48 / 736
Court of Appeal, Civil Division (Lord Denning
M.R., Harnian and Salmon L.J.)].
Crime: Intent to Avoid Payment of Fare:
Whether still in Process of Travelling
The respondent was charged under Byelaw No.
8 (1) of the London Transport Board that he,
with intent that the Board should be defrauded,
tendered to an authorised person money on behalf
of another person with intent to enable the per–
son on whose behalf the money was tendered to
travel on the railway without having previously
paid her fare. The actions alleged
took place
when the respondent and a woman companion
had arrived at the wayout barrier of an under–
ground station. The magistrate considered that
on a proper construction of the wording of the
byelaw the offence could be committed only before
the person on whose behalf the money was ten–
dered had travelled, and he therefore dismissed
the information. On appeal by the prosecutor the
court held that so long as a person is in the pro–
cess of arriving at the exit from the arrival plat–
form that person is still travelling and the case
would be remitted with a direction to convict.
[Murphy v Verati (1967), 1 WLR 641; (1967)
1
AER 861. Queen's Bench Division, Divisional
Court (Lord Parker C.J., Winn L.J. and Willis
J.)]-
Evidence: Admission at First Trial
The jury had been unable
to agree at the
appellant's first
trial on a charge of receiving
stolen property, but at the retrial he was convic–
ted. At the second trial the prosecution called as
a witness a police officer who had been present at
the first trial to testify that the appellant had then
admitted that he had possession of the goods.
During the cross-examination it was elicited that
at the first trial the appellant had explained how
he came into possession of the goods and stated
that he did not know they were stolen.
The appellant appealed against conviction on
the grounds that the judge was wrong to allow
the officer's evidence because first, it was inad–
missible or, even if it was admissible, it was in the
circumstances of the case unfair as the appellant
had not given evidence, and second, because, if
the admission as to possession was taken to be
true (the appellant having given no evidence to
deny it), then also his explanation must be taken
to be true.
It was held that the officer's evidence, though
novel, was admissible and not unfair in the gen–
eral circumstances of the administration of justice;
the judge had directed the jury to consider both
admission and explanation, but as the appellant
had not given evidence to verify the explanation
or deny the admission, it was natural that the
jury should attach more weight to
the latter.
Appeal dismissed.
[R. v McGregor (1967) 3 WLR 274; (1967)
2 AER 267. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division
(Lord Parker C.J., Diplock L.J. and Ashworth
J-)].
Fatal Accident: Settlement
to
be Approved
by the Court
The deceased was killed in an accident due
to negligence and breach of statutory duty by the
respondent company. In August 1965 a settle–
ment was agreed "subject to the approval of the
court" on behalf of the deceased's widow and
infant son in respect of damages under the Law-
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and
the Fatal Accidents Acts. An originating sum–
mons was taken out on 13th October 1965 for an
order that the agreed terms of the settlement be
approved and
in November the summons was
heard and approved by the master. On 25th Oc–
tober the appellant had remarried, but at the
November hearing none of
those present were
aware of this. Before the order was drawn up the
appellant's solicitors became aware of her remar–
riage and informed the respondents who had the
order set aside.
On appeal it was held that the agreement in
August was shown by the nature of its condition
not to be intended to have legal effect. By virtue
of R.S.C. (Rev.) 1962 Ord. 80, r. 11, the validity
of the agreement for settlement, as it included a
claim for a person under disability, depended
upon
its being approved by the court and as
approval had been obtained under a misappre–
hension the master was right to set aside the order.
[Dietz v Lenning Chemicals Ltd.
(1967)
2
AER 282. House of Lords
(Lord Reid, Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce, Lord Wil-
berforce and Lord Pearson)].
Libel: Qualified Privilege: Malice
A was introduced by W to B as a trustworthy
businessman. It was agreed that B should hold
some air-frames selected by A with a view to their
possible sale by A, who had extensive contacts for
such spare parts. A did not, however, bind himself
to buy or to find a buyer, and in fact no buyer
was found. Meanwhile the value of the equipment
held by B fell and in anger he wrote a letter to
W which contained the words "I fear that A is
not conversant with normal business ethics", and
asked W to pass the contents of the letter on to
A. In a libel action brought by A, the defendant
B pleaded,
inter alia,
qualified privilege.
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