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INFORMS Nashville – 2016

245

3 - Service Systems With Coarse Priorities: The Social Cost Of

Revenue Maximization

Martin Lariviere, Northwestern University,

2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States,

m-lariviere@kellogg.northwestern.edu

, Itai Gurvich, Can Ozkan

We consider how social maximization differs from revenue maximization in a

queuing system in which a continuum of customer types is mapped to a finite

number of priority classes. The decision maker controls coverage (how many

customers to serve), coarseness (how many priority levels to offer), and

classification (how types are assigned to classes). We show that both types of

decision makers provide similar coverage and coarseness. They differ in how they

split customers between classes. Relative to the social planner, the revenue

maximizer may have the highest priority class over- or undersubscribed

depending on the behavior of the distribution of customer values.

4 - Learning In Online Matching Platforms: Multi-armed Bandits With

Capacity Constraints

Vijay Kamble, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 9, United States,

vijaykamble.iitkgp@gmail.com

We consider the interaction between two central operational challenges for

almost any matching platform: on the one hand, new users are continuously

arriving, and the platform’s goal is to learn the attributes of these users quickly

enough to ensure satisfactory matches. On the other hand, learning these

attributes typically requires experimenting with matches and observing the

outcomes, which is difficult since the supply of entities to be matched to is

limited. In this paper we address the correct balance between these activities in

such two-sided matching platforms, in the presence of supply constraints.

TA36

205B-MCC

Operations and Supply Chains for Innovative Goods

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Supply Chain

Sponsored Session

Chair: Robert Swinney, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States,

robert.swinney@duke.edu

1 - Promoting Innovative Technology In Developing Countries

Through Solution-based Contracts

Guangrui Ma, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China,

magr@connect.ust.hk

, Ying-Ju Chen, Hau Leung Lee

Limited knowledge and lack of proper skills make potential users reluctant to

purchase innovative technology, e.g., drip irrigation systems, even though it can

improve yields incredibly. We show that through solution-based service, firms can

help farmers, especially in developing countries, overcome the above knowledge

barrier of using the technology, thus leading to higher market adoption and

profitability. Besides, a yield-based payment structure can facilitate efficient

financial cost saving when farmers face financial constraint, and hence

incentivises farmers’ adoption further more.

2 - Designing Supply Chains For Substitutable Digital And

Physical Goods

Zhenhuan Lei, Duke University,

zhenhuan.lei@duke.edu,

Robert Swinney

We consider a firm selling two partially substitutable goods, one digital and one

physical, e.g., a downloadable and DVD version of the same movie. The physical

good is characterized by non-zero marginal production cost, positive production

leadtime, and, potentially, a mismatch between supply and demand. The digital

good is characterized by zero marginal cost and no inventory constraints. We

consider how market and product characteristics drive the firm to price each

product, determine inventory, choose a selling strategy involving one or both

goods, and design its supply chain.

3 - Dynamic Stimulus In Crowdfunding

Longyuan Du, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada,

Longyuan.Du14@rotman.utoronto.ca,

Ming Hu, Jiahua Wu

We study the dynamics of online crowdfunding in which a campaign would fail

unless a predetermined funding goal is achieved within a given duration. We

demonstrate empirically using KickStarter data the significant benefit of

dynamically offering stimulus. Motivated by the empirical results, we build a

theoretical model to analyze several policies, such as seeding, feature upgrade and

promotional discount, and provide the optimal timing of stimulus offerings

depending on time- and pledge-to-go. We then illustrate the stimulus policies’

benefits using failed projects from Kickstarter.

4 - Food Wastage In Commercial Kitchens

Varun Karamshetty, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, 77300, France,

varun.karamshetty@insead.edu,

Elena Belavina, Karan Girotra

Kitchens are wasting as much on food waste as they make in profits. With an

estimated $1 trillion in food being wasted every year, food waste is not only a

huge economic loss, but also has a major impact on our environment accounting

for nearly 15% of global GHG emissions. We analyze proprietary data to

understand key drivers of food wastage in commercial kitchens. We identify the

controllable factors, and quantify the impact of each of them. We then propose

changes in their operations that minimize wastage while maintaining their service

quality and bottom-line.

TA37

205C-MCC

Sustainability Issues in Supply Chains I

Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt, Sustainable

Operations

Sponsored Session

Chair: Saed Alizamir, Yale University, 165 Whitney Ave,

New Haven, CT, 06511, United States,

saed.alizamir@yale.edu

1 - Should Brands Tighten Certification Standards

Li Chen, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States,

li.chen@cornell.edu,

Shiqing Yao, Kaijie Zhu

Global brands are increasingly relying on third-party certification to screen out

low-quality suppliers. However, an unethical certifier may collude with a low-

quality supplier to produce a false certification. In this study, we investigate the

buyer’s equilibrium strategy in setting certification standard under the risk of

supplier-certifier collusion.

2 - Can Brands Claim Ignorance? Unauthorized Subcontracting In

Apparel Supply Chains

Anna Saez de Tejada Cuenca, PhD Student, UCLA Anderson

School of Management, Los Angeles, CA, United States,

anna.sdtc.1@anderson.ucla.edu

, Felipe Caro

The collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh brought into focus the poor

safety conditions faced by many workers in the apparel industry. A common way

in which safety and environmental standards are violated is through

unauthorized subcontracting. We analyze empirically some factors that can lead

suppliers to outsource their production to third parties without their retailers’

knowledge. We use data provided by a supply chain manager that consists of over

30,000 orders, including 36% of subcontracted ones. Our results provide

managerial insights to retailers on what factory and order characteristics increase

the probability of unauthorized subcontracting, and how it can be prevented.

3 - Optimal Production Planing In Agricultural Supply Chains

Utku Serhatli, PhD Student, INSEAD, Constance de le Boulevard,

Fontainebleau, 77590, France,

utku.serhatli@insead.edu

,

Enver Yucesan, Andre Du Pin Calmon

We model the production decisions of a corn seed manufacturer who faces supply

and demand uncertainties, product returns, and quality problems over a finite

horizon. More specifically, we build an N-period model to capture the inherent

complexities and solve the two-period scenario where we prove the optimality of

a base stock policy and show the impact of operational agility on profit. We also

investigate the impact of yield variability and return rates on the optimal

production quantities. We complement our theory using numerical results with

data from a major European agro-chemical company.

4 - Managing A Responsible Supply Chain Under Threat Of Public

Disclosure

Saed Alizamir, Yale University,

saed.alizamir@yale.edu

, Sang Kim

We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a downstream supply chain

member (“buyer”) is penalized disproportionately due to a compliance violation

by an upstream member (“supplier”). Buyer’s ability to audit the supplier is

limited, and she faces a risk of being publicly blamed after the supplier’s violation

is caught by a third party. Supplier exerts effort to enhance compliance in each

period, but risks having his relationship terminated due to a stochastic compliance

outcome.

TA37