

fied that had the land been let at a rack-rent the

appellant would have been entitled to receive it

as agent or trustee for his wife. Control of the

business by the husband was no ground for infer–

ring that the wife would have appointed him her

rent collector if she had vacated occupation and

let at a rack-rent.

Per curiam :

It is illogical that a person served

with an enforcement notice can defy it with im–

punity merely because of failure to serve some

other person; the attention of Parliament should

be drawn to this weakness in enforcement pro–

cedure.

[Courtney-Southan v Crawley Urban District

Council (1967) 3 WL R57; (1967) 2 AER 246.

Queen's Bench Division

(Winn L.J., Ashwarth

and Widgery J.) ].

Estate Duty: Exemption by Reason of Purchase

A testator granted an annuity to his widow on

condition that within three months she agreed to

hold one-half of her own estate (as at his death)

for herself for life and thereafter upon similar

trusts to those affecting the husband's residuary

estate. The widow subsequently gave notice that

she complied with the condition and received the

annuity. On her death she bequeathed one-half of

her estate on the trusts affecting her late hus–

band's residuary estate.

Held :

(Upholding Buckley J.) one moiety of

the wife's estate passed by reason of purchase only

within the exemption in S. 3 of the Finance Act

1894 but (reversing Buckley J.) that S. 44 of the

Finance Act 1940 (as amended by the Finance

Act 1950) had the result that the annuity was

not to be treated as consideration and therefore

the transaction fell to be treated as a gift. Section

(1)

and duty became payable since it could not be

said that Lady Harmsworth was entirely excluded

from any benefit.

[Re Harmsworth

deceased. Barclays Bank

Limited v

I.R.C.

(1967) 3 WLR 152;

(1967)

2 AER 249. Court of Appeal (Lord Denning

M.R., Harman L.J., and Salmon L.J.)].

CORRESPONDENCE

Solicitors' Costs

Dear Sir,

We would like to draw your attention to the

position regarding the taxation of solicitors' costs

on a party-and-party basis in High Court pro–

ceedings, and in particular in actions for damages.

Our experience in practice, in which we handle

a large number of cases on behalf of plaintiffs is,

that in fact, although the cost of maintaining an

office has increased by at least 300 per cent since

we ourselves started in practice in 1955, yet it is

the practice of the taxing masters of the High

Court to allow the same instructions fees, or in–

deed, somewhat lower instructions fees than were

being allowed in 1955.

This can easily be established by examining

bills of costs which we have in our possession, and

which we are sure other members of the profession

have also in their possession going back for a

number of years.

It must also be borne in mind, that over this

period the state have found it necessary to increase

by almost 600 per cent, the court fees in order to

cover the cost of administering the court offices

which take care of this type of litigation.

We feel that matters have now got to the stage

where some representations must be made to the

appropriate authority to enable solicitors, such as

ourselves who engage to a great extent in general

practice involving High Court litigation, to obtain

reasonable instructions fees in High Court pro–

ceedings.

It is in our opinion, most unfair that virtually

all items of outlay which in most cases a solicitor

has to carry for perhaps one or two years in cases

of this nature, should be so substantially increased