2016 INFORMS Annual Meeting Program

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INFORMS Nashville – 2016
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SA25
2 - Modeling Health Insurance Marketplaces
Zhaowei She, Georgia Institute of Technology,
As part of the Affordable Care Act, Health Insurance Marketplaces (HIX) has
significantly reduced the number of uninsured in the United States. However,
concerns exist about quality and accessibility of services in HIX. Motivated by
these concerns, we propose a theoretical framework to understand the current
state of HIX, and make projections about its future and sustainability. Our analysis
shows that the current design of HIX may unintentionally incentivize health plans
to ration services to attract low risk enrollees, leading to adverse selection and
narrow-network phenomena in HIX. Moreover, HIX’s limitations in addressing
upcoding behavior can lead to an unraveling of the market.
3 - Balancing Functional And Technical Quality In Health Services
Under Provider Consolidation And Shifts In Payment Structure
Aaron H Ratcliffe, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
438 Bryan Building, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
Greensboro, NC, 27402-6165, United States,
Ann Marucheck, Wendell G Gilland
We develop a competitive queueing model to study how health service providers
balance investments in functional quality (experiential elements of service)
against investments in technical service quality (positive service outcomes). Our
analytical derivations measure the impact of provider consolidation and
alternative payment structures on the equilibrium technical quality and
functional quality efforts and equilibrium wait times for health service.
SA24
109-MCC
Dynamics of Scope and Innovation
Invited: Strategy Science
Invited Session
Chair: Brian Wu, University of Michigan, Tappan Street, Ann Arbor,
MI, 48109, United States,
1 - Adaptation On Multiple Landscapes: Relatedness, Complexity
And Dynamic Coordination Costs
Aseem Kaul, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN,
United States, Mo Chen, Xun Wu
We introduce and explore the concept of dynamic coordination costs, i.e. the
reduction in a diversified firm’s ability to adapt within its businesses resulting
from the coordination of activities across them. Using a modified NK simulation,
we show that a combination of rigidity and learning means that these costs are
highest at moderate levels of relatedness across business, with the level of
interdependency within businesses moderating this effect. We also show that
diversifying entrants in new markets experience a short-term learning advantage,
but a long-term rigidity disadvantage. Our study speaks to work on organizational
adaptation and strategic renewal in multi-business firms.
2 - Innovation In Ecosystems
Gwendolyn K Lee, University of Florida, 2822 SW 94th Drive,
Gainesville, FL, 32608, United States,
Martin Ganco, Rahul Kapoor
We consider the context for innovation to comprise of interdependent industries
within an ecosystem. Using a simulation model, we explore how the structure of
interdependencies shapes the pattern of innovation across industries. The notion
is that an industry’s close proximity to end-use provides firms with a larger pool
of components to combine but also more complex objective function to solve. A
larger pool presents more choices and covers a wider variety of choices. However,
certain architectural configurations impose heavy constraints on downstream
firms. We show innovation outcomes depend on the architecture of
interdependencies across and within the different industries in an ecosystem.
3 - Effect Of Competitor Investments On Established Firms’
Redeployment Entry Into Nascent Markets: Evidence From The
U.S. Electric Utilities’ Adoption Of Solar Energy
Shaohua Lu, Tulane University, Freeman School of Business,
New Orleans, LA, 70118, United States,
Jay Anand
This paper examines the effect of competitor investments on established firms’
entry into an emerging, uncertain market. To understand information effect, we
shift attention to the “flow” of recent competitor investments rather than
analyzing the “stock” of cumulative investments. We further postulate that this
information effect interacts with a competition effect in oligopolistic market
competition. We construct formal models and predict a U-shaped relationship. We
further examine how competitor similarity and existing capacity affect this U-
shaped relationship. Using data on investor-owned utilities’ entry into the solar
market, we find supporting evidence for our predictions.
4 - Stock Market Undervaluation Of Resource Redeployability
Arkadiy Sakhartov, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of
Business, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA, 19104,
United States,
The study uses three steps to establish the applicability of the strategic factor
market theory to acquisitions of firms in stock markets. First, the study reviews
literature on resource valuation and finds a likely source of the undervaluation,
ambiguity about redeployability of resources to a new business. Second, the study
compiles a case of Apple Inc., revealing a prolonged undervaluation of
redeployability of the firm’s resources to the smartphone business. Third, the
study builds a valuation model deriving the undervaluation as a function of
observable resource properties.
SA25
110A-MCC
Capacity Allocation and Scheduling Issues
Invited: Project Management and Scheduling
Invited Session
Chair: Zhixin Liu, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 19000 Hubbard
Dr, Dearborn, MI, 48126, United States,
1 - Coordination Mechanisms For Several Scheduling
Game Problems
Guo-Qiang Fan, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an,
China, Jun-Qiang Wang
We consider two scheduling problems in the non-cooperative game setting. Each
job is owned by a selfish agent whose strategy is to minimize its completion time.
(P1) For the scheduling game problem Q||max wjCj, we design the Greatest-
Weight-First Coordination Mechanism and show that the price of anarchy is
equal to 2-1/m for identical parallel machines and is not greater than 1+(m-
1)smax/ms for uniform parallel machines. (P2) For the scheduling game problem
Q|p-batch,b<n|Cmax, we design the FBLPT coordination mechanism and show
that the price of anarchy is not greater than 2-2/(3b)-1/(3max{m,b}) for identical
parallel-batching machines and 1+smax(1-1/max(m,b)) for uniform parallel
machines.
2 - Disruption Recovery For Berth Allocation
Li Chen, Assistant Professor, Tianjin University, College of
Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China,
Xiangtong Qi
A major disruption to a container terminal may cause a substantial delay to the
vessels waiting for services. When the terminal makes the berth allocation
decision after the hit of a major disruption, the possibility of missing container
transshipment becomes a new issue that does not exist in conventional berth
allocation models. We study the berth allocation problem under such a scenario
to balance the operational efficiency of the terminal and lose of misconnected
containers.
3 - Fixed Factor Allocation For Capacity Allocation With
Demand Competition
Zhixin Liu, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI,
United States, Jianbin Li, Xueyuan Cai
We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and two retailers. The supplier
sells a single product to the retailers, who in turn retail the product to customers.
The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers compete for the
supplier’s capacity and are duopolists engaged in Cournot competition for their
customers. We propose a new capacity allocation rule, fixed factor allocation,
which incorporates the ideas of proportional and lexicographic allocations: it
prioritizes retailers as in lexicographic allocation, but guarantees only a fixed
proportion of the total available capacity to the prioritized retailer. We show
desirable properties of the fixed factor allocation.